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In this dissertation, I reexamine the zombie argument developed by 
philosopher David Chalmers. The zombies argument claims that qualia, 
phenomenal qualities of our conscious experience do not supervene on 
physical facts. Since it is widely admitted that physicalism entails mind-body 
supervenience, the possibility of zombies refutes all possible forms of 
physicalism. Because of its huge implication, the zombie argument has 
provoked intense debates about the nature of consciousness and physicalism. 
In the zombie argument, a number of thorny issues concerning semantics, 
metaphysics, and epistemology are entangled. I will critically examine central 
notions and premises of the zombie argument and investigate related issues.  
This dissertation is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 deals with the 
notion of conceivability deployed in the zombie argument. The notion of 
conceivability supposed by the zombie argument is problematic. Especially, 
the notion of ideal conceivability turns out to be problematic. It is doubtable 
that possible formulations of ideal conceivability work well. The positive 
conceivability is also questionable. It is too intuition-sensitive and requires a 
complete theory of qualia, which is not given yet. If the notion of 
conceivability is problematic, the zombie argument may not be able to get 
off the ground.
Chapter 2 covers my reductio argument against the first premise of the 
zombie argument, the ideal positive primary conceivability of zombies. The 
consequence of the conceivability of zombies is a disjunction of qualia 
epiphenomenalism, Russellian monism, and interactionist dualism. In order to 
show that all of the disjuncts are wrong, I argue for the thesis of cognitive 
intimacy of qualia. Cognitive intimacy is a priori true, so that cognitively 
alienated qualia are negatively inconceivable. However, all of the disjuncts 
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commit to a negative conceivability of cognitively alienated qualia. By 
reductio, zombies are not ideally positively primarily conceivable. 
In Chapter 3, the second premise of the zombie argument is examined. 
The second premise is an application of a principle that ideal positive 
primary conceivability entails primary possibility(CP+). Arguing against CP+, 
some philosophers have attempted to parody the zombie argument. These 
anti-zombie arguments, however, have their own problems. The Russellian 
illuminati argument, which is my own version of the anti-zombie argument, 
avoids such problems. If the argument is sound, ideal positive primary 
conceivability cannot be a guide to primary possibility. Thus, even if 
zombies are ideally positively primarily conceivable, there is no guarantee 
that they are primarily possible.
Chapter 4 concerns another physicalist response against the zombie 
argument, the Phenomenal Concept Strategy(PCS). Relying on PCS, 
physicalists can avoid the conclusion of the zombie argument while 
accepting its central premises. According to Chalmers’ master argument, 
however, as far as phenomenal concepts are physically explicable, they 
cannot explain our epistemic situation. Against the master argument, I argue 
that PCS can maintain its explanatory potential, insofar as our epistemic 
situation should be characterized in topic-neutral terms. Thus, the master 
argument fails and even faces its own dilemma. 
If my arguments in this dissertation are successful, they will lead to a 
fourfold argument against the zombie argument: 1) the zombie argument is 
based on the problematic notion of conceivability. 2) Even if the notion of 
conceivability is accepted, the first premise of the zombie argument, the 
conceivability of zombies, is wrong. 3) Even if the first premise of the 
zombie argument is right, the second premise is wrong. 4) Even if the 
second premise is right, it does not guarantee that zombies are 
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metaphysically possible. Therefore, the zombie argument fails.
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David Chalmers, the zombie argument
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Introduction
The purpose of this dissertation is to reexamine the zombie argument 
developed by philosopher David Chalmers. The argument is known as the 
conceivability argument against physicalism: it starts by claiming that 
zombies i.e. creatures that are physically identical to us but lack our 
phenomenal feelings, or qualia, of experience are conceivable. From 
zombies’ conceivability, Chalmers draws their possibility. If zombies are 
possible, qualia do not supervene on physical facts. Since it is widely 
admitted that physicalism entails mind-body supervenience, the possibility of 
zombies refutes all possible forms of physicalism. Because of this huge 
implication, the zombie argument has provoked intense debates about the 
nature of consciousness and physicalism. Indeed, since it was first presented, 
the zombie argument never stops being controversial. A number of thorny 
issues concerning semantics, metaphysics, and epistemology are entangled in 
the zombie argument. In this dissertation, I will critically examine central 
notions and premises of the zombie argument and investigate related issues.  
This dissertation is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 deals with the 
notion of conceivability deployed in the zombie argument. The notion of 
conceivability supposed by the zombie argument is problematic. About the 
conceivability of zombies, Chalmers provides several distinctions: prima 
facie/ideal, positive/negative, and primary/secondary conceivability. The ideal 
conceivability of zombies turns out to be problematic, since possible 
formulations of ideal conceivability only work under the assumption of the 
ideal reasoner but we are not the ideal reasoner. The positive conceivability 
of zombies is also questionable. It is too intuition-sensitive and requires a 
complete theory of qualia, which is not given yet. If the notion of 
conceivability is problematic, the zombie argument may not be able to get 
off the ground.
2
Chapter 2 covers my reductio argument against the first premise of the 
zombie argument, the ideal positive primary conceivability of zombies. The 
consequence of the conceivability of zombies is a disjunction of qualia 
epiphenomenalism, Russellian monism, and interactionist dualism. In order to 
show that all of the disjuncts are wrong, I argue for a thesis of cognitive 
intimacy of qualia: phenomena qualities of conscious experience must be at 
least potentially attended to or noticed by subjects of experience under 
non-defective backgrounds. Cognitive intimacy is a priori true, so that 
cognitively not intimate, alienated qualia are negatively inconceivable. 
However, all of the disjuncts commit to a negative conceivability of 
cognitively alienated qualia. By reductio, zombies are not ideally positively 
primarily conceivable. If this reductio works, even if the notion of ideal 
positive primary conceivability is well-defended, the first premise of the 
zombie argument is false. 
In Chapter 3, the second premise of the zombie argument is examined. 
The second premise is an application of a principle that ideal positive 
primary conceivability entails primary possibility(CP+). Arguing against CP+, 
some philosophers have attempted to parody the zombie argument. These 
anti-zombie arguments, however, have their own problems. The Russellian 
illuminati argument, which is my own version of the anti-zombie argument, 
avoids such problems. Since the Russellian illuminati argument supposes 
CP+ and draws a contradictory conclusion, it would be a reductio argument 
against CP+. If the argument is sound, ideal positive primary conceivability 
cannot be a guide to primary possibility. Thus, even if zombies are ideally 
positively primarily conceivable, there is no guarantee that they are primarily 
possible. Even if the first premise of the zombie argument is true, the 
second premise is false.     
Chapter 4 concerns another physicalist response against the zombie 
argument, the Phenomenal Concept Strategy(PCS). Appealing to special 
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nature of phenomenal concepts, some philosophers have tried to explain 
away our problematic epistemic situation with regard to consciousness, 
including the explanatory gap and the conceivability of zombies. Relying on 
PCS, physicalists can avoid the conclusion of the zombie argument while 
accepting its central premises. According to Chalmers’ master argument, 
however, as far as phenomenal concepts are physically explicable, they 
cannot explain our epistemic situation. But PCS can maintain its explanatory 
potential, insofar as our epistemic situation should be characterized in 
topic-neutral terms. No matter how the topic-neutrality is interpreted, PCS 
can explain our epistemic situation regarding consciousness. Thus, the master 
argument fails and even faces its own dilemma. PCS is still a viable option 
for physicalists. That is, even if the first and second premise of the zombie 
argument is right, there is ‘the third way’ for physicalists to reject the 
zombie argument. 
If my arguments in this dissertation are successful, all the works in those 
chapters will lead to a fourfold argument against the zombie argument: 1) 
the zombie argument is based on the problematic notion of conceivability. 2) 
Even if the notion of conceivability is accepted, the first premise of the 
zombie argument, the conceivability of zombies, is wrong. 3) Even if the 
first premise of the zombie argument is right, the second premise is wrong. 
4) Even if the second premise is right, it does not guarantee that zombies 




The Zombie Argument and Conceivability
1.1 Chapter Introduction
In this chapter, first, I shall introduce the zombie argument and present its 
implications. The argument argues that so-called phenomenal qualities of 
conscious experience, or qualia, do not supervene on the physical.1) Indeed, 
the debate about the zombie argument may be one of the fiercest battles in 
the recent history of philosophy of mind. As the debate went on, the initial 
version has been updated over and over. Further, as the zombie argument 
evolved, the notion of conceivability has also been articulated. Thus, in this 
chapter, I will clarify what the zombie argument is first. (Section 1.2) Some 
of the conceivabilities Chalmers suggests are critically examined. (Section 
1.3) It will be shown that the notion of conceivability faces a number of 
problems 
1.2 The Real Zombie Argument 
Originally, the zombie argument was not that complicated.2) It took 
1) Throughout this dissertation, I will loosely use expressions ‘phenomenal qualities 
of conscious experience’, ‘qualia’, ‘phenomenal properties’, ‘phenomenal characters’, 
and ‘phenomenal states’ interchangeably. The terms such as ‘phenomenal 
consciousness’, ‘consciousness’, and ‘experience’ are roughly mean the same thing, 
phenomenal quality of conscious experience.
2) Chalmers himself summarizes his original version as follows:
(O1) P&~Q is conceivable.
(O2) If P&~Q is conceivable, P&~Q is metaphysically possible.
(O3) If P&~Q is metaphysically possible, materialism is false.
_______________________
(O4) Materialism is false. (Chalmers, 2010, p. 142)
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the most straightforward form of the conceivability argument against 
materialism. Through almost two decades of debates, nonetheless, it has 
been articulated over and over. The refined version of the zombie argument 
can be formalized as follows:  
(N1) PTI&~Q is ideally positively primarily conceivable
(N2) If PTI&~Q is ideally positively primarily conceivable, then PTI&~Q is 
primarily possible
(N3) If PTI&~Q is primarily possible, then PTI&~Q is secondarily possible, 
or Russellian monism is true.
(N4) If PTI&~Q is secondarily possible, materialism is false.
P represents a conjunction of all microphysical truths about our world. It specifies 
the fundamental microphysical properties, entities, and laws in the language of 
microphysics. Q represents an arbitrary phenomenal truth, a truth that a certain 
individual or organism instantiates a certain phenomenal property. Thus, P&~Q is 
the statement that everything is microphysically the same as in our world, but 
someone or something lacks a certain phenomenal property. Here, the individual or 
organism who shares everything physical with us but lacks the phenomenal property 
is the zombie twin of us, and the world satisfied P&~Q can be considered as the 
zombie world. I will call the original version of the zombie argument the old 
zombie argument. 
There are several features of the old zombie argument. First, the original zombie 
argument is grounded on the conceivability simpliciter. P&~Q is argued as merely 
conceivable, and this conceivability is not articulated at all. Further, the argument 
directly draws the metaphysical possibility from the conceivability. Most of all, the 
old zombie argument is not two-dimensional yet: the background semantic of the 
zombie argument, epistemic two-dimensionalism, does not directly constitute the old 
zombie argument. While the defense of the old zombie argument Kripkean cases of 
a posteriori necessity is two-dimensional (Chalmers, 1996, p. 131-134), the argument 
itself does not involve two-dimensionalism. 
Of course, the essential steps are Premise (O1) and (O2), but both are 
controversial: is P&~Q really conceivable? What is conceivability? Does the 
conceivability simpliciter of the zombie world entail the possibility of the zombie 
world? I think these questions motivated Chalmers to update the old zombie 
argument. To address the questions, he had to articulate the notions of 
conceivability and modality deployed in the old zombie argument.
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_______________________
(N5) Materialism is false, or Russellian monism is true. (Chalmers, 2010, p. 
161)
P and Q represent the same thing in the old zombie argument. T is a 
statement which precludes extra, non-physical properties. A world with 
ectoplasm or entelechy may satisfy P&~Q. To prevent possible 
complications, one can conjoin P with a “that’s-all” statement T. Therefore, 
PT states that P holds and no non-physical, alien truths hold. P can be 
replaced with PT. I represents the conjunction of all indexical truths, truths 
about I, here, and now. Indexical truths should supplement PT in the old 
zombie argument, because the microphysical truths are conceptually distinct 
from indexical truths. For instance, even though the Laplacian demon has 
complete microphysical knowledge, it may lack indexical knowledge, such as 
the knowledge that here is Seoul. If so, it is conceivable that all of those 
objective truths hold but that here is not Seoul. However, the fact that here 
is Seoul is not metaphysically distinct from all the microphysical facts about 
the world. Thus, such conceivability cannot defeat materialism. If Q 
functions like an indexical truth, then the conceivability of zombies cannot 
refute materialism. To fix this loophole, I should be conjoined with PT. Let 
us call the refined version of the zombie argument the new zombie 
argument. 
The new zombie argument seems valid, and its conclusion is impressive. 
The conclusion of the argument is a disjunction: materialism is false or 
Russellian monism is true. I shall fully explicate what Russellian monism is 
and how it works in the new zombie argument in Section 2.5 and 3.2. 
Compared to the old zombie argument, there are several significant 
differences in the new zombie argument. First, the new zombie argument is 
based on the sophisticated notion of conceivability. The conceivability is 
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specified as ideal, positive, and primary. What this ideal positive primary 
conceivability is will be exhaustively analyzed in following sections. 
Secondly, it does not directly draw the metaphysical possibility from the 
conceivability. Premise (N2) connects the conceivability of PTI&~Q with the 
primary possibility of PTI&~Q. Here, the possibility is primary, not 
metaphysical. The distinction between primary and secondary modality and 
its relevance to epistemic two-dimensionalism will be explained in the next 
section. Most importantly, the new zombie argument is in itself 
two-dimensional. Premise (N2) can be understood only in the 
two-dimensional framework. And Premise (N3) concerns the idea that 
primary and secondary intensions of P, T, I, and Q coincide. For epistemic 
two-dimensionalism is constitutive of the new zombie argument, it deserves 
to be called not only as the conceivability argument but also the 
two-dimensional argument against materialism. Last, the conclusion of the 
new zombie argument is weaker than that of the old one. It argues that 
materialism is false or Russellian monism is true.  
As the zombie argument has been updated, it loses its initial simplicity 
and involves many complications. There is no conceivability simpliciter. One 
must single out the ideal, positive, primary conceivability. Also, in 
distinguishing two sorts of possibility and stepping from the primary 
possibility to the secondary possibility, one must understand the 
two-dimensional framework. Furthermore, Russellian monism is deeply 
involved in the new zombie argument. The force of the new zombie 
argument comes from these complicated matters. Therefore, in critically 
examining the new zombie argument, one must consider those related issues 
carefully.3) 
The crucial point is that the new zombie argument is the official version 
3) However, in Chapter 3, we will see that many philosophers have failed to argue 
against the new zombie argument because they neglected those details and 
complications.
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of the zombie argument. As far as I know, after providing the new zombie 
argument, Chalmers does not provide any updated version. It seems that he 
thinks he fully articulated the zombie argument against materialism. “This 
completes the exposition of the two-dimensional argument against 
materialism.” (Chalmers, 2010, p. 154) Indeed, the argument is already 
complicated enough. Recently, Chalmers turns his attention and focuses on 
related matters, such as Russellian monism. Thus, the new zombie argument 
should be taken as the final, genuine the two-dimensional conceivability 
argument. Criticizing the old zombie argument does not work, for there is 
more developed, sophisticated version of the zombie argument. So in this 
dissertation, I will only deal with the new zombie argument. From now on, 
‘the zombie argument’ refers to the new zombie argument.
1.3 The Characters of Conceivability 
Despite the crucial role of conceivability, somewhat ironically, debates 
concerning the zombie argument tend to avoid the issue of conceivability. 
As far as I can tell, the nature of conceivability in the zombie argument is 
poorly understood. However, this issue of conceivability is crucial to 
understand my arguments in the following chapters. Fortunately, 
Chalmers(2002) has provided a comprehensive and instructive work on 
conceivability. His distinctions are quite articulated and deserve a careful 
look. Furthermore, Chalmers picks out a specific kind of conceivability as a 
genuine guide to possibility. In this section, I shall analyze his various 
notions of conceivability and their problems in turn.  
1.3.1 Prima facie VS Ideal Conceivability
According to Chalmers, conceivability can be divided into prima facie 
conceivability and ideal conceivability. A statement “S is prima facie 
conceivable for a subject when S is conceivable for that subject on the first 
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appearance.” In other words, “after some consideration, the subject finds that 
S passes the tests that are criteria for conceivability.” (Chalmers, 2002, p. 
147) To be prima facie conceivable, S does not need to be under any kind 
of tests or a deeper consideration. All that required is mere seeming of 
conceivability. This idea of prima facie conceivability is so mundane that it 
carries almost no weight in philosophical debates.  
The real issue is ideal conceivability. “S is ideally conceivable when S is 
conceivable on ideal rational reflection.” (Chalmers, 2002, p. 147, italics 
added) The problem of this formulation is, as Chalmers states, it is hard to 
see if such an ideal reasoner is possible at all. (ibid., p. 148) It might be 
the case that for every possible reasoner there is a smarter possible 
reasoner. Chalmers thus suggests another definition, invoking undefeatability 
by better reasoning: “S is ideally conceivable when there is a possible 
subject for whom S is prima facie conceivable, with justification that is 
undefeatable by better reasoning.” (ibid., p. 148) To ideally conceive of a 
statement, one should have undefeatable justification. Chalmers leaves 
undefeatability and reasoning as primitive notions. (ibid., p. 148) This is 
understandable since it seems unlikely that anybody can give a full, 
substantive analysis of such notions.4) 
There are several loopholes in this alternative formulation. Even if the 
notion of an ideal reasoner is not problematic and the initial formulation of 
ideal conceivability is restored, we cannot know whether many significant 
but controversial statements are ideally conceivable, for we are not ideal 
reasoner. This would seriously limit the use of ideal conceivability as a 
reliable guide to possibility.
4) In this respect, ideal conceivability is similar to knowledge. Without an 
exhaustive analysis of the concept of justification and truth, we can handle many 
cases concerning knowledge. Although both ideal conceivability knowledge lack 
complete, explicit analysis of defining notions, we can do many philosophical works 
about them.             
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The first problem is that even though ‘conceivable on ideal reflection’ is 
substituted by ‘undefeatable by better reasoning,’ I see no benefit of such 
substitution. The alternative formulation appears no better than the initial 
one. Since it exorcises the notion of an ideal reasoner, the alternative 
formulation might get around the possible regress of more sophisticated 
reasoners. However, even though there cannot be any regress of more 
sophisticated reasoners, there can be a possible regress of more undefeatable 
justifications. That is, as how sophisticated a reasoner is comes in degree, 
how undefeatable a justification seems to be a matter of degree. Whatever 
the undefeatability is, one thing is clear: when a justification becomes 
stronger, it becomes more undefeatable. The crucial point is that as there is 
no limit of more sophisticated reasoners, there is no limit of stronger 
justifications. The strength of justification is a function of many different 
factors. For instance, more evidence makes a belief more strongly justified. 
How belief is formed or acquired also affects the strength of justification. 
The better a way of forming belief gets, the stronger a justification 
becomes. For any given evidence, there can be further evidence. To a way 
of forming a belief, we can say the same thing. For any mean of belief 
formation, there can be a better mean of belief formation. If this is the 
case, there can be an infinite regress of stronger justifications. And such 
regress would yield an infinite regress of more undefeatable justifications, 
which is no better than the infinite regress of the more sophisticated 
reasoners.   
Even if one retreats to the initial formulation, there is another problem. 
According to the initial formulation, in order to know whether a statement S 
is ideally conceivable, one must know whether S is conceivable on ideal 
rational reflection. The problem of this requirement is clear: since we are 
not ideal reasoners, we generally do not, or cannot, know whether S is 
ideally conceivable. In answering a similar objection, Chalmers argues 
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I think that there is little reason to accept this claim. Although we are 
non-ideal, we can know that it is not ideally conceivable that 0=1 and that 
it is ideally conceivable that someone exists. We know that certain things 
about the world (say, that all philosophers are philosophers) are knowable 
a priori and that certain things about the world (say, that there is a table 
in this room) are not so knowable even by an ideal reasoner (Chalmers, 
2010, p. 155). 
This reply misses the point. The question is not that is there any statement 
that can be known to us as ideally conceivable. The question is that how 
can we know whether S is conceivable on ideal rational reflection, though 
we are non-ideal. Merely mentioning examples of the ideally conceivable 
cases cannot be the answer. The issue is explaining how they are known to 
non-ideal reasoners like us. 
Further, I think there is a plausible explanation for the mentioned cases. 
Consider the following conditional: if S is easily provable as conceivable or 
inconceivable on non-ideal rational reflection, S is conceivable or 
inconceivable on ideal rational reflection. Though I think this conditional is 
almost an a priori truth, whether it is a priori or not does not matter in 
the current context. Once we accept the conditional, all the cases Chalmers 
mentions can be explained. We can know ‘someone exists’ is ideally 
conceivable even though we are not ideal-reasoners, for ‘someone exists’ is 
easily provable by forming perceptual images of a situation where someone 
exists. How can we know that ‘1=0’ is inconceivable even on ideal rational 
reflection? Because we can know that ‘1=0’ is easily provable as 
inconceivable on non-ideal rational reflection. ‘1=0’ is easily provable as 
contradictory, and we know that a contradictory statement is inconceivable 
even under ideal reflection. If we replace ‘conceivable/inconceivable’ with 
‘knowable/unknowable a priori’, other examples can be explained in the 
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same way. Chalmers’ examples do not show that non-ideal reasoners can 
know that S is ideally conceivable or inconceivable. Rather, they suggest 
that the conditional in question may be true at best.     
Even if the conditional is correct, it tells us nothing about how non-ideal 
reasoners can know whether some statements are ideally conceivable or 
inconceivable, if they are not easily provable as conceivable or 
inconceivable. There is a lot of such statements in philosophy. For instance, 
can a Spinozan statement ‘God necessarily exists’ be easily proven as 
conceivable? How can we easily prove whether ‘there are some coincident 
objects’ is conceivable or not? What about statements arguing for junky or 
gunky worlds? Are statements of radical skepticism easily provable as 
inconceivable? Finally, is □PTI⊃Q (physicalism) or PTI&~Q (the zombie 
world) easily provable as conceivable? The conditional mentioned above 
only applies to easy, simple, or trivial statements. It cannot be applied to 
many sophisticated, complicated, and substantial statements in philosophy. 
Whether a certain philosophically substantial statement is easily provable as 
conceivable or not is always controversial. In such cases, we cannot know 
whether such statements are ideally conceivable or not. 
I am not saying that we cannot conduct any idealized thought experiment. 
What I am saying is that such idealized thought experiment works only in 
some cases. Imagining what would be possible for an ideal reasoner was a 
popular tool for intellectual investigation. Theologians asked what God 
would know, and physicists wondered what the Laplacean demon would 
know. In such cases, idealized thought experiments usually yield strongly 
intuitive conclusions. This success nonetheless cannot be generalized to all 
thorny issues in philosophy. Asking what if our cognitive limitations were 
removed is not a silver bullet for complicated philosophical debates about 
conceivability. For instance, can the Laplacean demon conceive a world 
where metaphysical nihilism is the case? Can God conceive of his or her 
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absence? Can an omniscient scientist with complete physical knowledge 
imagine the zombie world? It is clear that answers to these questions would 
diverge according to one’s metaphysical, epistemological, or even ideological 
stance. Then, what matters is not an idealized thought experiment itself. 
Further arguments for conceivability or inconceivability would be needed. 
Merely conducting idealized thought experiments would not settle the issue 
of ideal conceivability. Unless such arguments are given, one would not be 
able to know whether a certain statement is ideally conceivable or not. In 
short, at least in some difficult cases, one cannot know what is ideally 
conceivable by merely conducting such-and-such idealized thought 
experiments
For those who want to use ideal conceivability as a reliable guide to 
possibility, this would be bad news. They will hold that ideal conceivability 
entails possibility. Based on this entailment, they may attempt to argue that 
a certain philosophical statement is possible because it is ideally conceivable. 
However, in order to argue that the statement is ideally conceivable, they 
must explain how they can know that it is conceivable on ideal rational 
reflection, even though they are non-ideal reasoner. All in all, no matter 
how the notion of ideal conceivability is formulated, it faces several 
problems. 
1.3.2 Positive VS Negative Conceivability 
According to Chalmers, there can be negative and positive notions of 
conceivability. Negative conceivability is simple. It can be defined relative to 
knowledge or beliefs. Chalmers’ definition is that “S is negatively 
conceivable when S is not ruled out a priori, or there is no (apparent) 
contradiction in S.” (Chalmers, 2002, p. 149) For Chalmers, negative 
conceivability is purely a priori matter: to claim a statement is negatively 
conceivable, one should find apparent contradiction in that statement by a 
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priori process.
The disturbing kind of conceivability is positive conceivability. Chalmers 
claims that in order to positively conceive S, one must be able to “form 
some sort of positive conception of a situation in which S is the case.” 
(Chalmers, 2002, p. 150, emphasis mine) In articulating the notion of 
positive conception, imagination plays a central role. Chalmers says “to 
positively conceive of a situation is imagine (in some sense) a specific 
configuration of properties and objects.” (ibid., 150) Imagining a situation 
usually requires fine-grained details. Also, a sort of interpretation and 
reasoning is accompanied. Through these interpretative and reasoning 
processes, one can find out that the imagined situation is where S is the 
case. Then, one can say that the imagined situation verifies S. If the 
imagined situation turns out to verifies S by interpretation or reasoning of a 
subject, the subject can be said to imagine that S. (Chalmers, 2002) In 
forming a positive conception of a situation, two different processes are 
intertwined: One is psychological process of imagining a specific 
configuration of properties and object. Another is rational process of 
interpreting or reasoning the imagined configuration. If one can form a 
positive conception of a situation that verifies S, we can say that one can 
positively conceive S. 
Varieties of positive conceivability can be provided by classifying various 
notions of imagination. (Chalmers, 2002, p. 150-151) Chalmers divides 
imaginations into two kinds. The first imagination we can easily come up 
with is perceptual imagination. Subjects can make a perceptual image that 
represents S as being the case. When a perceptual image relevantly 
resembles a perceptual experience which represents that S is the case, the 
image represents S as being the case. Chalmers argues that one should not 
confuse perceptual imagining that S with merely supposing that S, or with 
entertaining the proposition that S. When a subject perceptually imagines 
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that S, the attitude she takes is not only toward an abstract entity such as 
proposition but also toward a specific situation, which is in a verifying 
relationship with S. Reasoning about that situation, one takes it to be the 
one that verifies S. The situation represented by the perceptual image can 
be considered as an “intermediate mental object” that mediates the subject 
and S. (ibid., p. 150) When a subject perceptually imagines that S, the 
subject must form a mental object, which is a perceptual image, that verifies 
S. Following Yablo, Chalmers calls this special property “mediated objectual 
character.” (Yablo, 1993) 
The second sort of imagination is modal imagination, which is not 
grounded by perceptual imagery. (Chalmers, 2002, p. 151) We can clearly 
imagine of situations that go beyond our possible range of perception. For 
example, it seems impossible to make visual images of atoms or Germany’s 
winning the Second World War. Also, many things cannot be perceived in 
principle, such as the invisible, untouchable, auditable, and so on. Moreover, 
several situations which cannot be distinguished by perception in principle 
also can be imagined. Consider a physical situation postulated by two 
theoretically different scientific hypotheses that have the same explanatory 
powers and testable predictions. Though perceptually indistinguishable in 
principle, they are entirely different objects of our imagination. It is clear 
that in these cases we do not or cannot form perceptual images to imagine 
a certain situation. Analogous to perceptual imagination, modal imagination 
also has a mediated objectual character. In order to modally imagining that 
S, one should imagine of a world, or a situation, that verifies S. In this 
case, a situation is a configuration of objects and properties within a world 
or a part of a world. Thus, there seems to be an essential difference in 
‘media’ of imagination of a world or situation. As perceptual imagination is 
mediated by perceptual image, modal imagination is mediated by intuition. 
In perceptual imagination, a subject imagines a certain specific situation by 
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forming perceptual images about the situation. In modal imagination, 
however, intuition takes a somewhat creative role. A situation is imagined 
by having “an intuition of(or as of)” the situation. (ibid., p. 151) For 
instance, when a subject modally imagines that a system of basic particles 
exists, she cannot have a perceptual image of that system. The subject can 
nonetheless have an intuition of a certain configuration of particles. Once 
the subject has an intuition of such situation, by reflection upon the 
situation, she can find out whether the imagined situation of which she has 
an intuition is where a system of basic particles exists.5) Being mediated by 
intuition, or intermediate mental object, modal imagination acquires a 
mediated objectual character as perceptual one does. “This objectual 
character […] is distinctive of positive conceivability.” (ibid., p. 150)
Modal imagination is a combination of psychological and rational 
processes. Both processes, however, are not immune to possible mistakes 
and flaws. One might think that she can imagine something contradictory. 
She might imagine a specific situation in a somewhat sloppy manner, and 
misinterpret the situation as verifying a certain contradictory statement. To 
avoid this kind of errors, Chalmers(2002) introduces the notion of 
coherency. “S is positively conceivable when one can coherently modally 
imagine a situation that verifies S” and “A situation is coherently imagined 
when it is possible to flesh out all arbitrary missing details in the imagined 
situation such that no contradiction reveals itself.” This is the “core notion 
of positive conceivability.” (ibid., p. 153) Coherency involves both processes 
of modal imagination. Psychologically, it must be possible to fill in every 
missing detail the imagined situation that verifies S. Rationally, it must be 
impossible to find any contradiction in that fully detailed situation.
The notion of positive conceivability faces at least three problems. First, 
5) As far as I can tell, “intuition”, “imagined situation”, and “intermediated mental 
object” are different expressions of the same thing.
17
positive conceivability is too sensitive to intuition. It is so dependent upon 
intuition that debates about positive conceivability may collapse into the 
matter of conflicting intuitions. Second, the rational process of coherent 
modal imagination appears to presuppose theory. If so, even when two 
subjects share the same intuition, as their theories involved in the rational 
process may differ, positive conceivability can be underdetermined. What is 
worse is that since we do not have a reliably agreed theory of qualia, the 
positive conceivbility of zombie cannot be determined.
The first problem is that positive conceivability is overly 
intuition-sensitive, as intuition is constitutive of positive conceivability. The 
psychological process is having an intuition of a specific situation and 
adding arbitrary details. This detailed intuition becomes a sort of ‘input’ to 
the rational process. In other words, the function of the psychological 
process is providing an “intermediate mental object” or “imagined situation” 
to be interpreted or reflected by subjects. The problem of this account is 
that intuition can diverge among different subjects. Whatever it is, having an 
intuition of is a sort of psychological process that is deeply rooted in 
subject’s psychology, philosophy, and even ideology. Then, it is obvious that 
there can be disagreements in intuitions. Philosophers always agree to 
disagree in their intuitions, and it is hard to have philosophy-free or 
ideology-free intuitions. Some may have an intuition of a certain situation 
but others may not. In other words, some may have an input to their 
reasoning but others may not. The issue of positive conceivability seems to 
overly depend on intuition. Whether a statement is positively conceivable 
may easily boil down to a conflict among incompatible intuitions.    
This intuition-sensitivity of positive conceivability directly affects the 
debates concerning the zombie argument. To decide whether PTI&~Q is 
positively conceivable, we must have an intuition of a certain situation that 
may or may not verify PTI&~Q first. Without the input of such intuition, 
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we cannot even start our interpretation, reflection, or reasoning. Here, 
difference of intuition comes in. On the one hand, as Hilbert and Bernays 
had a clear intuition of a finite configuration of symbols, some may have 
an intuition of a specific situation that may or may not verify PTI&~Q. On 
the other hand, as Brouwer and I failed to share Hilbert and Benays’ 
intuition, some may fail to have an intuition of such situation. Deciding 
whether PTI&~Q is positively conceivable becomes an issue of diverging 
intuition which does not allow any further intellectual endeavors.
The second problem concerns the rational process of coherent modal 
imagination. Once an imagined situation can be fully detailed by the 
psychological process, in order to check whether the detailed situation 
reveals contradiction, the rational process of interpreting, reflecting, and 
reasoning comes in. But the rational process cannot start from scratch. A 
rational subject’s interpretation, reasoning, or reflection requires various 
epistemic preconditions, such as background knowledge or belief. In other 
words, the rational process of coherent modal imagination must be 
theory-laden. Coherency of modal imagination is partly determined by a 
theory chosen by subjects. Then, whether the fully detailed imagined 
situation reveals contradiction or not becomes a matter of theory. For the 
rational process involves not only the initially imagined situation but also 
arbitrary details, the theory embedded in the rational process must be able 
to cover all the actual and possible details. This theory should include all 
kinds of science, such as physics, psychology, ethics, aesthetics, mathematics, 
metaphysics, etc. The theory must be complete enough to transform the 
initially imagined situation into a world. Let us call such theory complete 
ontology. It seems obvious that coherency of modal imagination may not be 
determined, as we do not have the complete ontology yet. Unless the final, 
conclusive complete ontology is given, the question of positive conceivability 
cannot have a conclusive answer. Moreover, it even seems possible that 
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there are multiple complete ontologies. Ontologies might be significantly 
different among different thinkers. For instance, two ideal reasoners sharing 
their detailed imagined intuition but have different complete ontologies. Even 
though they share their psychological process of coherent modal imagination, 
one ideal reasoner may find that the detailed imagined situation is 
contradictory, but the other may not. There would be an intuitively 
indistinguishable but rationally different detailed imagined situation. In short, 
positive conceivability of S can be underdetermined by intuition.6)
This underdetermination of positive conceivability provokes another 
problem for the positive conceivability of zombies. If certain complete 
ontology is needed, what would it be like? To decide whether a certain 
configuration of properties is contradictory or not, we must know what those 
configured properties are first. Hence, our complete ontology must include 
6) Some might object that the underdetermination cannot occur between the ideal 
reasoners. This seems to be a mistake. Even in ideal cases, the theory-ladenness of 
rational process does not go away. Ideal reasoners are ideal only in the sense that 
they are free of all contingent cognitive limitations. Even if ideal reasoners’ 
cognitive capacities are unlimited, this does not determine what complete ontology 
they would have. Moreover, what makes positive conceivability underdetermined is 
complete ontology, not cognitive capacities. It is clearly possible that cognitively 
unlimited reasoners lack any complete ontology. Then, it would also be possible that 
two ideal reasoners have different complete ontologies. Suppose that there are two 
Laplacean demons. Both are cognitively unlimited and have the same psychology. 
However, they suffer a sort of ontological conflict. One of them is a dualist, but 
the other is a materialist. Consider they are engaging in a debate concerning 
whether PTI&~Q is positively conceivable. Ex hypothesi, two demons share the 
same intuition, so that both have the same detailed imagined situation. Due to their 
incompatible but equally complete ontologies, however, their rational reflection upon 
the share situation cannot be the same. Under the dualist demon’s ideal rational 
reflection, the shared situation is revealed as coherent and verifying PTI&~Q. On 
the other hand, under the materialist demon’s ideal rational reflection, the shared 
situation is revealed as contradictory in somewhere and not verifying PTI&~Q. The 
dualist demon will argue that PTI&~Q is positively conceivable, but the materialist 
one will not. Even for ideal reasoners, the question of positive conceivability of 
PTI&~Q remains opened.
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metaphysical nature of such properties. If so, in order to know whether an 
intuition of situation where all physical properties fixed but an arbitrary 
phenomenal property is omitted is contradictory or not, one must know what 
phenomenal properties are first. That is, the required complete ontology 
should include a complete theory of phenomenal consciousness. Obviously, 
we do not have such theory yet. We only have a few competing hypotheses 
at best, and whether zombies are positively conceivable depends on which 
hypotheses will win. If phenomenal properties of consciousness turn out to 
be some sort of functional or representational properties, even if we have an 
intuition of the zombie world, we would interpret it as contradictory. We, 
however, do not know which theory is right about the nature of phenomenal 
properties yet. Without complete theory of phenomenal consciousness, one 
cannot rationally process any intuition of the zombie world. Without rational 
processes of interpretation or reasoning, one cannot know PTI&~Q is 
positively conceivable. Therefore, the first premise of the zombie argument 
cannot get off the ground. 
1.3.3 Primary VS Secondary Conceivability
The third distinction is primary and secondary conceivability. Chalmers 
claims that S is primarily conceivable(or epistemically conceivable) when it 
is conceivable that S is actually the case” and “S is secondarily conceivable 
when S conceivably might have been the case”. (Chalmers, 2002, p. 157) 
Primary conceivability is also called epistemic conceivability, and secondary 
conceivability subjunctive conceivability. Primary conceivability is based on 
the idea that the actual world might be different in various ways. These 
ways the actual world might be can be thought of as epistemic possibilities, 
which is roughly defined not being ruled out a priori: “it is epistemically 
possible that S if the hypothesis that S is not ruled out a priori.” (ibid., p. 
157) For example, ‘Hesperus≠Phosphorus’ is epistemically possible in that 
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the actual world might be the world in which ‘Hesperus≠Phosphorus’ is the 
case. Secondary conceivability is grounded on the different idea that there 
are several different ways the actual world might have been. These ways the 
actual world might have been can be considered as metaphysical 
possibilities, which are usually determined a posteriori. For instance, 
‘Hesperus≠Phosphorus’ is metaphysically impossible in that the actual world 
cannot have been the world in which ‘Hesperus≠Phosphorus’ is the case. 
Primary and secondary conceivability correspond to a priori and a 
posteriori respectively. When we primarily conceive S, how the actual world 
has turned out is temporarily suspended. The only thing that matters is 
being ruled out a priori or not. Although the watery stuff in our world 
turns out to be H2O, we certainly can think of a specific situation where 
the watery stuff in our world turns out to be XYZ. For the imagined 
situation is consistent and reveals no contradiction, we can rationally judge 
that the imagined situation verifies ‘water≠H2O’. Secondary conceivability is 
different. When we secondarily conceive S, we cannot suspend how the 
actual world has turned out. Rather, we can conceive S only after we know 
how the actual world turns out. Philosophers, appealing to Kripkean modal 
error scenarios, usually say that ‘water≠H2O’ is not even conceivable. The 
fact that water actually turns out to be H2O determines the referent of the 
term ‘water’ trans-worldly. Secondary conceivability is thus necessarily a 
posteriori matter.
1.3.4 The Characters of Conceivability
Chalmers chooses ideal primary positive conceivability as a genuine guide to 
primary possibility. “Ideal primary positive conceivability entails primary 
possibility.” (Chalmers, 2002, p. 171) According to the analyses so far, ideal 
primary positive conceivability can be defined as follows: 
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S is ideally primarily positively conceivable when (i) S is prima facie 
conceivable, with justification that is undefeatable by better reasoning and 
(ii) a situation where S is actually the case can be coherently modally 
imagined. 
Condition (i) states that S must be ideally conceivable, and (ii) claims that 
S should be positively and primarily conceivable. It is worth emphasizing 
that only this specific kind of conceivability matters in the zombie 
argument. One can draw a substantial modal claim only from ideal primary 
positive conceivability. It is the key to modality. Therefore, in this section, 
based on my analysis, I will summarize three main characters of ideal 
primary positive conceivability. These characters will play crucial roles in 
my argument and analysis in the following chapters.
First, ideal primary positive conceivability is psychological. This feature 
comes from positive conceivability. For S to be positively conceivable, a 
situation where S is the case must be coherently modally imagined. As a 
result of this imagination, subjects can have an intuition of the situation. By 
adding arbitrary details to the initially imagined situation, the imagined 
situation becomes a complete world. Having an intuition of a situation and 
arbitrary detailing consist of the psychological process of coherent modal 
imagination. Whatever they are, having an intuition and detailing are a 
matter of psychology. It involves certain psychological processes. In short, 
ideally primarily positively conceiving S is essentially psychological.       
Ideal primary positive conceivability is also rational. All three kinds of 
conceivability are grounded by rational notions in one way or another. We 
have seen that ideal conceivability is grounded by essentially rational 
notions, such as undefeatability and reasoning. Positive conceivability is also 
based on rational processes. In coherent modal imagination, once the 
psychological process of having an intuition and detailing is done, only 
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thing that left is the rational process of interpretation, reasoning, and 
reflection of the detailed imagined situation. In the end of this process, the 
detailed imagined situation may reveal itself as verifying S. The 
interpretation, reasoning, and reflection are clearly rational notions. Likewise, 
primary conceivability requires such rational processes. For all we know a 
priori, if imagined actual situations that may or may not verify S are 
consistent and reveals no contradiction, there seems to be no reason why 
the actual world cannot turn out that S is the case. This process must be 
rational. Thus, all of the three kinds of conceivability are rational in their 
nature.  
Last, ideal primary positive conceivability is digital. Conceivability is 
always an all-or-nothing matter. This all-or-nothing nature is found in all 
kinds of conceivability. It is obvious that ideal conceivability is 
all-or-nothing, as long as it is defined in terms of ideal rational reflection. 
On ideal rational reflection, S is conceivable or not. S cannot be hard or 
easy to be conceivable. Also, positive conceivability should be all-or-nothing. 
If a certain specific situation is coherently modally imagined and turns out 
to verify S, it is positively conceivable. If it does not verify S, S is 
positively inconceivable. S is verified or not. There is no middle ground. 
Primary conceivability also should be all-or-nothing for the same reason. If 
it is coherently modally imaginable that the actual world turns out to be 
where S is the case, S is primarily conceivable. If it is not, S is primarily 
inconceivable. Therefore, ideal primary positive conceivability is digital. 
There is no gray area or middle ground between the conceivable and the 
inconceivable. If someone feels that there may be degrees in ideal primary 
positive conceivability, it may be because she conflates conceivability with 
probability of actual conceiving. Of course, there may be probability of 
actually conceiving S, and probability is a matter of degree. The issue of 
conceivability, however, is not how probable actually conceiving S is. The 
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issue is whether S is conceivable or not. Talking about whether S is 
difficult or easy to conceive misses the point of conceivability. Although it 
can be hard or easy for some actual subjects to conceive S, S itself cannot 
be hardly or easily conceivable.        
These three characters of ideal positive primary conceivability will play 
crucial roles in the following chapters. Though I have pointed out several 
problems, I shall assume that the notion of ideal primary positive 
conceivability is consistent enough to be used in the zombie argument.7)My 
aim in the following chapters is showing that even if the notion of 
conceivability is unproblematic, the central premises of the zombie argument 
do not hold. 
7) Terminological notes: in the following chapters, I will loosely use expressions 
‘conceivability of zombies’ or ‘conceivability of the zombie world’ and 
‘conceivability of PTI&~Q’ interchangeably. So when I use an expression ‘imagine 
a certain situation’ without any special note, it is synonymous with ‘coherently 
modally imagine a certain situation.’
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Chapter 2 
The Inconceivability of Zombies
2.1 Chapter Introduction
In this chapter, I shall argue against the first premise of the zombie 
argument. The consequence of the conceivability of zombies is a disjunction 
of three different theses. I will show that all disjuncts are wrong. As for a 
background, in Section 2.2, the cognitive intimacy thesis will be introduced 
and defended. In Section 2.3, the first disjunct of the consequence of the 
conceivability of zombies, qualia epiphenomenalism, is rejected. It will be 
shown that qualia epiphenomenalism must allow a negative conceivability of 
a negatively inconceivable scenario. The second disjunct, Russellian monism 
will be critically examined and rejected in Section 2.4. Like qualia 
epiphenomenalism, Russellian monism entails a negative conceivability of a 
negatively inconceivable scenario. Finally, in Section 2.5, interactionist 
dualism, which is the last disjunct of the consequence of the conceivability 
of zombies, will be tackled. Interactionist dualism can be rejected in such a 
way that qualia epiphenomenalism and Russellian monism are refuted. This 
will complete my reductio argument against the conceivability of zombies. 
2.2 Cognitive Intimacy
Cognition often follows through experience: when we have experience, not 
always but usually, we are aware of our experience. This close relationship 
between experience and cognition is the topic of this section. 
2.2.1 Cognitive Intimacy
About the nature of phenomenal qualities of conscious experience, I suggest 
the following thesis:
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Cognitive Intimacy: under non-defective backgrounds, phenomenal qualities 
of conscious experience must be potentially paid attention to or noticed by a
subject of experience.
What cognitive intimacy states is simple: unless a subject of conscious 
experience is under defective background conditions, qualia must be in a 
position to be attended to or noticed by the subject. Conversely, any subject 
of conscious experience must be in a position to pay attention to or notice 
qualia of his or her experience. This thesis needs some clarifications. 
First, paying attention to and noticing are cognitive processes. They are 
not cognitive states, such as judgments, beliefs, and knowledge. Cognitive 
processes are also distinct from cognitive contents, which represent the 
world or self. Indeed, in cognitive and clinical psychology, cognitive 
contents and cognitive processes are considered as two independent variables. 
Cognitive process can be treated as sort of mental act. When we pay 
attention to or notice something, we, in a cognitive sense, do or act upon 
that thing. What makes cognitive processes special is this active nature. 
Cognitive processes can be classified in various ways. If cognitive 
processes involve information about mental states, let us call them 
introspective cognitive processes. There is a related question of how 
cognitive processes operate or how they are driven. Cognitive processes can 
be top-down/control-driven or bottom-up/stimuli-driven. If they are 
top-down/control driven, a subject’s attending to and noticing would be 
active, reflective or higher-order. On the other hand, if cognitive processes 
are bottom-up/stimuli driven, they would be passive, pre-reflective or 
first-order. Most of all, cognitive processes themselves can either be 
conscious or unconscious. While these distinctions are crucial in empirical 
research, cognitive intimacy thesis stands neutral on such distinctions. In 
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what follows, ‘cognitive processes’ is used to refer to two introspective 
cognitive processes: attending to and noticing.
Second, what backgrounds are and how they can be compromised is 
relative to theoretical and empirical advances of cognitive science and 
neuroscience. The term “backgrounds” can refer to both varieties of 
computational processes and their physical substrates. Relative to theoretical 
and empirical advances, we may identify what the backgrounds for cognitive 
processes are and when they go abnormal. It must be noted that the 
non-defective backgrounds cover not only normal but also ideal conditions. 
For not only normal subjects but also ideal creatures without cognitive 
limitation, phenomenal qualities of their conscious experience must be 
potentially attended to or noticed. The Laplacian demon for instance, must 
be able to pay attention to the painfulness when he is suffering severe 
migraine. 
Third, it is worth emphasizing that cognitive intimacy is very weak. It 
claims that qualia do not need to be actually attended or noticed by subjects 
of experience. Instead, they must be potentially attended or noticed. Clearly, 
there seems to be a lot of qualia that actually slip out our range of 
attention or notice. For example, if someone is so distracted by a flurry of 
office activities, she may not actually appreciate the taste of coffee she is 
sipping. She has a certain gustatory experience, nonetheless. The quality of 
taste can be attended to or noticed by her. If she focused on the taste, or 
the taste itself were somehow intensified, she could attend to or notice 
them. Many qualia are, or can be, out of our scope of attention and notice. 
I take this possible or actual dissociation between cognition and experience 
as data. Such dissociation does not bother cognitive intimacy. What the 
thesis claims is that qualia ‘might have been’ paid attention to or noticed 
by a subject if we ‘were’ in the non-defective backgrounds. The crucial 
point is that even if subjects are in the non-defective backgrounds, qualia do 
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not have to be actually paid attention to or noticed. All that matter is that 
they can be so. Compared to higher order theory of consciousness, cognitive 
intimacy is clearly weaker. (Rosenthal, 1986; 1993; 2005) According to the 
theory, to be phenomenally conscious, there must be actual higher-order 
states of the first order states. Cognitive intimacy exactly denies such 
commitment. No actual higher-order states are needed at all. All that needed 
is potential cognitive processes.8)        
2.2.2 Arguments for Cognitive Intimacy
Why should we accept cognitive intimacy? I think there are at least three a 
priori reasons that are based on conceptual analysis of phenomenal qualities 
of conscious experience.  
The first reason comes from the phenomenal part of phenomenal quality 
of conscious experience. Almost in all contexts, implicitly or explicitly, a 
phenomenal quality of experience is something that can appear or reveal 
itself to someone. Further, how phenomenal qualities can appear to or reveal 
themselves to subjects of experience determines their nature, what they 
essentially are. As Strawson clearly pointed out, phenomenal qualities are 
“properties which are of such a kind that their whole and essential nature as 
properties can be and is fully revealed in sensory-quality experience given 
8) The idea that qualia must be potentially attended to or noticed by subjects of 
experience resonates with what Nagel says about what-it-is likeness. (Nagel, 1974) 
There is nonetheless a crucial difference between Nagel’s analysis and cognitive 
intimacy. Nagel appears to argue that a phenomenal quality of experience is 
something that is like for a subject. However, cognitive intimacy claims that a 
phenomenal quality is something that can be like for a subject. In other words, 
Nagel seems to think that being actually appeared to the subject is necessary and 
sufficient for something to be a phenomenal quality of experience. I think, however, 
the actual appearance to the subject may be sufficient but not necessary for 
phenomenal qualities. In this sense, cognitive intimacy potentializes Nagel’s idea of 
“the subjective character of experience”, transforming what-it-is-likeness into 
what-can-be-likeness. (ibid., p. 436)
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only the qualitative character that that experience has.” (Strawson, 1989, p. 
224) For instance, the phenomenal redness of the ripe tomato is phenomenal 
in virtue of the fact that it can appear to or reveal itself to Mary. This 
perspectival character is constitutive of the nature of phenomenal qualities. 
And in order to appear to or reveal themselves to subjects, qualia must be 
at least potentially attended to or noticed by the subjects. That is, being 
phenomenal entails being perspectival, and being perspectival entails 
cognitive intimacy of phenomenal qualities. I think cognitive intimacy must 
be taken to all of those who hold that phenomenal quality of experience is 
in itself perspectival. As far as we maintain the notion of phenomenal 
quality described so far, denying cognitive intimacy would always bring an 
unintelligible consequence that there can be an appearance that never appears 
to anyone or a revelation that can be revealed to no one. 
The second reason is that the conscious part of phenomenal qualities of 
conscious experience seems to entail cognitive intimacy of qualia. If certain 
mental properties are instantiated by conscious experience, they are in the 
conscious level of mind.9) In other words, if a mental property is of 
conscious experience, it must be something that one can be conscious of. If 
certain mental properties cannot be attended to or noticed, there is only one 
possible explanation why it is so: it is because they are in the unconscious 
level of mind. This consideration strongly suggests that if phenomenal 
qualities are of conscious experience at all, they must be cognitively 
intimate. Being of conscious experience implies being in the conscious level 
of mind, and being in the conscious level of mind entails cognitive intimacy 
of phenomenal qualities. If so, denying cognitive intimacy of phenomenal 
qualities combines two incompatible claims: on the one hand, as far as 
9) This does not mean that we are in a position to introspect every property of 
conscious experience. Properties such as being produced by certain neural 
mechanisms, being maintained by molecular structures, or causing certain 
physiological effects can be neither noticed nor attended by subjects.
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phenomenal qualities are of conscious experience, they must be properties 
that we can be conscious of. On the other hand, insofar as phenomenal 
qualities are not cognitively intimate, they are properties that we cannot be 
conscious of.
Last, the fact that we can be certain about phenomenal qualities of our 
experience entails cognitive intimacy. I think it is undeniably true that we 
can be certain about phenomenal qualities at least. Yes, sometimes when 
one is “out of her mind” or “losing it”, one might not be certain about his 
or her own experience. In that case, one should ask his or herself ‘am I 
really experiencing this?’ Even if this is possible, it never bothers the 
possibility of being certain about what her experience is like. If qualia can 
be cognitively not intimate, however, one cannot be certain about what it is 
like to have that experience in principle. Even when we are highly focused 
on normal or even enhanced backgrounds, there always will be a skeptical 
scenario that may falsify our belief about our own conscious experience. For 
example, even when Mary encounters the ripe tomato, she cannot be certain 
about what her visual experience is like. While she is not deranged, there is 
still a skeptical scenario that she is not visually experiencing phenomenal 
red alone. Maybe she is experiencing the phenomenal red with a 
phenomenal yellow or even phenomenal rainbow. In that case, the yellow or 
rainbow qualia cannot be noticed and entirely hidden from Mary’s 
perspective. Mary cannot be certain that she is seeing only the phenomenal 
redness, since there can always be a mixture of noticed qualities and 
unnoticeable ones. This situation generalizes to every possible experience. 
There always will be varieties of skeptical scenarios that defeat one’s belief 
about what she experiences. This is not merely implausible but also wrong. 
We clearly can be certain that we are experiencing only certain things and 
nothing else. Indeed, except some mathematical or logical truths, phenomenal 
qualities are only things that we can be certain about.
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It seems that qualia must be potentially attended to or noticed by subjects 
of experience. The conceptual analysis of the notion of a phenomenal 
quality of conscious experience tells us that being non-defective, being 
phenomenal, and being of conscious experience entail cognitive intimacy of 
qualia. Moreover, the idea that phenomenal qualities of experience can be 
hidden from a subject’s cognition is incompatible with the possibility of 
certainty of experience. While the evidence of cognitive intimacy is 
overwhelming, strong counterexamples are hard to find. All these 
considerations lead to the conclusion that we should accept cognitive 
intimacy.
What I want to emphasize is a priori status of cognitive intimacy. Note 
that in defense of cognitive intimacy, I have never appealed to anything 
empirical but solely relied on a priori reasons and conceptual analyses. I 
believe cognitive intimacy is not something that can be confirmed or refuted 
a posteriori. It is justified a priori, and I believe it is an a priori truth. 
This is also Chalmers’ point. He says “there is not even a conceptual 
possibility that a subject could have a red experience like this one without 
having any epistemic contact with it: to have the experience is to be related 
to it in this way.” (Chalmers, 1996, p, 107, italics added) This intimate 
cognitive relation also partially explains why qualia have been characterized 
as immediately accessible.10) It is a priori true that qualia are cognitively 
10) Seager(2016a) provides a good summary of the traditional characterizations of 
qualia. Among such characterizations, the fourth essential property is important in 
the current context: “(4) Qualia are immediately accessible. The minimal explication 
of this notion is that we are non-inferentially aware of our modes of consciousness, 
of the way that things currently seem to us.” (ibid., p. 165) Cognitive intimacy can 
explain the immediate accessibility. Immediate accessibility means that qualia are 
cognitively accessed from the first-person perspective of subjects without any 
inference or empirical observation. Once we direct our attention inward and focus 
on our own experience, we are directly aware of what it is like to have that 
experience. This being aware of experience by introspection is in itself a cognitive 
process. Saying that qualia are immediately accessible to a subject is another way 
of saying that qualia must be paid attention to or noticed by the subject. In other 
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intimate. In other words, it is conceptually impossible that qualia are 
cognitively alienated.
2.3 Epiphenomenalism and Dull Jane
In the previous section, I have set my theses about the nature of 
phenomenal qualities and cognitive processes. In this section, my 
examination of the zombie argument is started. I shall summarize the most 
common reaction to the zombie argument and Chalmers’ reply. Perry(2001) 
has raised an issue of qualia epiphenomenalism against the conceivability of 
zombies. Chalmers’ first response is denying that the conceivability of 
zombies entails qualia epiphenomenalism. He points out there are many 
type-B materialists who accept the conceivability of zombies but are not 
committed to qualia epiphenomenalism. Second, he argues that even if the 
conceivability of zombies entails qualia epiphenomenalism, there is a 
sophisticated version of qualia epiphenomenalism that evades all the 
criticisms against qualia epiphenomenalism. In Section 2.3.2, I shall argue 
that Chalmers’ first reply does not work, for type-B materialists do not 
actually accept the conceivability of zombies in the relevant sense. And I 
will provide a reductio argument against qualia epiphenomenalism in Section 
2.3.3. In Section 2.3.4, possible objections are examined and rejected. 
2.3.1 The Conceivability of Zombies and Epiphenomenalism
The most common and instant reaction to the zombie argument is that the 
conceivability of zombies entails qualia epiphenomenalism. A representative 
case is John Perry’s critiques on the zombie argument. (Perry, 2001) Let us 
accept the causal closure of the physical and absence of overdetermination. 
In conceiving zombies, one must fix all the physical properties but subtract 
a particular phenomenal property. If so, there cannot be any causal role for 
words, cognitive intimacy says that qualia are essentially immediately accessible.
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the subtracted phenomenal property to play. The only way for the zombie 
world can be conceivable seems to be committing to qualia 
epiphenomenalism. Qualia epiphenomenalism, however, has never been 
preferred by many, as it is too counterintuitive.
Chalmers is well aware of this objection and provides a threefold 
response: 1) doubting the entailment; 2) biting the bullet; 3) diluting the 
implication. The first response comes from an observation that there are a 
number of physicalists who deny qualia epiphenomenalism but admit the 
conceivability of zombies. The second reply involves Chalmers’ positive 
hypothesis about consciousness. The third appears to be the strongest 
response, which expands the debate to cover interesting views in 
metaphysics of consciousness. The second reply seems to repeat the 
traditional defense of epiphenomenalism.11) so, I take this third reply as his 
11) Chalmers’ second reply is to argue that we may bite the bullet of 
epiphenomenalism. His  naturalistic dualism can be seen as a sophisticated form of 
qualia epiphenomenalism. Chalmers’ strategy is arguing that naturalistic dualism is 
not vulnerable to several criticisms usually raised against epiphenomenalism. 
Naturalistic dualism argues that consciousness naturally, not logically, supervenes on 
physical properties and phenomenal properties are fundamental. If so, there must be 
fundamental psychophysical laws that connect the phenomenal domain and the 
physical domain. Naturalistic dualism is nonetheless a version of qualia 
epiphenomenalism. It claims that all the causal and explanatory roles are taken by 
the physical. Thus, though Chalmers insists on avoiding the title 
‘epiphenomenalism,’ naturalistic dualism must be taken as a special kind of qualia 
epiphenomenalism. Chalmers’ attitude about qualia epiphenomenalism is dubious. He 
shows his dubious position by stating “I do not describe my view as 
epiphenomenalism” and “But the view implies at least a weak form of 
epiphenomenalism, and it may end up leading to a stronger sort” in a single 
paragraph. (Chalmers, 1996, p. 160) Actually, he goes further. Chalmers says “Any 
view that takes consciousness seriously will at least have to face up to a limited 
form of epiphenomenalism.” (ibid., p. 158) Despite his ambiguous attitude, I could 
not find any reason not to think that Chalmers in fact commits to qualia 
epiphenomenalism.
Naturalistic dualism can dodge a number of problems qualia epiphenomenalism 
usually faces. First, it can explain away our intuition about causal efficacy of 
phenomenal properties. Naturalistic dualism claims that what actually causes 
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real response to the objection from qualia epiphenomenalism.  I shall 
examine the first two replies in this section, the full assessment of the third 
one will be taken independently after this section.       
2.3.2 Type-B Materialism and The Conceivability of Zombies 
Chalmers’ first response is denying that qualia epiphenomenalism is entailed 
by the conceivability of zombies. He claims that the conceivability of 
zombies is “accepted by many “type-B” materialists (those who accept an 
epistemic gap between the physical and the phenomenal but deny an 
ontological gap), all of whom deny epiphenomenalism: e.g., Ned Block, 
Chris Hill, Joe Levine, Brian Loar, and many others” and “their mere 
existence” shows that the conceivability of zombies has nothing to do with 
qualia epiphenomenalism. (Chalmers, 2004, p. 183) If the conceivability of 
zombies already builds in qualia epiphenomenalism, “it would require that 
[philosophers who accept the conceivability of zombies] be deeply irrational, 
or have deeply divided minds.” (ibid., p. 183) The conceivability of 
zombies, Chalmers explains, “rests partly on prima facie conceivability 
intuitions that many share, and partly on deeper considerations concerning 
the absence of any conceptual linkage between microphysical concepts 
(which are structural-functional in nature) and phenomenal concepts (which 
behavioral effects are the physical states, not the phenomenal states. Even so, by 
virtue of natural supervenience, there should be strong regularities among 
phenomenal and physical states’ behavioral effects. It is natural to infer causalities 
from such regularities. Further, naturalistic dualism can assimilate the evolution of 
consciousness. According to naturalistic dualism, there must be a certain physical 
feature which actually brings adaptive behaviors. As a matter of fundamental laws, 
there must be an experience which naturally supervenes on that physical feature. 
Due to natural supervenience, when the physical feature is selected, the 
consciousness also will be selected. As a result, consciousness will have its own 
evolutionary history, which is parallel to the history of its physical substrates. How 
can consciousness can evolve through natural selection can be explained as a matter 
of fundamental psychophysical laws.                         
35
are not). In both cases, […] their support presupposes nothing about 
epiphenomenalism.” (ibid., p. 183)
First of all, “the mere existence” of type-B materialists cannot be the 
counterexample against the charge of qualia epiphenomenalism, since type-B 
materialists commit to a wrong kind of conceivability. To see this, we 
should focus on in what sense type-B materialists admit the conceivability 
of zombies. As I explained in the previous chapter, the zombie argument 
requires the positive conceivability of zombies. In order to positively 
conceive PTI&~Q, one must coherently modally imagine a situation that 
verifies PTI&~Q. One must have an intuition of and reflect upon a situation 
that verifies. The crucial point is that all of these psychological and rational 
processes involve verifying situations, specific configurations of properties 
and objects. When type-B materialists claim that they accept the 
conceivability of zombies, however, they do not commit to any verifying 
situation. They accept the conceivability of zombies merely in the sense that 
PTI&~Q reveals no apparent contradictions. In other words, what they really 
admit is the negative conceivability of zombies. To my knowledge, they do 
not care about having an intuition of and reflecting upon a situation that 
verifies PTI&~Q. If so, type-B materialists do not accept the conceivability 
of zombies in the relevant sense.12) 
Even after Chalmers distinguished positive conceivability from negative 
one, there are type-B materialists who fail to grasp the notion of positive 
conceivability. Some prominent type-B materialists complain about the 
distinction between positive and negative conceivability. For example, Joseph 
Levine confesses
12) There is also a historical reason for type-B materialists’ ignorance of positive 
conceivability. In fact, Type-B materialists’ arguments and Chalmers’ reply was 
before Chalmers articulates his notion of conceivability. So, the debate only focused 
on the conceptual coherency of zombies.
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My problem is this. I don’t really see the difference between positive and 
negative conceivability. So take this example. Chalmers claims that while the 
falsity of certain unprovable mathematical hypotheses (e.g., the Continuum 
Hypothesis) are negatively conceivable (their unprovability means that their 
truth or falsity is not a priori), they are not positively conceivable. But why 
not say that merely by entertaining the statement expressing the 
mathematical hypothesis itself one has thereby positively conceived it? How 
is this different from conceiving of a zombie? Of course if positive 
conceivability were restricted to what could be imagined, in the sense of 
calling up the relevant perceptual image, the distinction would make clear 
sense. But Chalmers doesn’t want positive conceivability restricted that 
much. So what then determines when a description corresponds to the 
positively conceivable and when it doesn’t? […] For Chalmers, positive 
conceivability is supposed to be a distinctive mental act. But my problem, 
as expressed above, is that I don’t really understand what this distinctive 
mental act is or how to determine when a statement is subject to it. 
(Levine, 2011, italics added)
Levine’s complaint is instructive: some type-B materialists do not even 
understand what positive conceivability is. Those type-B materialists would 
not be able to positively conceive PTI&~Q, even though they claim that 
they accept the conceivability of zombies. How can one positively conceive 
a statement without knowing what it is to positively conceive? 
Therefore, Chalmers’ first reply to the claim that the conceivability of 
zombies entails qualia epiphenomenalism fails. The examples of type-B 
materialists are irrelevant, as type-B materialists do not catch the right sort 
of conceivability that is supposed by the zombie argument. Unless there is 
any independent proofs that type-B materialists admit the positive 
conceivability of zombies, Chalmers’ first replay to the charge of qualia 
epiphenomenalism does not work.    
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2.3.3 The Story of Dull Jane
Chalmers argues that even if the conceivability of zombies entails qualia 
epiphenomenalism, as far as qualia epiphenomenalism is consistent, there is 
no reason to reject it. While qualia epiphenomenalism seems consistent, 
when it is carefully cashed out, it will get into troubles. In this section, it 
will be argued that qualia epiphenomenalism entails the negative 
conceivability of a scenario that qualia cannot be attended to or noticed by 
subjects of experience. This violates cognitive intimacy, so that we have a 
reductio argument against qualia epiphenomenalism.
To start, it is crucial to understand how cognitive processes can occur. 
Cognitive processes are grounded by diverse activities of information 
processing: conceptualization, categorization, storage, retrieval of information, 
and so on. And it is hard to see how something that makes no changes or 
differences can generate, transmit, transform, and storage information. In this 
sense, these changes or differences, which can be called traces, are media 
or vehicles of information processing. How can these traces implement 
diverse information processing? The only thing we can think of is 
causation: all activities of information processing are supposed to be 
implemented by multiple procedures operating through causal chains 
involving traces in cognitive systems. Once information is assumed to be 
processed by physical systems, (our biological brain) traces must be 
physical. It is widely agreed in cognitive science that information processing 
should be realized by physical causation. However, cognitive systems can be 
non-physical. In this case, information is not processed by brains. It would 
be processed by immaterial souls, so that traces must be non-physical. The 
information processing by souls should be implemented by causal changes of 
non-physical traces. 
Can qualia epiphenomenalism accept this immaterial kind of information 
processing? It seems that there is no a priori reason for qualia 
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epiphenomenalism not to allow immaterial souls, non-physical traces and 
causation. However, this move has a price. If qualia epiphenomenalism 
adopts information processing by non-physical causation, this non-physical 
causation cannot supervene on microphysical facts. If they supervene on 
microphysical facts, qualia epiphenomenalism cannot be compatible with the 
conceivability of zombies. Remind that when PTI&~Q is claimed to be 
conceivable, T means that there are only microphysical and indexical facts 
and nothing else. But if souls or non-physical causal chains supervene on 
microphysical facts, when P holds, there must be something else, namely 
facts about souls or non-physical causation. So T cannot hold. Souls’ or 
non-physical causation’s supervenience on microphysical facts violates the 
that’s-all clause in PTI&~Q. As far as souls or non-physical causation 
supervenes on microphysical (plus indexical) facts, qualia epiphenomenalism 
is incompatible with the conceivability of PTI&~Q. In order for qualia 
epiphenomenalism to be compatible with the conceivability of zombies, souls 
or non-physical causation must not supervene on microphysical facts. 
Now, all the mentioned ideas can be turned into a reductio argument 
against qualia epiphenomenalism. The driving idea is that if qualia 
epiphenomenalism is the case, it is at least consistent that qualia can lost 
their cognitive intimacy. For reductio, let us suppose that qualia 
epiphenomenalism is right. Let us further assume that the super-scientist 
Mary is under not defected backgrounds. When she escapes from her 
achromatic room and sees the ripe tomato, certain physical differences occur 
in her brain and cause red qualia. Since qualia are supposed to be 
epiphenomenal, however, Mary’s red qualia cannot make any physical traces 
in her brain. Instead, they make non-physical traces in Mary’s soul. Due to 
these non-physical traces and their causation, the red qualia can be attended 
to or noticed by Mary. On the other hand, there is Jane, who is a perfect 
physical doppelganger of Mary. The only difference is that Jane has no 
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soul. This is conceivable because souls do not supervene on microphysical 
facts. When she escapes from her achromatic room and sees the ripe 
tomato, her brain causes the same red qualia with Mary. Like Mary’s red 
qualia, Jane’s red qualia cannot make any physical traces. The crucial 
difference is that unlike Mary’s, Jane’s red qualia cannot make any 
non-physical traces either. Jane has no soul, so that there is nothing on 
which non-physical traces are registered. As a result, no causal changes can 
be occurred in Jane’s cognitive system even when she acquires the red 
qualia. Since there cannot be any new causal chain at all, there can be 
neither information processing nor cognitive processes involving Jane’s red 
qualia. So the red cannot be paid attention to or noticed by her. All rich 
experience but no cognitive process makes Jane a dull girl. Let us call the 
full description of this situation the story of dull Jane. As far as qualia 
epiphenomenalism is true and compatible with the conceivability of zombies, 
this story must be coherent. If the story of dull Jane is coherent, it cannot 
be ruled out a priori and should be negatively conceivable. 
However, as far as cognitive intimacy is true a priori, the story of dull 
Jane is negatively inconceivable. In the story of dull Jane, the phenomenal 
redness is cognitively alienated. In Section 2.2.3, I have argued that 
cognitively alienated phenomenal qualities are incoherent and conceptually 
impossible. The dull Jane story commits to exactly such qualia, and it is 
conceptually incoherent. If so, the story should be ruled out a priori and 
not even negatively conceivable. By reductio, qualia epiphenomenalism is 
not only counterintuitive but also wrong. It is wrong in that it entails what 
is negatively inconceivable is conceivable. 
2.3.4 On Non-causal Epistemic Relations 
Against the critique thus far, qualia epiphenomenalists would claim that 
qualia-involved cognitive processes, namely paying attention to or noticing 
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phenomenal qualities, are exceptional. They would reply that at least in 
attending to and noticing phenomenal qualities, no information processing 
and causal difference are needed. Instead, there can be non-causal epistemic 
relations that enable qualia-involved cognitive processes. If there is such 
relation, Jane’s red qualia do not have to be cognitively alienated. Although 
the appeal to non-causal epistemic relation seems to work at first sight, 
however, in what follows, I shall argue that it does not. After pointing out 
a problem of verifiability and falsifiability of non-causal epistemic relations, 
I will show why such relations cannot account for cognitive intimacy of 
qualia. 
I think there is a principled reason to believe that no non-causal 
epistemic relation can help to explain qualia-involved cognitive processes. In 
order to show this, first, I shall reveal the cognitive structure of the most 
well-known kind of non-causal epistemic relations, acquaintance. Another 
kind of non-epistemic relations, which is self-representation, shares this 
cognitive structure.13) I will argue that the cognitive structure generalizes to 
any kind of non-causal epistemic relations and this is why non-causal 
epistemic relation cannot account for qualia-involved cognitive processes.    
Chalmers has pointed out an interesting aspect of acquaintance. In his 
theory of phenomenal concepts and beliefs, The formation of direct 
phenomenal concepts is based on the cognitive act of attention to 
phenomenal qualities of experience they pick out: “The clearest cases of 
direct phenomenal concepts arise when a subject attends to the quality of an 
experience and forms a concept wholly based on the attention to the quality, 
‘taking up’ the quality into the concept. (Chalmers, 2003, p. 235) This 
13) Though ‘self-presentation’ or ‘self-manifestation’ would be better to grasp the 
idea of appearance or revelation of phenomenal qualities, I will stick to the term 
‘self-representation’, because some philosophers already have coined the term to 
grasp the phenomena of appearance or revelation. See (Kriegel, 2009). 
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cognitive act of attention is called demonstration. Demonstration can be 
characterized as a cognitive relation between subjects and phenomenal 
qualities that enables the formation of direct phenomenal concepts. Chalmers 
identifies acquaintance with this relation: “acquaintance has been 
characterized only as that relation between subjects and properties that 
makes possible the formation of direct phenomenal concepts”. (ibid., p. 248) 
Then, acquaintance with phenomenal qualities is attending to phenomenal 
qualities, or acquaintance must be grounded by attention. Gertler(2001) also 
has independently developed a similar account of phenomenal concept, 
according to which a phenomenal state is introspected when it is 
“embedded” in another state and this state receives demonstrative attention.
Indeed, there is a very strong intuition that acquaintance with a 
phenomenal quality is determined by paying attention to the quality, in that 
it will vary directly as a function of that attention in cases where that 
attention varies while all other physical, cognitive, and phenomenal 
background conditions are fixed, and that it will not vary independently of 
that attention in such cases. Furthermore, across a wide range of possible 
cases in which the attending to the quality is varied while background 
properties are held constant, the acquaintance relation with the quality will 
co-vary with attention to that quality. In this sense, acquaintance with qualia 
can be said to be at least partially constituted by attending to those qualia. 
Acquaintance with qualia always starts by paying attention to those qualia, 
and when one attends to qualia, she is already acquainted with those qualia. 
Then, then acquaintance with qualia does not ground paying attention to 
those qualia. The opposite would be closer to the truth. Acquiantance is 
constitutively grounded by cognitive process of attention. If something 
cannot be attended even unconsciously,14) one would not be in a position to 
14) In Section 2.2.1, I emphasized that paying attention and noticing themselves are 
mental acts that can be either conscious or unconscious.
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be acquainted with it. If something is at least unconsciously attended, one is 
already acquainted with it. This is the cognitive structure of acquaintance.  
This cognitive structure applies another form of non-causal epistemic 
relations, self-representation. Some philosophers have been argued that once 
subjects have qualia, qualia present themselves to subjects. In this case, 
unlike acquaintance, we do not actively engage in “direct access” to qualia. 
Rather, it would be better to say that qualia appear or reveal themselves to 
us, and we are passively involved in cognitive reception of qualia. However, 
in virtue of what such reception is possible? In order for subjects to receive 
qualia, they must be equipped with some degree of notice. If a subject is 
so drowsy or preoccupied that she cannot, consciously or even 
unconsciously, notice anything, what would appear or reveal to her mind? 
Certainly, nothing. Nothing will appear or reveal itself to the subject’s mind 
because she is not cognitively ready for the appearance or revelation. For 
example, even if we have pain, if our mind is so deflected or focused on 
something else, the pain will not appear or reveal itself to us as painful. If 
all backgrounds are fixed, noticing qualia would directly determine 
self-representation of those qualia: if one notices a phenomenal redness, it 
presents itself to her. If one does not notice the phenomenal redness, it 
cannot manifest itself to her. As acquaintance with qualia necessarily starts 
with attending to those qualia, self-representation of qualia always ends with 
noticing those qualia. Noticing to qualia, therefore, partially constitutes 
self-representation of those qualia.15) 
Given the cognitive structure, we can understand why any attempt to 
explaining cognitive intimacy of qualia in terms of non-causal epistemic 
relations to qualia is doomed to fail. In order to be non-causally 
epistemically related to a particular phenomenal quality, subjects may 
15) A similar analysis has already been provided in Section 2.2.2 for cognitive 
intimacy.
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actively and reflectively access to their qualia or passively and 
pre-reflectively receive them. Acquaintance, or “direct access”, is a typical 
case of the first, and self-representation, or “revelation”, is representative of 
the latter. However, saying that someone directly accesses to something 
without attending to that thing sounds unintelligible. Saying that something 
reveals itself to someone but she does not notice that thing does not make 
sense. Whatever non-causal epistemic relation is, it must be partially 
constituted by qualia-involved cognitive processes. If this is the case, no 
matter what kind of non-causal epistemic relations qualia epiphenomenalism 
adopts, they cannot make qualia to be cognitively intimate. No non-causal 
epistemic relations can make qualia to be potentially paid attention to or 
noticed, because such relations hold only when qualia are actually attended 
to or noticed. How can a relation render something accessible, if the 
relation comes after when that thing is accessed? 
In contrast, information processing theory of qualia-involved cognitive 
processes does not face such circularity. In accounting for how qualia can 
be attended to or noticed, the theory would simply appeal to some set of 
physical processes of forming, storing, transmitting, or retrieving or 
information. No qualia-involved cognitive processes are required in this 
process. Of course, there must be enabling or background conditions for the 
information processing, but they are not qualia-involved cognitive processes 
that should be explained. For a detailed, low-level explanation, one can 
specify the background conditions in neural terms. For a more abstract, 
high-level explanation, one can do the same thing in computational terms. 
Either way, information processing would make qualia cognitive intimate 
without presupposing attending to or noticing qualia.
All in all, I think there are good reasons to doubt that non-causal 
epistemic relation can account for cognitive intimacy. The cognitive structure 
of non-causal epistemic relations implies that all possible kinds of such 
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relations must be constituted by qualia-involved processes, so that it cannot 
account for how such qualia-involved processes are possible. Therefore, there 
seems to be no reason to believe that non-causal epistemic relation will 
make Jane’s new qualia to be cognitively intimate. 
2.3.5 Objections and Replies
There may be possible objections to the story dull Jane and my reductio 
argument. In this section, I shall consider three possible objections and 
argue that they are not successful.
Objection 1: your reductio argument works only if you already presupposed 
a causal theory of knowledge. According to the theory, in order for a belief 
about something to be justified, that thing must be causally responsible in 
formation of the belief. Likewise, according to your argument, in order for 
qualia-involved cognitive processes to occur, qualia must cause changes or 
differences. However, the causal theory of knowledge fails to be a general 
principle about knowledge and justification. Even Goldman, the one who 
first brought the theory in the field of epistemology, abandoned his own 
view in the face of various criticisms. If so, qualia epiphenomenalism can 
be safe from your argument, for there is plenty of reasons to reject its 
background epistemology. 
Reply: this objection stems from a natural misleading of my argument. Note 
that I have never said anything about how experience justifies belief about 
it. The problem I raised runs deeper than knowledge or justification. The 
point of my argument is not that for phenomenal beliefs to be justified, 
experience must be mediated through appropriate causal connection to the 
beliefs. Rather, the point is that for qualia-involved cognitive processes to be 
occurred, information about qualia must be processed. In turn, information 
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about qualia to be processed, qualia must involve certain causation. The 
background theory of my argument is not a causal theory of knowledge, but 
information processing theory of cognition. Even if the causal theory of 
knowledge can be rejected, my argument should not be, as the theory is 
irrelevant to the story of dull Jane.      
Objection 2: as your argument stresses that phenomenal qualities must cause 
changes or differences to be attended to or noticed, it might be taken as a 
variety of causal theory of reference. However, it is not obvious that the 
theory can be generalized to all cases of reference. Paradigmatic 
counterexamples include abstract objects, logical relation, future events, and 
fictional characters, which cannot be causally connected to a subject. As we 
are always talking and thinking about these things, there seems to be no 
strong reason to adopt a causal theory of reference. Your argument would 
lose much of its force, if it is built on a causal theory of reference.
Reply: this objection conflates cognition with reference. My argument claims 
that something must cause changes or differences to trigger information 
processing grounding qualia-involved cognitive processes. It does not argue 
that it must do so to be referred to. Cognitive processes and reference are 
conceptually distinct. Cases where cognition and reference come apart will 
make this point clear. 
It is easy to find cases of cognition without reference. Such cases 
typically involve either initial or sloppy cognitive processes. To refer to 
something, we must have intensions or make thoughts about it. When we 
encounter something for the first time, on the other hand, we pay attention 
to or noticed it without any intension or thought about it. In such case, we 
come to have intensions or thoughts about that thing in virtue of initial 
noticing, attending to or noticing it. Initial cognitive processes always come 
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before the reference by intensions or thoughts. In this sense, they can be a 
case of cognition without reference. Moreover, even when a subject pays 
attention to or notices something, her attention and notice might not be 
enough. Attending to and noticing come in degrees. Only sufficient cognitive 
processes can make us have intensions or thoughts. This constraint of 
degrees suggests that there can be cognitive processes that cannot result in 
having intension or thoughts. Such cognitive processes would not be 
accompanied by any reference. These insufficient or sloppy cognitive 
processes can be called cognition without reference.
We also have examples of reference without cognition. Cognitive 
processes are not necessary for reference. Rather, what seems really needed 
is, as Chalmers noted, having intensions or thoughts about referents. 
(Chalmers, 1996, p. 201) For instance, suppose that I have a thought <the 
tallest man in the world will be taller than me>. Do I have to pay attention 
to or notice the actual tallest person in the world? Obviously, I do not. I 
cannot even do so simply because I never met him. Further, the fact that 
we remember people who passed away or imagine future events shows that 
we can have intensions or thoughts about things that are not present. 
However, we cannot notice or pay attention to something that is not present. 
In cases of abstract objects or relations, it becomes more evident that no 
cognitive processes are required to reference. To have a thought <5 is an 
odd number>, I do not have to notice or pay attention to the number 5 as 
an abstract object. Without any notice or attention to disjunctions or material 
conditionals, I can talk and think about them. In all these case, cognitive 
processes are not prerequisites for reference. The only thing that matters is 
having intensions or thoughts, or deploying concepts at best. The provided 
cases show that cognition and reference can come apart. My argument 
involves only cognitive processes, not reference. 
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Objection 3: you have argued that any non-causal epistemic relations must 
be partially constituted by attention or notice. This may not be the right 
description about the relationship between subjects and phenomenal qualities, 
however. Qualia epiphenomenalist can argue that the relationship between 
subjects’ mind and their phenomenal qualities is so epistemically intimate 
that it would not be mediated by any cognitive process. Qualia are not 
objects ‘apart’ from our mind. There seems to be no ‘distance’ between our 
mind and qualia. This consideration makes a logical space for a non-causal 
epistemic relation to qualia that is not mediated by any attention or notice. 
Relying on this epistemically intimate relation, qualia epiphenomenalism 
would be able to account for cognitive intimacy of qualia.     
Reply: the problem of this objection is that it is hard to see how there can 
be such epistemically intimate relation. As I have argued in the previous 
section, there seems to be two ways how subjects’ mind can be 
epistemically related to phenomenal qualities: we can either actively access 
to our qualia or passively receive our qualia. When we actively access to 
our qualia, we must pay attention to those qualia. Epistemic access always 
requires consciously or unconsciously attending. If we pay no attention to 
something, in what sense we epistemically access to that thing? Indeed, 
epistemic access and attention are so tightly related that they are sometimes 
treated interchangeable. On the other hand, if we passively take our qualia, 
we should notice them. Epistemic reception without conscious or 
unconscious notice seems unintelligible. If we epistemically receive 
something, it implies that we somehow notice that thing. If this is the case, 
the epistemically intimate relation without attention or notice seems to make 
no sense. In such relation, our mind would neither epistemically access to 
nor epistemically receive qualia. How can we be epistemically related to our 
qualia, if we neither access nor receive our qualia? I think there is little 
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reason to call such relation ‘epistemic’ or ‘intimate’. That relation would be 
neither active nor passive. I do not see how such epistemically ‘middle’ 
way is even possible. If we do not access or receive qualia, in what sense 
our mind is related with them at all? I believe this is one of the reasons 
why those philosophers who endorse non-causal epistemic relations 
characterize such relations in terms of attention or notice.16) All things 
considered, there seems to be no such ‘epistemically intimate’ relation that 
makes qualia cognitively intimate.
All in all, I conclude that qualia epiphenomenalism is wrong in that it 
entails an incoherent scenario, the story of dull Jane. The story implies that 
Jane cannot attend to or notice the red qualia she gains, even if she is in 
not defected cognitive backgrounds. Above all, the dull Jane story implies 
that Jane’s qualia lack cognitive intimacy. But this cannot be the case. 
Therefore, if my reductio argument against qualia works, qualia 
epiphenomenalism turns out to be false. 
Even if qualia epiphenomenalism is wrong, there is the last resort left for 
Chalmers. As I show in Section 2.4.1, he can dilute the epiphenomenal 
implication by considering other hypotheses. Replying to Perry’s analysis, 
Chalmers claims 
Furthermore, the Russellian monist view is a nonepiphenomenalist view that 
we have seen is compatible with the conceivability of zombies in the 
16) Chalmers himself admits that the relation between qualia and subjects’ mind is 
intimate. “This relation would seem to be a peculiarly intimate one that is made 
possible by the fact that experiences lie at the heart of the mind rather than 
standing at a distance from it, and it seems to be a relation that carries the 
potential for conceptual and epistemic consequences. We might call this relation 
acquaintance.” (Chalmers, 2010, p. 285) However, as we have seen, he also 
emphasizes that such ‘peculiarly intimate’ relation between experience and mind 
essentially involves attention to qualia. 
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relevant sense. Finally, even Cartesian interactionist dualism, in which 
consciousness certainly plays a causal role, is compatible with the 
conceivability (and possibility) of zombies. On such a view, physically 
identical beings without consciousness will presumably have large causal 
gaps in their functioning (or else will have some new element to fill those 
gaps), but there is nothing obviously inconceivable about such causal gaps. 
(Chalmers, 2010, p. 156)
Chalmers can insist that the conceivability of zombies is still viable because 
it can be supported by other positions instead of qualia epiphenomenalism. 
Russellian monism and interactionist dualism are candidates. What this claim 
really amounts to is that the conceivability of zombies entails not just qualia 
epiphenomenalism but qualia epiphenomenalism or Russellian monism or 
interactionist dualism. 
This response seems to the strongest one, for one must show that all of 
its disjuncts are false in order to refute the conceivability of zombies. For I 
had argued against qualia epiphenomenalism in this section, what is left is 
showing why both Russellian monism and interactionist dualism are wrong. 
In the following sections, I shall argue that both seemingly 
non-epiphenomenalist views face serious problems. 
2.4 Russellian Monism and Flipping Inscrutables 
In recent years, Russellian monism is getting attention from philosophers of 
mind. Roughly, Russellian monism claims that at the fundamental level of 
the physical, there is a certain sort of properties that somehow responsible 
for phenomenal qualities of our conscious experience. These properties are 
considered to be intrinsic/categorical properties that ground the 
structural/dispositional ones. Proponents claim that Russellian monism is 
compatible with the conceivability of zombies and can be a viable 
alternative of traditional physicalism. In this section, however, I shall argue 
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that a deeper analysis of what Russellian monism commits to shows that it 
is wrong. To show this, first, I shall summarize Russellian monism’s 
minimal commitments. (Section 2.4.1) Second, it will be argued that 
Russellian monism faces a reductio. (Section 2.4.2) Several possible 
objections are examined and rejected. (Section 2.4.3) If my argument works, 
the optimistic assessment of Russellian monism, which is now pervasive to 
philosophy of mind and metaphysics, should be seriously reconsidered.
2.4.1 The Basics of Russellian Monism
The long history of debates surrounding the Hard problem of consciousness 
made many philosophers to think that they meet the dead end. This 
pessimism has prompted many philosophers of mind to find radical 
alternatives, making theories of consciousness more fertile. Russellian 
monism, or “type-F monism” in Chalmers’ terminology, is definitely such 
hypothesis which seems getting more and more intellectual fever these days. 
(Chalmers, 2010, p. 133-137) Yet even until now, what should be counted 
as minimal, basic elements of Russellian monism has not been clearly 
addressed. So I want to draw several essential commitments of Russellian 
monism first. Then some optimism and skepticism will be sketched.   
Russellian monism starts by noticing a conceptual or epistemic limit of 
physics. Physics only can find out such-and-such structural or dispositional 
properties of the physical but cannot ‘see through’ what actually ground 
those properties. This idea originated from Russell’s famous remarks of the 
nature of physics. In his Analysis of Matter, Russell states
It is not always realized how exceedingly abstract is the information that 
theoretical physics has to give. It lays down certain fundamental equations 
which enable it to deal with the logical structure of events, while leaving it 
completely unknown what is the intrinsic character of the events that have 
the structure. We only know the intrinsic character of events when they 
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happen to us. Nothing whatever in the theoretical physics enables us to say 
anything about intrinsic character about events elsewhere. They may be just 
like the events that happen to us, or they may be totally different in strictly 
unimaginable ways. All that physics gives us is certain equations giving 
abstract properties of their changes. But as to what it is that changes, what 
it changes from and toㅡas to this, physics is silent. (Russell, 1959, p. 
17-18)
Russell’s remark points out that what physics can give us about the physical 
world is merely abstract relations and nomic or causal profiles of 
fundamental entities. It does not, and may be cannot, teach us the nature of 
relata or what exactly those entities are. According to Russell, though 
physics can access to the structure and dynamics of the physical world, 
physics teaches us nothing about what is structured and why there are such 
dynamics. Taking this view on the nature of physics seriously is the central 
reason why all the variants of Russellian monism are called ‘Russellian.’ 
Sharing Russell’s pessimism about physics should be taken as the first 
hallmarks of Russellian monism.       
Russellian monism assumes that the unknown intrinsic properties of basic 
physical entities ground dispositional properties of those entities in a way 
that categorical properties ground dispositional ones.17) These properties are 
not only unknown but unknowable by physical sciences in principle. Since 
the alleged properties are supposed to be intrinsic and ground dispositional 
17) I intentionally simplified the situation, because many heavy issues are involved 
in characterizing Russellian monism. At least four distinctions should be noted: (i) 
extrinsic vs. intrinsic, (ii) dispositional vs. categorical, (iii) relational vs. 
non-relational, and (vi) structural-and-dynamic vs. non-structural-and-non-dynamic 
properties. As many of readers would have noticed, I implicitly have been 
assimilating all of them. There can be, and actually have been, a number of thorny 
metaphysical debates concerning these distinctions. Nonetheless, I just remain 
temporarily neutral on those issues and use all these distinctions more or less 
interchangeably in this dissertation. For some related points, see (Alter and 
Nagasawa, 2015, p. 427-432)
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properties of fundamental physical entities, they are considered ‘the intrinsic 
natures’ of basic entities or “categorical grounds” of their dispositions. Due 
to their unknowability, those intrinsic natures or categorical grounds deserve 
to be called inscrutables.18) The term roughly means that they cannot be 
‘read off’ by physical sciences. Positing inscrutables, therefore, should be the 
second hallmark of Russellian monism. 
Last, Russellian monism claims that inscrutables ‘give rise to,’ ‘generate,’ 
or ‘ground’ phenomenal properties of conscious experience. According to 
Russellian monism, inscrutables are responsible for phenomenal qualities we 
feel when we have conscious experience. There are a number of distinctions 
concerning what inscrutables really are and how they are responsible for our 
phenomenology. First, inscrutables can be either phenomenal or 
protophenomenal. Inscrutables can be phenomenal in such a way that our 
qualia are. Or, they can be protophenomenal in that they are not 
phenomenal in themselves but jointly ground the phenomenal qualities of 
higher order systems. Second, inscrutables can generate or ground 
phenomenal properties by constitution or emergence. Qualia may be 
18) The term ‘inscrutable’ is, as far as I know, introduced in (Montero, 2014). It is 
used in (Alter and Nagasawa, 2015) and (Chalmers, 2015). Some might doubt that 
inscrutables are really necessary. Why not just satisfy with what physics, actually or 
possibly, teaches us? As stated in the quoted passage from Russell, fundamental 
physics seems to be ‘abstract’ in that it provides mere structures and dynamics of 
the physical reality. If the physical reality is like what fundamental physics 
describes, our physical world itself must be abstract. It would be a strange world 
where only relations and dispositions exist but no relata or grounds can be found. 
However, it is hard to believe that our world is like that. Whatever the term 
‘abstract’ means, our physical world is apparently not abstract. Rather, it seems to 
be concrete in nature. Though the opposite view has been endorsed by some 
philosophers, it is natural to think that relations require relata and dispositions 
should be grounded. In other words, there must be something that “breathes fire 
into the equations [of any possible grand unified theory of physics] and makes a 
universe for them to describe”. (Hawking, 1988, p. 174) Proponents of Russellian 
monism emphasize that this gap between abstract physics and concrete reality 
provides a good reason to posit inscrutables.
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constituted by or emerged from inscrutables in certain organizations.19) This 
generative or grounding role of inscrutables might be the most important 
and distinctive feature of Russellian monism. It must be taken as the third 
hallmark or Rusellian monism.
Given the three hallmarks of Russellian monism, Russellian monism can 
be summarized in conjunction of three claims. I argue that however 
Russellian monism is formulated, it must commit to the three theses 
arranged below20):
Structuralism about physics: the basic properties physics describes are 
relational/dispositional properties. 
Realism about inscrutables: there are inscrutables, the natures of which are 
not wholly relational/dispositional. 
Foundationalism about inscrutables: at least some inscrutables ground basic 
physical properties as well as phenomenal properties of experience. 
19) These commitments lead to many possible versions of Russellian monism. As 
already noted by many, it is hasty to judge that Russellian monism is just a 
sophisticated version of crazy panpsychism, which distributes experiences like ours 
all over the physical universe. About ‘the argument from weirdness’, see (Alter and 
Nagasawa, 2015, p. 445-446). Indeed, for there are two possible natures of 
inscrutables, basically two types of Russellian monism are possible: if inscrutables 
are phenomenal in themselves, we have a panpsychist Russellian monism. If they 
are not, we have panprotopsychist Russellian monism. Further, according to the two 
possible ways how inscrutables give rise to or ground phenomenal properties, a 
constitutive Russellian monism and emergent Russellian monism. Therefore, there can 
be at least four versions of Russellian monism: panpsychist-constitutive, 
panpsychist-emergent, panprotopsychist-constitutive, panprotopsychist-emergent 
versions. While all these versions are interesting, I will not delve into each of 
them. The arguments I will develop later in this section does not depend on details 
of versions of Russellian monism.
20) While this formulation comes from (Alter and Nagasawa, 2015, p. 425), I 
substitute the original formulation’s ‘(proto)phenomenal foundationalism’ with 
‘foundationalism about inscrutables’. 
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Russellian monism is indeed “hot stuff” in recent consciousness studies 
and philosophy of mind. This intellectual fever suggests that many of 
philosophers see optimistic prospects in Russellian monism.21) There seem to 
be at least two virtues of Russellian monism. Once properly construed in 
pan(proto)psychist form, Russellian monism might explain why there is such 
thing as phenomenal qualities at all. If (proto)phenomenal properties are 
already spread in the fundamental level of the physical world and qualia are 
constituted or emerged from the (proto)phenomenal properties, ‘why’ of 
consciousness will be solvable in principle. Another reason for pursuing the 
pan(proto)psychist version of Russellian monism is that it elegantly deals 
with the issue of mental causation. Inscrutables realize all the 
relational/dispositional properties in the fundamental level of the physical. 
And It has been strongly argued that dispositions can be causally relevant 
only by inheriting their categorical grounds’ causal power. (Prior, Pargetter, 
& Jackson, 1982) If so, inscrutables are parts of the causal implementation 
of our world from which all the causal powers come. Once understood in 
this way, pan(proto)psychist Russellian monism arises as an attractive picture 
of how the phenomenal can have causal influence to the physical.
Moreover, a physicalist version of Russellian monism, Russellian 
physicalism, has been developed and discussed.22) Russellian physicalism can 
21) Holman states “The advertising for [Russellian monism] is that it constitutes just 
the insight needed to break (what many see as) the current impasse on the 
mind-body problem.” (Holman, 2008, p. 49) Alter and Nagasawa agrees with 
Holman by saying “Many philosophers would agree that that result is both desirable 
and not delivered by traditional theories in the philosophy of mind.” (Alter and 
Nagasawa, 2015, p. 448) Russellian monism appears to properly handle three 
problems that never be answered by other theories of consciousness so far: the Hard 
problem of consciousness, the problem of mental causation, and the conceivability 
argument. 
22) Russellian physicalism has been recently developed by (Motenro, 2014). See 
also (Strawson, 2006; Papineau, 2002, p. 22-23; Pereboom, 2011). Russellian 
physicalism is a minimal physicalism in that it holds that phenomenal facts 
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be immune to the old zombie argument. According to the old zombie 
argument, PTI&~Q is conceivable. Proponents of Russellian physicalism 
argue that when we conceive the zombie world, one cannot help but ignore 
the fact about inscrutables, because they cannot be grasped even by 
complete physics. P is wholly constituted by truths about microphysical 
structures and dynamics and totally lacks truths about inscrutables. As it is 
widely acknowledged that there is no a priori entailment between 
microphysical and phenomenal truths, PTI&~Q is conceivable. From this 
conceivability, the metaphysical possibility of PTI&~Q follows. However, 
what such possibility implies at most is that some phenomenal facts do not 
supervene on the microphysical facts. The conceivability of zombies thus 
does not exclude the possibility that all phenomenal facts supervene on 
microphysical facts plus inscrutables facts. If there is any way to call 
inscrutables physical, it can be argued that phenomenal facts are fixed by 
physical facts. (Chalmers, 2015; Alter and Nagasawa, 2015) Thus, even if 
zombies are conceivable and conceivability entails possibility, the falsity of 
physicalism does not follow. At least a distinctive, nonorthodox sort of 
physicalism can survive. In this way, Russellian physicalism can assimilate 
both two central premises of the zombie argument, while maintaining a form 
of physicalism. 
Russellian monism, however, is not immune to skeptical concerns. The 
immediate question is how inscrutables ground the phenomenal. Doubts go 
both ways of grounding. If constitutive Russellian monism is the case, it is 
hard to see how this sort of mental composition occurs. This is what 
supervene on the physical facts. It is also a radical form of physicalism in that it 
assumes physical properties that cannot be revealed even by complete physics. For 
this reason, Russellian physicalism would be “a highly distinctive form of 
physicalism that has much in common with property dualism and that many 
physicalists will want to reject.” (Chalmers, 2010, p. 152) If “there are physicalist 
versions of Russellian monism, they are nontraditional physicalist theories.” (Alter 
and Nagasawa, 2015, p. 438)
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usually called the combination problem. (James, 1890/1950; Seager, 1995; 
2010; 2016b) Constitutive Russellian monism should provide explanations of 
how inscrutables constitute phenomenal qualities. When such explanation is 
provided, we have a genuine “mental chemistry”. (Mill, 1848; Coleman, 
2012) Unfortunately, no “mental chemistry” has been successful yet.23) Even 
if we choose emergent Russellian monism, it is doubtable that phenomenal 
emergence can be any explanation of how phenomenal properties are 
generated. All of the issues described so far can be raised against the 
panprotopsychist version of Russellian monism. At any rate, Russellian 
monism’s potential is doubtable and controversial at best.24) Both optimism 
and pessimism raise various issues of current studies of Russellian monism. 
However, they are not my concern in this chapter. What I want to show is 
that no matter how it is construed, Russellian monism will face some 
troubles.
2.4.2 The Flipping Inscrutables 
At first glance, Russellian monism seems to have no problematic 
implications. However, I think a deeper reflection on inscrutables’ grounding 
of qualia would reveal its own problems. In the following, I will show that 
Russellian monism must allow something negatively inconceivable to be 
23) Chalmers’ recent work is comprehensive as well as instructive on this matter. 
(Chalmers, 2015)
24) One can also wonder what the nature of inscrutables is. This question is given 
to both versions of Russellian monism. For the panpsychist version, the claim that 
basic physical entities have phenomenal properties like us sounds so weird. Even 
Nagel expresses his doubt on such view by stating “Presumably the components out 
of which a point of view is constructed would not themselves have to have a point 
of view”. (Nagel, 1979a, p. 194). For panprotopsychist version, there is always a 
risk of elusive otherism, the view that whatever generates consciousness, it would 
always be something other than what has been thought of as phenomenal. (Bourget, 
2017) 
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negatively conceivable and turns out to be false. If my argument is on the 
right track, the optimism toward Russellian monism must be seriously 
reconsidered.
Before we start, it is worth noting that Russellian monism is compatible 
with the existence of immaterial souls. The basic commitments of Russellian 
monism are perfectly compatible with immaterial souls and non-physical 
causation. However, as explained in Section 2.3.3, if those immaterial 
supervene on microphysical (plus indexical) facts, Russellian monism cannot 
be compatible with the conceivability of PTI&~Q. In order for Russellian 
monism to be compatible with the conceivability of zombies, souls and 
non-physical causation should not supervene on microphysical (plus 
indexical) facts. Moreover, it seems clear that inscrutables and souls or 
non-physical causation are conceptually distinct. One can easily conceive of 
intrinsic properties that ground microphysical and phenomenal properties 
without conceiving souls or non-physical causation. And as far as I know, 
all Russellian monists are thinking about inscrutables without presupposing 
souls or non-physical causation. If souls and non-physical causation 
conceptually supervene on inscrutables, then it would require that all those 
Russellian monists be deeply irrational. There is no reason to accept this 
extremely implausible idea. So, it is safe to assume that souls and 
non-physical causation conceptually supervene neither on facts about 
microphysics nor on facts about inscrutables. 
Then, let us suppose that inscrutables necessarily ground phenomenal 
properties.25) And start with the example of Jane introduced in Section 
2.3.3. Jane is a perfect physical duplicate of Mary without soul. The only 
difference is that in this case, Mary and Jane share not only microphysical 
25) Although it is arguable that inscrutables ground phenomenal qualities 
contingently, metaphysical grounding relations are often assumed to be 
metaphysically necessary. In this dissertation, I will follow this widely accepted 
assumption.
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structures and dispositions but also inscrutables. As explained in the previous 
paragraph, since facts about souls do not supervene on facts about 
microphysics and facts about inscrutables, even if Mary has a soul, it can 
be consistent to imagine her soulless inscrutable duplicate. When Jane sees 
the ripe tomato for the first time, in her brain, may be somewhere in V1, a 
particular group of neurons is activated. However, the neuronal group is not 
merely a neural correlate of red qualia. It is also the partial implementation 
of functional organization of Jane’s brain. It plays certain causal roles in 
Jane’s brain. By that activation, she says or does whatever those who first 
see a red thing would say or do.  
And here comes the trick. Inscrutables of the neuronal group necessarily 
grounds Jane’s red qualia. Basic particles that compose neurons of the group 
instantiate inscrutables, and these inscrutables are somehow organized to 
ground the red qualia. Let us call that inscrutable complex I. Next, a 
Cartesian demon invents a neuroprosthetic device. While it functions the 
same as Jane’s original neuronal group, the device is fundamentally different 
in one respect: basic particles of the neuroprosthetic device play the same 
microphysical roles as basic particles of the neuronal group do. The only 
difference is that they instantiate completely different inscrutables. For 
example, electrons, which compose the neuronal group, and schlectrons, 
which make up the device, perfectly share their microphysical roles. They 
are microphysically indistinguishable in principle. In the device, the 
organization of the different inscrutables grounds different phenomenal 
properties. It grounds blue qualia rather than red ones. Let us call such 
inscrutable complex I*.  
When Jane visually admires the color quality of her first-seen tomato, the 
Cartesian demon decides to replace Jane’s neuronal group with his device. 
By the extremely covert and sophisticated way, he succeeds to unwittingly 
install his device in Jane’s brain. When the demon turns on the switch in 
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his laboratory, the neuronal group in Jane’s brain is suddenly replaced by 
the device. Through this procedure, the inscrutable complex of the neuronal 
group, I, is suddenly flipped to the inscrutable complex of the device, I*. 
By necessary phenomenal grounding, the initial red qualia in Jane’s visual 
field suddenly turn into blue ones. In short, when the demon turns on the 
switch, Jane unexpectedly sees blue.
The question is what would happen in Jane’s qualia-involved cognitive 
processes. Can the fresh phenomenal blue in her visual experience can be 
attended to or noticed by Jane? Here, as I defended in Section 2.3.3, 
cognitive processes require varieties of information processing, and 
information processing needs causal chains of traces. Since Jane is supposed 
to be soulless, if there is any causation at all, it must be a physical one. 
However, although I is substituted by I*, this procedure does not make any 
physical difference and change. The demon’s procedure only makes changes 
or differences in inscrutables. As long as structuralism about physics holds, 
there cannot be any physical differences between the neuronal group and the 
device. After the demon turns on the switch, in all levels of the physical, 
every physical causal process would be preserved. Physical causal processes 
in Jane’s brain must be fixed, and information processing cannot be 
initiated. Therefore, even though the color of the ripe tomato is brutally 
changed from red to blue ‘in front of her eye’, the newly acquired blue 
qualia cannot be paid attention to or noticed by Jane. All these absurdities 
can happen even when Jane’s attention is abnormally sharpened or she is 
fully informed and readies for the demon’s procedure. This scenario can be 
called the flipping inscrutables.
The flipping inscrutables scenario is a Russellian variant of dancing 
qualia. (Chalmers, 1996, p. 266-273) The crucial point is that Russellian 
monism entails that this flipping inscrutables scenario is at least coherent. 
Nothing in Russellian monism is incompatible with the scenario. 
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Structuralism about physics, realism about inscrutables, and foundationalism 
about inscrutables, the conceptual distinction between inscrutables and souls 
are consistent with the flipping inscrutables scenario. To the extent that 
necessary phenomenal grounding holds, Russellian monism entails that the 
flipping inscrutables scenario is consistent. If the scenario is consistent, there 
is no way for Russellian monism to rule out the scenario a priori. If it 
cannot be ruled out a priori, it is at least negatively conceivable. Therefore, 
Russellian monism entails the negative conceivability of the flipping 
inscrutables. It must be noted that I am not committing to any modal claim. 
All I argue for is a weak epistemic claim that the flipping inscrutables 
scenario must be at least negatively conceivable under Russellian monism.   
Even if Russellian monism entails the negative conceivability of the 
flipping inscrutables scenario, the scenario makes no sense. The reason is 
cognitive intimacy. In the scenario, no matter how Jane is rational or alert, 
there is no way for the new blue qualia to be attended to or noticed by 
her. However, cognitive intimacy enforces that in the non-defective 
background, the blue qualia must be potentially attended to or noticed by 
Jane. For the flipping inscrutables scenario implies that there can be 
cognitively alienated qualia, the scenario turns out to be incoherent. Under 
the assumption of necessary phenomenal grounding, Russellian monism must 
claim that the loss of cognitive intimacy of Jane’s newly acquired qualia is 
negatively conceivable. Nonetheless, such cognitively alienated qualia are 
incoherent and negatively inconceivable. By reductio, Russellian monism is 
wrong.
2.4.3 Objections and Replies
There may be many possible objections against the flipping inscrutables 
scenario. Every step of the argument might have a corresponding objection. 
In what follows, I will examine possible objections and show that none of 
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them works. 
Objection 1: the flipping scenario assumes that microphysical structures and 
dispositions are multiply realizable. However, proponents of Russellian 
monism can argue that this is inconceivable. For example, basic particles’ 
gravitational interactions allow only one sort of inscrutables as their ground. 
For an electron to pull another one, it must instantiate a particular kind of 
inscrutables. No other inscrutable can ground the electron’s disposition to 
pull another. At the fundamental level, functions of Jane’s neuronal group 
must be realized by I and only by I. I* cannot ground dispositions of the 
neuronal group’s basic particles. If so, the invention of the neuroprosthetic 
device by the demon would be inconceivable.         
Reply: this objection contradicts with Russellian monism’s first commitments. 
Structuralism about physics states that properties of basic physical entities 
are relational and dispositional. Realism about inscrutables states that 
inscrutables are not relational and dispositional. Following these two 
commitments, one must conclude that there cannot be any conceptual 
connection from basic particles’ relations or dispositions to their inscrutables. 
For instance, if inscrutables’ grounding is a priori entailed by microphysical 
relations/dispositions, one would be able to read off which 
relational/dispositional properties are grounded by which inscrutables without 
any empirical information. One would ‘see through’ what basic particles do 
and find out which relations/dispositions are grounded by which inscrutables. 
Nevertheless, structuralism about physics and realism about inscrutables 
guarantee that there cannot be such a priori entailment. And if there is no 
a priori entailment, the Cartesian demon’s invention of the device is 
conceivable in principle. We can conceive of multiple realizations of a 
functional property because truths about the realized functional property do 
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not entail truths of realizers. Likewise, one can conceive of multiple 
realizations of microphysical structures or dynamics, since truths about 
microphysical structures or dynamics entail nothing about inscrutables.
Objection 2: you have argued that when the switch turns on, there cannot 
be any new cognitive process because there cannot be any new physical 
change or difference. There is a change in qualia, however. Flipping I into 
I*, the demon changes the red qualia into blue ones. It is possible that this 
intrinsic, phenomenal change enables the blue qualia to be attended or 
noticed by Jane. Russellian monists can argue that qualia-involved cognitive 
processes may not depend on only structural and dynamics of physics. They 
may depend on intrinsic, phenomenal change either. If this is the case, the 
intrinsic and phenomenal change between the old and new qualia may 
suffice to make the new blue qualia cognitively intimate.
Reply: it is hard to see how such purely intrinsic, phenomenal changes 
make Jane to pay attention to or notice her new qualia. Ex hypothesi, since 
all structural and dynamical properties of microphysics are fixed, all physical 
causal chains should remain intact. So there cannot be any physical 
information processing. Also, Jane is soulless. Thus, there cannot be any 
physical or non-physical information processing involving Jane’s new qualia. 
If any attending to or noticing the new qualia is possible at all, therefore, it 
must be due to some sort of non-causal epistemic relation to those qualia. 
However, I have argued in Section 2.3.4 that non-causal epistemic relations 
cannot explain how attending to or noticing qualia is possible, because they 
are necessarily constituted by attention to or notice of qualia. If so, there is 
no way for qualia to be potentially attended or noticed. That is, 
qualia-involved cognitive processes cannot depend on intrinsic, phenomenal 
change of qualia.
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Objection 3: there is still a logical space for the newly acquired qualia to 
be potentially paid attention to or noticed by Jane. While the old red qualia 
are grounded by I, the newly acquired blue qualia are grounded by I*. This 
difference in grounding may initiate cognitive processes involving the new 
blue qualia. Though the new qualia cannot trigger new information 
processing at all, their being differently grounded by I* can somehow affect 
Jane’s cognition. Then, Jane’s newly acquired blue qualia can be cognitive 
intimate without new information processing.
Reply: be that as it may, there seems to be no way for the difference in 
grounding to bring cognitive processes involving the new qualia. There is a 
good analogy for this point. If Jane can attend to or notice her new blue 
qualia, she must be able to do so with her neuroprosthetic device. There is 
a strong analogy between them: both are given by the Cartesian demon’s 
intervention. Both are newly acquired when the switch turns on. Most of 
all, both are grounded by I*. Thus, if Jane can pay attention to or notice 
her newly acquired blue qualia in virtue of the difference in grounding, she 
can do so with her newly acquired device.  
Then, consider whether Jane can cognitively access to the device. 
Obviously, she cannot. Although there is a difference in grounding between 
Jane’s neuronal group and the device, when the switch turns on, she cannot 
detect anything about the device. From the perspective of Jane, whether her 
neuronal group in her brain is replaced or not, it would not affect her 
cognition in the slightest. It follows that the device’s being grounded by I* 
does not render the device potentially attended to or noticed. This cognitive 
failure strongly suggests that the difference in grounding cannot make the 
grounded things cognitively intimate. This result straightforwardly applies to 
the case of qualia: newly acquired qualia’s being differently grounded by I* 
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would not make them to be potentially paid attention to or noticed by Jane.
Objection 4: cognitive intimacy is supposed to be true a priori. Therefore, 
Russellian monism must assimilate cognitive intimacy anyway. For instance, 
proponents of Russellian monists may take cognitive intimacy as their fourth 
commitment. So even if the flipping inscrutables scenario is negatively 
conceivable, Russellian monists would deny that it entails the loss of 
cognitive intimacy. They would insist that even when inscrutables are 
flipped, the newly acquired blue qualia must be potentially attended or 
noticed by Jane and that there is a way to explain how those qualia can be 
cognitively intimate. 
Reply: the point of my argument is that there is no way for Russellian 
monism to assimilate cognitive intimacy. For the sake of argument, let us 
suppose that Jane’s new blue qualia can be attended or noticed by Jane. 
The question is what underlies this cognitive intimacy of the new qualia. 
Logically, there are only two candidates: 1) the grounded new blue qualia; 
2) the grounding inscrutable complex I*. In replying to Objection 2, I have 
argued that the new qualia themselves cannot enable any qualia-involved 
cognitive process. And my reply to Objection 3 shows that there is a good 
reason to think that I* cannot make Jane’s new qualia cognitively intimate. 
Then, Jane’s new qualia cannot be cognitively intimate under Russellian 
monism. If Jane’s new qualia cannot be cognitively intimate under 
Russellian monism, Russellian monism should be false.  
Qualia epiphenomenalism would want to account for cognitive intimacy. 
However, if the story of dull Jane and my replies to possible objections are 
right, they cannot. Qualia epiphenomenalism is thus wrong. Likewise, my 
argument and replies are intended to show that Russellian monists cannot 
account for cognitive intimacy, even if they want to. Even if Russellian 
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monism takes cognitive intimacy as their fourth commitment, my argument 
would show that Russellian monism is inherently inconsistent: the first three 
commitments undercut the fourth.
In this section, I have argued that Russellian monism is a seemingly 
promising but wrong hypothesis. The optimistic prospects of Russellian 
monism, therefore, should be critically reconsidered. In the next section, I 
will deal with the last disjunct of the consequence of the conceivability of 
zombies, interactionist dualism. 
2.5 Interactionist Dualism and Swapped Psychons 
Interactionist dualism claims that nonphysical entities actually exist and 
causally interact with physical entities. Since it argues for a possibility that 
some physical events might be caused by nonphysical phenomena, 
Interactionist dualism is incompatible with the causal closure of the physical 
and the completeness of the physics. Despite its unattractive appearance, in 
the debate concerning the zombie argument, interactionist dualism emerges 
as a consistent and even decent alternative to physicalism. Chalmers argued 
that the conceivability of zombies might have interactionist dualism as one 
of its possible consequences. (Chalmers, 1999; 2010)26) If so, the prima 
facie consistency of interactionist dualism might lend some support to the 
conceivability of zombies. In this section, however, I shall argue that when 
it comes to qualia, interactionist dualism turns out to be false. To this end, 
first, in Section 2.5.1, how the conceivability of the zombie might be 
26) While Chalmers reserves to accept interactionist dualism, he also says that it is 
“elegant and appealing and not obviously false.” (Chalmers, 1999, p. 493) He 
further thinks “there is at least room for viable interactionism to be explored and 
that the most common objection to interactionism has little force. […] if we have 
independent reason to think that consciousness is irreducible, and if we wish to 
retain the intuitive view that consciousness plays a causal role, then this is a view 
to be taken very seriously.” (Chalmers, 2010, p. 129-130)
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compatible with interactionism is summarized. I shall argue in Section 2.5.2 
that interactionist dualism is wrong in that it cannot help but allows an 
essentially negatively inconceivable scenario to be negatively conceivable. 
Then, possible objections will be considered and rejected If the argument in 
this section is sound, we can have not only traditional worries or complaints 
about interactionism but a new argument against it. As a result, the last 
position entailed by the conceivability of zombies can be rejected.   
2.5.1 The Conceivability of The Gappy Zombie World    
How interactionist dualism is entailed by the conceivability of zombies 
demands some clarification. Let us presume that one believes that 
interactionist dualism is true of the actual world. In order to conceive of the 
zombie world, all that she needs to do is subtracting just one of the 
phenomenal qualities in the actual world, while leaving all physical events 
intact. This imaginary subtraction will necessarily leave a “causal gap” 
somewhere in the conceived situation. This “causal gap” renders some 
physical events causally underdetermined, so that there will be certain 
physical events that are unexplainable. However, there seems to no bar to 
conceiving of such unexplainable physical events. (Chalmers, 2004. p. 184; 
2010, p. 156) Therefore, interactionist dualism is compatible with the 
conceivability of zombies. According to interactionist dualism, the actual 
world can be described by the scheme below.
    
                                 q
                  · · · → en            en+1 → · · ·
Figure 1
en and en+1 represent physical events. q is an arbitrary phenomenal quality 
67
of experience. The small arrows refer to physical causal chains to en or 
from en+1. The large ones represent psychophysical interactions between en, 
en+1, and q. For example, en might be an activation of pain receptor. q 
might be an immaterial painfulness, and en+1 might be an activation of 
reticular formation, which results in dopamine secretion, sending signals to 
prefrontal cortex, and motor planning involved in various avoidance 
behaviors. Dots after en+1 may signify those following neural events. Given 
this scheme, the conceived zombie world under interactonist dualism might 
be described as follows. 
      
               · · ·  →  en    (   )    en+1  →  · · ·
Figure 2
The bracket between en and en+1 represents the causal gap made by 
imaginary subtraction of q. Despite the causal gap, the full physical 
description of en and en+1 and all the involved causal chains would be 
perfectly the same. Though in the zombie world en loses one of its effects 
and en+1 loses one of its necessary causal conditions, this omission would 
not make any difference in the physics of the world, because the lost one, 
namely q, is immaterial. The remove of psychophysical interactions 
represented by large arrows would not bring any change to the physics, as 
they are psychophysical. If so, while the zombie world conceived under 
interactionist dualism would be causally gappy, such world is nonetheless 
conceivable in so far as it makes any sense.  
2.5.2 The Swapped Psychons  
In this section, after setting several points about the nature of interactionist 
dualism and causation, I will describe a scenario and argue that 
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interactionist dualism must allow that it is negatively conceivable.27) 
However, such scenario is negatively inconceivable, so we have a reductio 
argument against interactionist dualism.
Two points must be noted. First, in order to be compatible with the 
conceivability of zombies, interactionist dualism must hold that 
psychophysical causation is contingent. If psychophysical causality is 
necessary, either the physical event in Figure 1, en, necessarily causes q or 
another physical event, en+1, must be caused by q. Either way, it would be 
impossible to imagine a situation in which en and en+1 present but q is 
absent. For the former, since en is supposed to necessarily cause q, the 
situation where en presents but qn is absent is unimaginable. For the latter, 
for en+1 is assumed to be necessarily caused by q, imagining the situation 
where en+1 occurs but q does not occur is impossible. As far as 
interactionist dualism is compatible with the conceivability of zombies, it 
must hold that psychophysical causation is contingent.
Second, even if interactionist dualism supposes immaterial souls, they 
should not supervene on microphysical facts. The reason is, again, its 
compatibility with the conceivability of zombies. I have explained in Section 
2.3.3 that because of the ‘that’s-all’ clause in PTI&~Q, the conceivability of 
zombies cannot allow any soul or non-physical causation. If interactionist 
dualism assumes that souls or non-physical causation supervene on 
microphysical facts, then it cannot assimilate the conceivability of PTI&~Q, 
since it cannot satisfy T. Insofar as interactionist dualism is supposed to be 
compatible with the conceivability of zombies, it must hold that souls or 
non-physical causations does not supervene on microphysical facts. 
27) The term ‘psychon’ was coined by Eccles, who originally used the term to 
specify a special mental unit affecting neuronal activities in the brain. My use of 
the term in this thesis is much more liberal then Eccles’. I will use ‘psychon’ in 
order to refer to any immaterial or non-physical qualia that interactionist dualism 
commits to.
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With these points in mind, let us picture a situation where psychons are 
swapped. The scenario goes as follows: by some quirk in prevailing laws of 
nature, a psychon in the actual world is swapped by another completely 
different psychon. Due to this swapping of psychons, whatever had been 
directly or indirectly caused by the psychon is instead caused by that 
different psychon. Also, there are no immaterial souls. The immaterial pain 
in the actual world, for instance, is swapped by immaterial pleasure in wi. 
The situation of wi thus can be described by the figure below.  
     
                                 q*
                · · ·  →  en            en+1  →  · · ·
Figure 3
wi is a supermasochistic world. In the actual world, the activation of pain 
receptors causes the intense pain q, and the pain sends signals to prefrontal 
cortex, which cause motor planning and finally lead to complex contractions 
of muscle tissues in one’s limb. After the swapping, however, the same 
activation of pain receptors brings an extreme pleasure q*. And q* causes 
the signal sending to prefrontal cortex, motor planning, etc. And there is no 
soul or non-physical causation. This is conceivable because souls are 
supposed not to supervene on anything physical. A person who have felt the 
intense pain, say Jane, now loses her soul and feels the extreme pleasure. 
However, the extreme pleasure does not make any physical difference. Jane’ 
brain operates the same, and she still shows pain behaviors. This is all that 
the swapped psychons scenario is about. It is an interactionist version of 
inverted qualia. 
Then, can the swapped psychon, q*, be attended to or noticed by Jane? 
It cannot. There is no way for q* to be attended to or noticed by Jane, 
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since even after the swapping, there are no causal differences. Ex hypothesi, 
there are no physical differences. There cannot be any non-physical 
differences either, since there is no non-physical entity. Physically and 
non-physically, there is no difference at all. And I have shown that if there 
is no difference, there is no cognitive process either. This implies that even 
if Jane feels the extreme pleasure, she cannot pay attend to or notice that 
feeling. This is so even when Jane is perfectly rational or alert. In a 
nutshell, Jane’s new pleasure is cognitively alienated from her.    
Is this swapped psychons scenario negatively conceivable under 
interactionist dualism? In other words, is the scenario not ruled out a priori 
by interactionist dualism? Apparently, it is not. In conceiving the scenario, 
one should do only two things: (1) to imaginarily distort psychophysical 
causal chains; (2) to subtract any immaterial souls (if they exist). Since 
interactionist dualism must hold that psychophysical causality is contingent, 
(1) is clearly conceivable. (2) is also conceivable, since it is assumed that 
soul or anything immaterial does not supervene on the physical. 
Interactionist dualism is compatible with both (1) and (2). As the swapped 
psychons scenario is coherent under interactionist dualism, it is at least 
negatively conceivable. Therefore, once interactionist dualism is compatible 
with the conceivability of the zombie world, there is no way for 
interactionist dualism to deny that the inert psychons are negatively 
conceivable. It cannot help but entails that the scenario is at least negatively 
conceivable.
However, is the swapped psychons scenario really negatively conceivable? 
The whole point boils down to whether the swapped but cognitively 
alienated qualia are negatively conceivable. We have already seen that such 
case is not even negatively conceivable. In Section 2.3 and 2.4, I have 
argued that when qualia cannot make any change and difference, they 
cannot be informationally processed and cannot be attended to and noticed 
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by subjects of experience. However, cognitive intimacy does not allow 
qualia to be cognitively alienated, so that scenarios which entail such 
possibility must be rejected. The swapped psychons scenario is also exposed 
to the same reductio argument. Consider Figure 3. q* cannot be cognitively 
intimate. However, this cannot be the case, if cognitive intimacy is true a 
priori. Therefore, the swapped psychons scenario is incoherent and 
negatively inconceivable. The argument so far raises a reductio against 
interactionist dualism: interactionist dualism entails that the swapped 
psychons scenario is negatively conceivable. If my argument is right, it is 
not even negatively conceivable that psychons are swapped. By reductio, 
interactionist dualism turns out to be wrong.      
2.5.3 Objections and Replies
There might be possible objections. Objections may come from largely two 
directions: denying the negative conceivability of the swapped psychons 
scenario or arguing for the cognitive intimacy of inert psychons. I will 
examine four of such objections and show that none of them is successful.
Objection 1: it can be argued that qualia-involved cognitive processes are so 
special and unique that they should be treated as exceptions of information 
processing theory of cognition. Proponents of interactionist dualism may 
claim that in attending to or noticing q*, no set of information processing is 
required. It might be the case that qualia can be attended or noticed through 
a cognitively special way. For instance, interactionist dualism can accept 
some sort of non-causal epistemic relation. If so, q* can be cognitively 
intimate under interactionist dualism.   
Reply: it is not clear at all that any non-causal epistemic relation can help 
anything here. In Section 2.3.4 and 2.3.5, I have shown that why no 
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non-causal epistemic relation can make qualia cognitively intimate. The 
cognitive structure of non-causal epistemic relation undercuts the possibility 
that qualia-involved cognitive processes will be explained in terms of 
non-causal epistemic relation. While there are overwhelming reasons to doubt 
that non-causal epistemic relations enable qualia-involved cognitive processes, 
reasons to accept such relations are hard to find. I think one can safely 
assume that appealing to non-causal epistemic relation cannot help 
interactionist dualism.
Objection 3: if your argument is right, even physicalism would be exposed 
to the same reductio. In order to conceive the swapped psychons, the only 
thing one need to do is to accept that psychophysical causation contingent. 
And as you rightly pointed out in replying to Objection 1, interactionist 
dualists cannot hold that psychophysical causation is necessary. Insofar as 
physicalists hold that psychophysical causation is contingent, they cannot 
help but admit that the swapped psychons scenario is negatively conceivable 
at least. Then, physicalism would turn out to be wrong. In effect, if your 
reductio argument is valid, every philosophical position that assumes the 
contingency of psychophysical causation would turn out to be false. Of 
course, this is not the case.
Reply: the swapped psychons scenario is not even negatively conceivable, 
when physicalism is true. The minimal necessary condition for physicalism 
is mind-body supervenience. Therefore, if physicalism is true, psychons must 
supervene on something physical, regardless of whether the physical world is 
causally closed or not. There must be a physical base p on which q 
supervenes. Since q supervenes on p, en can cause q only by causing p. For 
the same reason, in order for en to cause q*, it must cause p* which is a 
physical supervenience base of q*. However, when en causes p* instead of 
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p, it cannot be en anymore, for physical events are individuated by their 
causal profiles. As Chalmers emphasizes, physical entities are structural and 
dynamical in nature: they are defined by how they interact with other 
properties or conditions in particular ways. For instance, what it is to have 
a certain mass is to stand in certain law-like relations to other entities, such 
as gravity. If so, physical events must be individuated by there law-like 
relations to other physical events. en is en because it is causally related with 
p. Once it causes a different effect, namely p*, en must be individuated 
differently. For instance, en is individuated as the activation of pain receptor 
because of its causal relation to C-fiber firing. If en is causally related to a 
different event, D-fiber firing, it should be individuated as something 
different, the activation of pleasure receptor. So once physicalism is 
assumed, to change psychophysical causations while leaving physical events 
intact is impossible. Changing the psychophysical causal chain from en to q 
entails changing the physical causal chain from en to p, and once the 
physical causal chain from en to p is changed, en cannot remain fixed as it 
is. Therefore, the swapped psychons scenario is inconceivable under 
physicalism.
2.6 The Inconceivability of Zombies
Let us take stock. The conceivability of zombies entails the disjunction of 
three different theses: qualia epiphenomenalism, Russellian monism, and 
interactionist dualism. In order to refute the conceivability of zombies, I had 
to show that all of the three disjuncts are false. From Section 2.3 to 2.5, I 
have provided my reductio arguments against each of them. It is easy to 
notice that the same pattern is repeated in all my reductio arguments. All 
three positions entailed by the conceivability of zombies entails the negative 
conceivability of cognitively alienated qualia. Cognitive intimacy, nonetheless, 
blocks this conceivability. 
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Why do all the positions suffer the same pattern of reductio? The reason 
seems to be that they all neglect the issue of cognitive intimacy. I think 
this ignorance can be partially explained by the way how the Hard problem 
of consciousness is raised. The Hard problem always asking why there is 
such thing as consciousness at all. Sometimes it asks how physical processes 
can generate experience. These questions are essentially about existence of 
consciousness. Accordingly, when philosophers are engaging in the debate 
concerning consciousness, they tend to focus on metaphysical questions: is 
consciousness identical to physical process? Do phenomenal facts supervene 
on physical facts? Can qualia be functionalized? The Hard problem of 
consciousness is centered on the metaphysical nature of consciousness. 
Nonetheless, there are crucial issues of consciousness other than the Hard 
problem. For example, is there any consciousness that cognitively insulated 
from subjects? Does attention supervene on to phenomenal aspects of our 
experience? Can phenomenal qualities of our experience be unnoticeable in 
principle? These are the questions of the cognitive essence of consciousness. 
Some philosophers were overly obsessed with the metaphysical nature of 
phenomenology that they missed the cognitive essence of it. None of qualia 
epiphenomenalism, Russellian monism, and interactionist dualism attempt to 
take account of the cognitive intimacy of consciousness. Since all of these 
positions neglect the cognitive essence of phenomenology, it is likely that 
they ignore cognitive intimacy either. Conversely, once we turn our attention 
to the issues of cognitive intimacy, I believe that many would seriously 





In this chapter, I shall move on to the second premise of the zombie 
argument, which states that ideal positive primary conceivability of PTI&~Q 
entails the primary possibility of PTI&~Q. Whereas CP- claims that ideal 
negative primary conceivability entails primary possibility, CP+ states that 
ideal positive primary conceivability entails primary possibility. (Chalmers, 
2010) The second premise of the zombie argument is an application of 
CP+. Recently, some type-B materialists suggest anti-zombie arguments that 
parody the zombie argument. Anti-zombie arguments draw a paradoxical 
conclusion that if CP+ is right, CP+ is wrong. However, in Section 3.2, I 
shall argue that all the anti-zombie arguments previously suggested fail. The 
failure of the previous attempts suggests that to be a precise parody, 
anti-zombie arguments must reflect the ideal positive primary conceivability 
and the possibility of Russellian monism. Taking this point into account, I 
will provide a Russellian version of anti-zombie arguments. If the argument 
succeeds, CP+ can be rejected.  
3.2 The Russellian Illuminati Argument and the 
Conceivability-Possibility Entailment 
Many philosophers have been focused on the second premise of the zombie 
argument: if PTI&~Q is conceivable, is primarily possible. This premise is 
an application of a general principle linking conceivability and modality. 
Chalmers(2002) argues that if a statement S is ideally positively primarily 
conceivable, S is primarily possible. This thesis is called CP+. (Chalmers, 
2010, p.147) Despite numerous attempts to refute CP+, Chalmers believes 
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that all those criticisms fail. The central reason is that there seems to be no 
convincing counterexample against CP+. “[T]here have been many attempts 
at providing counterexamples to CP+, but none of these provides clear 
counterexamples.” (ibid., p. 180) I disagree. A number of physicalists have 
suggested that if zombies are conceivable, a conscious creature which 
satisfies physicalist description is also conceivable. I shall argue that from 
such conceivability, one can develop a counterargument against CP+. In 
what follows, I will argue that mentioned cases can be considered as 
counterexamples against CP+. First, by examining ‘the anti-zombie 
arguments’ provided by those philosophers who prefer physicalism, I will 
point out that all of them share the same problems. (Section 3.2.1) Then, 
my versions of two-dimensionally articulated anti-zombie arguments will be 
suggested, and actual and possible objections will be replied. (Section 3.2.2 
and 3.2.3) 
3.2.1 Anti-zombie arguments
Impressed by the force of the zombie argument, a group of philosophers has 
been attempted to show that the same move can be made to argue for 
physicalism. Their arguments share common features. First, by applying CP+ 
or something similar to CP+, they suggest their own zombie arguments 
which show that the physicalism is wrong or dualism is right. Next, by 
applying CP+ or something like CP+ again, they parody the zombie 
arguments. They appeal to a conceivability of creatures that are 
indistinguishable from us in every physical and even conscious aspect. The 
crucial twist is that even though these creatures are identical with us, they 
have nothing over and above their physical properties. These imaginary 
creatures are wholly physical and do not have any non-physical 
consciousness. Hence, to conceive such creatures is tantamount to conceive 
purely physical consciousness. These creatures have many names, including 
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“anti-zombies” (Frankish, 2007; 2012) or “zoombies” or “shombies” (Brown, 
2010; 2013) The parody arguments draw the secondary (metaphysical) 
possibility of such creatures. If so, physicalism is right and dualism is 
wrong. Combining the original and parody arguments, one can draw a 
contradiction: physicalism is right and wrong. Or, dualism is wrong and 
right. Since other premises seem OK, by reductio, the premise of CP+ must 
be rejected. This is what the anti-zombie arguments are about. 
There have been many varieties of the anti-zombie arguments. The first 
one was presented by Keith Frankish. (Frankish, 2007) As a target 
argument, he presents a version of the zombie arguments: (1) zombies are 
conceivable. (2) If zombies are conceivable, then zombies are possible. (3) 
If zombies are possible, then consciousness is not physical. (4) So 
consciousness is not physical. (ibid., p. 652) Then, Frankish suggests his 
version of the anti-zombie argument by simply replacing ‘zombies’ with 
‘anti-zombies’.
(A1) Anti-zombies are conceivable
(A2) If anti-zombies are conceivable, then anti-zombies are possible
(A3) If anti-zombies are possible, then consciousness is physical
(A4) So consciousness is physical.
The parody arguments yield a contradiction. Premise (2) or (A2) is 
suspicious. Both are applications of the principle that conceivability entails 
possibility. Thus, it seems that we have a good reason to believe that even 
if something is conceivable, it does not mean that it is possible.    
Frankish’s argument has received much attention. In the current context, 
however, its problems are obvious. First, the target and parody arguments do 
not correctly apply CP+. CP+ states that if a statement is ideally, primarily, 
and positively conceivable, it is primarily possible. However, premise (2) 
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and (A2) state that if zombies or anti-zombies are conceivable, then they 
are possible. They do not reflect CP+. They are link conceivability 
simpliciter with metaphysical possibility. Frankish’s anti-zombie argument 
cannot provide a reductio against CP+. His version of the anti-zombie 
argument is irrelevant to countering CP+. 
Second, even if Frankish revises his argument by implementing CP+, the 
reductio against CP+ does not follow. To draw secondary possibility of 
anti-zombies, he must show that anti-zombies are ideally, positively, and 
primarily conceivable and that their primary possibility entails their 
secondary possibility. The problem is that Frankish does not provide any 
argument for these claims. He ignores the two-dimensional structure of the 
zombie argument and sticks to his own anti-zombie arguments. Without 
showing the positive conceivability and the secondary possibility of 
anti-zombies, Frankish’s argument cannot conclude that physicalism is right. 
In turn, it fails to draw a contradiction and raise a reductio against CP+. 
Even if Frankish sets his argument in the two-dimensional framework and 
argues for the positive conceivability and secondary possibility of 
anti-zombies, it still falls short of raising the reductio against CP+. 
Frankish’s argument neglects the possibility of Russellian monism. To 
complete the reductio, the anti-zombie argument should yield a contradiction 
with the conclusion of the zombie argument. The conclusion of the zombie 
argument, however, is not merely that physicalism is wrong. It is that 
physicalism is wrong or Russellian monism is the case. To draw a 
contradiction, Frankish must show that physicalism is right and Russellian 
monism is not the case. Unless Russellian monism is rejected, the 
anti-zombie argument fails to draw a contradiction and complete the 
reductio. 
There is another version of anti-zombie arguments. Recently, Richard 
Brown(2013) developed his own anti-zombie argument. Brown rightly points 
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out that like physicalism, dualism itself implies a modal claim, namely □(Q
⊃~PT). This modal claim can be interpreted as ‘necessarily, if there is a 
certain phenomenal quality, it is not the case that everything that exists is 
physical’. Although Brown does not provide his target argument, we can 
easily reconstruct it based on the modal claim: (1*) □(Q⊃~PT) is 
negatively conceivable. (2*) If □(Q⊃~PT) is negatively conceivable, then □
(Q→~PT) is primarily possible. (3*) If □(Q⊃~PT) is primarily possible, 
then □(Q⊃~PT) is secondarily possible. (4*) If □(Q⊃~PT) is secondarily 
possible, then dualism is true. (5*) Dualism is true. Brown’s parody of this 
dualist conceivability argument runs as follows: 
(S1) PT&Q is negatively conceivable.
(S2) If PT&Q is negatively conceivable, then PT&Q is primarily possible.
(S3) If PT&Q is primarily possible, then PT&Q is secondarily possible.
(S4) If PT&Q is secondarily possible, then dualism is false.
(S5) Dualism is false. (ibid., p. 2)
PT&Q is incompatible with □(Q⊃~PT). PT&Q can be roughly construed as 
‘everything that exists is physical and there is a phenomenal quality’. 
Brown(2013) calls creatures living in a world where PT&Q holds shombies. 
While shombies are purely and wholly physical, they are conscious. From 
the negative conceivability of PT&Q or shombies, Brown draws a 
contradiction between (5*) and (S5). As in Frankish’s argument, here one 
can reject (2*) or (S2) by reductio. Both state that if something is 
negatively conceivable, it is also primarily possible. 
While Brown’s shombie argument reflects two-dimensional structures, it 
nonetheless faces similar problems with Frankish’s. First, the shombie 
argument is irrelevant to countering CP+. The shombie argument does not 
involve the positive conceivability of PT&Q or shombies. It relies on the 
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principle that if something is negatively conceivable, it is primarily possible. 
This has nothing to do with CP+. Rather, such principle is more akin to 
CP-. That is, the shombie can be a reductio against CP- at best.
Moreover, the shombie argument fails to draw the secondary possibility of 
□(Q⊃~PT) or PT&Q, as it ignores the possibility of Russellian monism. 
Russellian monism and premises (3*) and (S3) are incompatible. Both 
premises can be justified only when primary and secondary intentions of P 
coincide. Nevertheless, Russellian monism claims that they are distinct. To 
see why, one must understand the semantics of microphysical term in the 
two-dimensional framework. It is usually assumed that primary and 
secondary intensions of microphysical term coincide. Microphysical terms, 
such as ‘mass’, ‘charge’, and ‘spin’, are theoretical terms. Their definitions 
are given by theoretical or causal roles they play. ‘Charge’ is defined as 
properties that play charge-roles. It appears intuitive that whatever satisfies 
the definition deserves to be called charge. Even if a certain alien property 
in Twin Earth occupies all the charge-roles, many would call the property 
charge. In this sense, primary and secondary intentions of microphysical 
terms are the same: in worlds considered as actual, they refer to whatever 
satisfies theoretical definitions. In worlds considered as counterfactual, they 
still pick out the same thing. When an expression’s primary and secondary 
intentions coincide, the expression is called semantically neutral. (Chalmers, 
2006) 
Russellian monism denies the semantic neutrality of microphysical terms. 
According to Russellian monism, while primary intensions of microphysical 
terms are a priori given by theoretically defined roles, secondary intensions 
are fixed by inscrutables that actually play those roles. As explained in 
Section 2.4.1, microphysics captures only dispositional or structural properties 
of microphysical entities in the fundamental level. It does not tell us what 
intrinsic natures of microphysical entities ground those dispositions or 
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structures. Russellian monism assumes that actual inscrutables ground 
structures and dynamics. As the primary intention of ‘water’ is given by 
water-roles, Russellian monism claims that the primary intentions of 
microphysical terms are given by theoretical roles. However, as the 
secondary intension of ‘water’ is fixed by the chemical property that 
actually plays water-roles, the secondary intension of microphysical terms 
should be fixed by the inscrutables which actually play theoretical roles. 
That is, Russellian Monism treats microphysical terms as some sort of 
natural kind terms. Russellian monism’s semantic distinction of primary and 
secondary intensions of microphysical terms is rooted in its metaphysical 
distinction of intrinsic and dispositional/structural properties of microphysical 
entities. 
  This Russellian monism’s semantic of microphysical terms immediately 
affects the shombie argument. Microphysical terms are not semantically 
neutral, so that Russellian monism denies the semantic neutrality of 
microphysical truths P. Then, if Russellian monism is the case, even if a 
statement involving P is primarily possible, its secondary possibility does not 
follow. Indeed, in the zombie argument, from the primary possibility of 
PTI&~Q, Chalmers does not draw only its secondary possibility. He infers 
that PTI&~Q is secondarily possible or Russellian monism is true. This is 
the reason why the zombie argument concludes that physicalism is wrong or 
Russellian monism is true. (Chalmers, 2010) Thus, if P is not semantically 
neutral, there is no way to argue for (S3). Even if PT&Q is primarily 
possible, it does not follow that it is secondarily possible. This is why 
Brown’s parody argument fails: Russellian monism and (S3) are 
incompatible. Brown can argue for (S3) only when he successfully rules out 
the possibility of Russellian monism. As far as I can tell, however, he 
never provides any counterargument against Russellian monism. 
Balog also provides an anti-zombie argument.28) Her parody conceivability 
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argument appeals to a conceivability of illuminati. Illuminati, according to 
Balog, are “purely physical creatures that are our physical duplicates and 
enjoy phenomenal experiences”. (Blog, p. 16) Illuminati are very similar to 
Frankish’s anti-zombies and Brown’s shombies. Balog knows well about 
other anti-zombie arguments and is clearly aware of how her illuminati 
argument would work as a reductio against CP+.29) “The point is not to 
take the argument seriously as a positive argument. Rather, it is meant to 
be a reductio of Chalmers’ principle connecting conceivability and modality 
that underlies both the CPpos Principle”. (ibid., p. 25) Balog’s illuminati 







Here, AP is an a priori operator, a shorthand of ‘it is a priori that’. Cpos 
and Cneg are conceivability operators, respectively representing ‘it is 
positively conceivable that’ and ‘it is ne gatively conceivable that’. ◊ means 
that ‘it is metaphysically possible that’. q is an arbitrary phenomenal term, 
and p is a microphysical term.
The inference from (I1) to (I3) is straightforward. (I4) needs some 
explanations. Why is P&~Q metaphysically impossible when p=q is 
metaphysically possible? This is because p and q are assumed to be rigid 
28) Three versions of Balog’s manuscript are circulated online. The one used in this 
dissertation is from
http://www.philosophy.rutgers.edu/joomlatools-files/docman-files/Balog%20paper.pdf.
29) See (Balog, p. 23, fn60)
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designators. Their referents are fixed by what they refer to in the actual 
world. In every counterfactual world, they pick out whatever they pick out 
in the actual world. For instance, ‘pain’ would refer to painfulness in every 
counterfactual world where painfulness exists. ‘Spin’ would pick out 
properties playing spin-roles in all counterfactual worlds where such 
properties are. If so, when p=q holds in one counterfactual world, it must 
be true in all counterfactual worlds. Two-dimensionally put, when p=q is 
secondarily possible, p=q is secondarily necessary. As P includes the truth 
about p and Q is the truth about q, it implies that there cannot be a 
counterfactual world where P&~Q holds. All the inferences so far are a 
priori, so that we have (I4).    
What about (I6)? It says that if it is a priori that P&~Q is not possible, 
P&~Q is negatively inconceivable. This seems to be true by the notion of 
negative conceivability. Remind that a statement is negatively conceivable 
when it cannot be ruled out a priori. (Chalmers, 2002) By contraposition, 
when a statement is ruled out by a priori reasoning, it is not negatively 
conceivable. The antecedent of (I5) shows that P&~Q is impossible on a 
priori ground, and the consequent says that it is negatively conceivable. 
Thus, P&~Q is negatively inconceivable. And this yields a contradiction. 
Obviously, P&~Q is negatively conceivable. The zombie argument supposes 
that P&~Q is ideally, positively, and primarily conceivable, and positive 
conceivability clearly entails negative conceivability. (ibid.) If so, as (I6) 
yields a contradictory consequence, (I2) must be rejected by reductio. 
Although the illuminati argument is better than other anti-zombie 
arguments in distinguishing positive and negative conceivability, it has a 
number of problems. Most of all, it does not involve CP+. (I2) states that 
the positive conceivability of P&Q&□(p=q) entails the metaphysical 
possibility of it. It is not an application of CP+. Moreover, Blog’s argument 
applies CP+ to a wrong conceivability. Though the argument rightly captures 
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the positive conceivability, it does not concern ideal or primary 
conceivability. If so, strictly speaking, the argument cannot apply CP+ to 
(I1). The argument also deals with a wrong statement. In (I2), the illuminati 
argument applies CP+ to the partially modal statement, P&Q&□(p=q). 
Chalmers, however, may reject this move by restricting CP+ only to 
non-modal statements. Indeed, he thinks that this restriction can be done 
without being ad hoc (Chalmers, 2010, p. 179). If the application of CP+ in 
(I2) is blocked, the illuminati argument cannot be sound.    
The most serious weakness of the illuminati argument is that there is no 
argument for the central premise of the argument, the positive conceivability 
of P&Q&□(p=q). Balog merely mentions that “there is reason to think that 
the conceivabilitypos of zombies and the conceivabilitypos of illuminati are on 
a par. […] Both are equally prima facie conceivablepos, due precisely to the 
direct and substantial grasp of phenomenal properties that phenomenal 
concepts afford us.” (Balog, p. 23) Prima facie conceivability nonetheless 
has nothing to do with positive conceivability. Unless Balog provides any 
clear reason to think that P&Q&□(p=q) is positively conceivable, she cannot 
successfully finish the reductio against CP+.  
All these considerations lead to the conclusion that all of the anti-zombie 
arguments miss the target. On the one hand, anti-zombie arguments do not 
concern the positive conceivability of anti-zombies. As CP+ is essentially 
about the relationship between positive conceivability and primary possibility, 
when anti-zombie arguments do not involve the positive conceivability of 
anti-zombies, they cannot have any bearing on CP+. They can be reductio 
arguments against CP- at best. Chalmers seems to know this problem 
already. Against all attempts to refute CP+, He says that they “seem to 
work best as challenges to CP- rather than to CP+, so that CP+, which is 
all that is required for the argument against materialism, is relatively 
unthreatened.” (Chalmers, 2010, p. 160) On the other hand, all the 
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anti-zombie arguments do not take account of the possibility of Russellian 
monism. Russellian monism involves whether the primary possibility of 
anti-zombies entails the secondary possibility of anti-zombies. However, none 
of the anti-zombie arguments concern Russellian monism. They simply 
ignore the issue of semantic neutrality of P or Q. The anti-zombie 
arguments cannot do what they supposed to do, until these loopholes are 
fixed. 
Therefore, if one wants to develop a successful anti-zombie argument, one 
must do two things: first and foremost, one must build his or her argument 
on the notion of positive conceivability. Second, the semantic neutrality and 
Russellian monism must be taken seriously. Anti-zombie arguments are 
essentially intended to provide a reductio against CP+ by appealing to the 
semantic neutrality of P and Q. In other words, one must secure the 
semantic neutrality of phenomenal and microphysical terms. In the next 
section, I will suggest my version of anti-zombie arguments that is not 
plagued by these problems. 
3.2.2 The Russellian Illuminati Argument 
My version of anti-zombie argument starts by introducing a physicalist 
version of Russellian monism. As explained in the previous section, 
Russellian monism may assume that intrinsic properties which ground 
microphysical dispositions and structures are (proto)phenomenal. If intrinsic 
properties, or inscrutables, are protophenomenal, they can be assumed to be 
physical. Dispositional or structural properties at the fundamental level of the 
physical can be grounded by physical inscrutables. Indeed, Chalmers 
suggests that physical properties as dispositional or structural properties 
might be called narrowly physical, but physical properties as intrinsic and 
inscrutable properties can be labeled broadly physical (Chalmers, 2015). We 
should allow that inscrutables can be at least broadly physical. I have 
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already mentioned that there are various versions of Russellian physicalism. 
Then, narrowly physical properties are grounded by broadly physical 
inscrutables. I will call this version of Russellian monism type-B Russellian 
Physicalism. In short, type-B Russellian monism is a type-B materialist 
version of Russellian monism which assumes broadly physical inscrutables.30)
  Against the zombie argument, type-B materialists, physical truths do not 
entail a priori phenomenal truths. The physical and the phenomenal are 
conceptually distinct, so that it is possible to conceive one without another. 
There remains the so-called ‘epistemic gap’. A group of type-B materialists, 
however, presupposes an identity between phenomenal and physical 
properties. This identity cannot be known a priori as the identity between 
H2O and water cannot be known a priori. There is nonetheless an essential 
difference between these two kinds of identities: if one knows everything 
about H2O and the concept of water, it seems that she can be in a position 
to deduce that H2O is identical to water. Type-B materialists argue that such 
deduction is impossible in the phenomenal-physical identity. Even when one 
knows everything about physics and other truths, she cannot deduce that a 
certain physical process is consciousness. In other words, the identity is not 
entailed a priori by physical truths or PTI. For this absence of a priori 
entailment, there cannot be any transparent and reductive explanation 
between phenomenal qualities and physical processes. The 
phenomenal-physical identities are unique and epistemically primitive in this 
sense. (Chalmers, 2010; Chalmers and Jackson, 2001) 
  Type-B Russellian physucalism inherits many features of type-B 
materialism. It claims that phenomenal properties are conceptually distinct 
from complexes of broadly physical inscrutables. There is no a priori 
entailment from truths about broadly physical inscruatables to truths about 
30) Chalmers already drew a similar distinction between “type-A constitutive 
panpsychism” and “type-B constitutive panpsychism”. (Chalmers, 2015, p. 25)
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phenomenal properties. There would be the epistemic gap between them. 
Further, type-B Russellian physicalism argues that although phenomenal 
properties are identical to a complex of broadly physical inscrutables, the 
identity is not entailed a priori by truths about broadly physical inscrutables. 
If so, why and how phenomenal properties are complexes of broadly 
physical inscrutables cannot be explained transparently and reductively. Like 
phenomenal-physical identities in type-B materialism, identities between 
phenomenal qualities and complexes of broadly physical inscrutables are 
epistemically primitive.










(R10) (R2) or (R7) is wrong. Either way, CP+ is false. 
The argument above can be called the Russellian illuminati argument. I 
introduced new terminology: cipp in (R1) and (R2) is a conceivability 
operator, which means ‘It is ideally, positively, primarily conceivable that’. 
The term p and P in Balog’s illuminati argument are replaced by the term 
pi and Pi. pi is an inscrutable term for an arbitrary complex of physical 
inscruatables. Let us call it a complex physical inscrutable. On the other 
hand, whereas P in the illuminati argument refers to the conjunction of all 
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physical truths, Pi in the Russellian illuminati argument represents a 
conjunction of all inscrutable truths. When every microphysical term in P is 
replaced by its corresponding inscrutable term, we have Pi. As P includes 
the truth about p, Pi includes a truth about pi as one of its conjuncts. For 
insrutables are broadly physical in type-B Russellian physicalism, Pi can be 
considered as a conjunction of all broadly physical truths. In Chalmers’ 
terms, P is the conjunction of narrowly physical truths, but Pi is that of 
broadly physical truths. ◊1 and ◊2 are two-dimensional modal operators that 
respectively represent ‘It is primarily possible that’ and ‘It is secondarily 
possible that’.
  Whereas the original argument identifies a phenomenal property with a 
microphysical property, my argument makes the same identification with a 
complex physical inscrutable. As all versions of anti-zombie arguments 
assume purely physical creatures with consciousness, type-B Russellian 
physicalism supposes that consciousness itself is somehow identical to a 
complex physical property. Both allow purely physical consciousness and 
deny non-physical consciousness. (R1) claims that PiQTI&(pi=q) is ideally 
positively primarily conceivable. (R2) is an application of CP+. (R3) states 
that PiQTI&(pi=q) is primarily possible, it is secondarily possible. The 
inference from (R4) to (R5) can be justified analogously to the inference 
from (I4) to (I5) in the illuminati argument. (R6) says that PiTI&~Q is 
ideally, positively, primarily conceivable. From CP+ and the semantic 
neutrality of Pi and Q, the inference from (R6) to (R9) is straightforward. 
(R9) contradicts with (R5). Since there seem to be no problems in other 
premises, it is either (R2) or (R7) that should be rejected. Both are 
applications of CP+. Therefore, CP+ must be false. Given CP+ and the 
semantic neutrality of the terms, inferences from (R4) to (R5) and from 
(R7) to (R9) seem to be safe. What should be justified is (R1), (R2), (R3), 
and (R6). In what follows, I will argue for each of them in turn.
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  For (R1), the first thing to notice is that it does not involve any modal 
claim. This makes (R1) safe from the objection that the illuminati argument 
faces. As explained in the previous section, the illuminati argument involves 
the partially modal claim, namely P&Q&□(p=q). It applies CP+ to P&Q&□
(p=q), so that it cannot avoid the objection that CP+ may be restricted only 
to non-modal statements. The Russellian illuminati argument does not have 
such problem, because (R1) includes no modal operator. Instead of □(p=q), 
(R1) has pi=q. It is purely a non-modal statement. Therefore, even if the 
applicability of CP+ is narrowed down to non-modal claims, it does not 
affect the Russellian illuminati argument.
  (R1) is a conceivability claim. It claims that PiQTI&(pi=q) is ideally, 
positively, and primarily conceivable. It is easy to see that PiQTI&(pi=q) is 
ideally and primarily conceivable. There seems to be no better reasoning to 
refute the statement. I cannot find any inconsistency or contradiction in it. 
Further, it is conceivable that the actual world turns out to be the world 
where PiQTI&(pi=q) is the case. Hence, (R1) is ideally as well as primarily 
conceivable. Justifying (R1) thus hinges on showing that PiQTI&(pi=q) is 
positively conceivable.
  As explained in Section 1.3.2, to see if a certain statement is positively 
conceivable, one should check whether a situation is coherently modally 
imagined. On the one hand, there must be a psychological process of 
having an intuition of a situation. On the other hand, there must be a 
rational process of interpreting or reflecting upon the intuited situation. 
Interpreting or reflecting upon such situation, a conceiver investigates 
whether there will be any contradiction in the situation. In the end of the 
intertwined two processes, if the conceiver finds that the fully detailed 
situation verifies the statement in question, she can be said to modally 
imagine the statement. If so, in order to argue for the positive conceivability 
of PiQTI&(pi=q), one must answer the following question: is the situation 
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that verifies PiQTI&(pi=q) coherently modally imaginable?
  I think the answer is simply yes. One can have an intuition about a fully 
detailed situation, and one’s reflection upon such situation would tell that it 
verifies PiQTI&(pi=q). Chalmers says “I can detect no internal incoherence; I 
have a clear picture of what I am conceiving when I conceive of a 
zombie.” (Chalmers, 1996, p. 99) Likewise, I have a very clear picture of 
the situation I am coherently modally imagining. There is a psychological 
process of having an intuition of a situation. There is also a rational process 
of reflecting upon the imagined situation. Finally, my rational processes lead 
me to think that such fully detailed situation verifies PiQTI&(pi=q). The 
situation should be treated as the Russellian illuminati world, the world 
where type-B Russellian physicalism is the case.
  One can even illustrate what the Russellian illuminati world would be 
like. For instance, in such world, a complex physical inscrutable C is a 
migraine. C has every property that migraine has, and vice versa. Migraine 
also satisfies every inscrutable description that C satisfies. Both share 
everything. Nonetheless, there are no transparent and reductive explanations 
for their identity. The identity between migraine and C is not entailed a 
priori by truths about C or even by PiTI. Even if one knows everything 
about C, she cannot be in a position to deduce any truth about migraine. 
The identity is supposed to be epistemically primitive. Such identity would 
appear as epistemically primitive regularities: whenever and wherever C is 
instantiated in my forehead, I suffer from migraine, and vice versa. 
Conversely, anytime and anywhere C is not instantiated in my forehead, I 
do not suffer from migraine, and the reverse holds. All the theoretical 
advances and empirical findings lead to the conclusion that there cannot be 
any law of nature or metaphysical principle, or even God’s action or 
miraculous coincidence connecting C and migraine as two distinct 
phenomena. This is only a very rough picture of the situation, but one can 
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easily expect that a complete world can be constructed by adding all the 
details required. Thus, the psychological process for coherent modal 
imagination of the situation will go on. What about the rational process? 
What would our interpretation or reflection tell us about such situation? I 
think the answer is clear: there is no reason to think that they are distinct. 
Then, the rational reflection upon such situation will conclude that the 
situation verifies the identity statement ‘C=migraine’. Clearly, the Russellian 
illuminati world can be exhaustively detailed without contradiction. 
Therefore, one can coherently modally imagine the world where type-B 
Russellian physicalism is true.
(R2) is an application of CP+ to (R1). The first thing to notice is that 
(R1) captures every aspect of conceivability that should be considered. 
Whereas (I1) focuses only on the positive conceivability, (R1) deals with the 
ideal positive primary conceivability. Moreover, unlike the illuminati 
argument, the statement to be conceived is free of any modal operator. Due 
to this non-modality, one can safely apply CP+ to PiQTI&(pi=q) even when 
CP+ is restricted to non-modal statements. This is how my Russellian 
version of the illuminati argument can be safe from the charge of focusing 
on wrong conceivability and applying CP+ to wrong statements. As 
Russellian argument rightly reflects three aspects of conceivability and only 
involves non-modal statements, there is nothing to worry about applying 
CP+ to (R1). Then, we can have (R2).
In (R3), we can see how the Russellian illuminati argument solves one of 
the two problems for anti-zombie argument. Contrast to other versions, my 
argument secures the semantic neutrality of PiQTI&(pi=q). The primary and 
secondary intentions of inscrutable terms must coincide. As ‘H2O’ picks out 
H2O in all worlds no matter how worlds are considered, in all worlds 
considered as actual or counterfactual, inscrutable terms would refer to 
physical inscrutables they actually pick out. Accordingly, the conjunction of 
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all inscrutable truths Pi also should be neutral. And I temporarily take a 
widely accepted view that the primary and secondary intensions of 
phenomenal terms coincide. If so, q and Q are semantically neutral and one 
can safely draw the Russellian illuminati world’s secondary possibility from 
its primary possibility. The Russellian illuminati argument is not vulnerable 
to the possibility of Russellian monism, since it is built on inscrutable terms 
rather than microphysical ones: even if Russellian monism is true, primary 
and secondary intentions of inscrutable terms must coincide. Regardless of 
the truth of Russellian monism, with the assumption that q and Q are 
semantically neutral, (R3) holds.      
(R6) argues that PiTI&~Q is ideally positively primarily conceivable. For 
the ideal conceivability, I cannot find any rational reasoning that falsifies 
PiTI&~Q. Remind that Pi is the conjunction of inscrutable truths. These 
inscrutable truths must be broadly physical truth. And according to type-B 
Russellian physicalism, there cannot be any a priori entailment between 
broadly physical truths and an arbitrary phenomenal truth. Then, there is no 
barrier to ideally conceive PiTI without Q. For positive conceivability, I 
have a clear positive conception about a situation where PiTI&~Q is true. 
The situation might be considered as the Russellian zombie world, which 
shares every broadly physical inscrutables with the Russellian illuminati 
world but lacks q. For Q is a truth about q, Q cannot hold in the 
Russellian zombie world. In such world, pi still realizes microphysical 
dispositions and structures but does not have any property that q has. 
Neither does it satisfy any phenomenological description which q would 
satisfy. No matter how arbitrary details are fleshed out, my rational 
reflection upon such world does not find any contradiction. The Russellian 
zombie world is simply a zombie world whose microphysical structures and 
dynamics are realized by physical inscrutables. This Russellian version of 
zombie worlds appears to be as positively conceivable as the original 
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version. Last, for primary conceivability, I can easily conceive of the case 
where the actual world turns out to be the Russellian zombie world. There 
seems to be no a priori reasoning to rule out the epistemic hypothesis that 
the Russellian zombie world is actually the case. Thus, PiTI&~Q is 
conceivable, in an ideal, positive, and primary sense. Let us call (R6) the 
conceivability of Russellian zombies.
For the sake of argument, I assumed that phenomenal terms are 
semantically neutral thus far. While this assumption has been widely 
endorsed, one may doubt it in principle. Primary and secondary intensions 
of phenomenal terms might not coincide in such a way that primary 
intensions are determined by what phenomenal properties are like, while 
secondary intensions are fixed by what phenomenal properties really are. In 
the case of the phenomenal term pain, for instance, the primary intension 
would pick out the painfulness of pain, while the secondary intension would 
refer to a property that is actually painful. This distinction of primary and 
secondary intensions of ‘pain’ revives a modal illusion for pain. That is, 
one can legitimately conceive of a world where a certain property that is 
painful but not pain is not identical with the actually painful property. This 
modal illusion directly defies the Kripkean intuition that what is qualitatively 
identical with pain just is pain. It is widely believed that introspection upon 
experience tells us what experience is like, and what experience is like is 
what it is. However, introspection may reveal only what it is like, not what 
it really is. Once the appearance-reality gap is restored in phenomenal 
properties, there seems to be no way to deny such counterintuitive 
conceivability. Except the Kripkean intuition, there seems to be no principled 
reason to preclude the appearance-reality gap in phenomenal properties. If 
so, one can have a right to doubt the semantic neutrality of phenomenal 
terms.
If phenomenal terms are not semantically neutral, the Russellian illuminati 
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argument cannot be sound. Premise (R3) and (R8) fail to be justified. I 
think, however, another argument that is equivalent to the Russellian 
illuminati argument can be constructed. Even when primary and secondary 
intensions of phenomenal terms are distinct, one can build a new Russellian 
illuminati argument by utilizing expressions describing properties that are 
essentially reflected by the primary intensions of phenomenal terms. Let me 
explain. If type-B Russellian physicalism is right, a phenomenal term would 
behave like natural kind terms. For instance, as the primary and second 
intensions of ‘water’ are respectively <the watery stuff> and <H2O>, those 
of ‘pain’ would be like <the painful feeling> and <complex physical 
inscrutable>. Here, painfulness can be considered as a property that is 
closely associated with the primary intension of ‘pain’. The primary 
intension of ‘pain’ must be determined by what can be known by a priori 
understanding of the term. Painfulness is the only property we can know a 
priori about ‘pain’. Thus, the primary intension of ‘pain’ must reflect 
painfulness. Without reflecting painfulness, it cannot be the primary intension 
of ‘pain’. In this sense, painfulness is the property essentially reflected by 
the primary intension of ‘pain’. Concerning the other phenomenal term, 
‘phenomenal redness’, phenomenal redness-likeness would be such property. 
The only property that we can know a priori about ‘phenomenal redness’ is 
that it is phenomenal redness-like, so that the primary intension of 
‘phenomenal redness’ must reflect phenomenal redness-likeness. Let us call 
such properties intensional essences. 
Now, we can think of an expression that describes painfulness, 
‘painfulness’ for example. The important step is analyzing this expression in 
two-dimensional way. What is the primary intension of ‘painfulness’? 
Clearly, ‘painfulness’ would pick out painfulness in all worlds considered as 
actual. What is the secondary intension of the term? Definitely, the term 
would refer to painfulness in every world considered as counterfactual. The 
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primary and secondary intensions of ‘painfulness’ coincide. They both rigidly 
designate painfulness in all worlds no matter how worlds are considered. 
Likewise, the primary and secondary intensions of ‘phenomenal 
redness-likeness’ would rigidly designate phenomenal redness-likeness in all 
world. These expressions can be called intensional essence terms. It can be 
said that intensional essence terms for consciousness always capture 
intensional essences of consciousness, which are appearances of 
consciousness revealed by introspection.   
Now, we can see how a new version of the Russellian illuminati 
argument can be constructed even when phenomenal terms are semantically 
non-neutral. If phenomenal terms are not semantically neutral, it is 
impossible to build the Russellian illuminati argument with phenomenal 
terms. However, there is more than one way to skin a cat. Instead of 
phenomenal terms, one can use intensional essence terms for phenomenal 
properties. To illustrate, suppose that the primary and secondary intensions 
of ‘pain’ are distinct. Then, we must give up the original version of the 
Russellian illuminati arguments. Nonetheless, the phenomenal term leaves an 
intensional essence term behind. As a semantic substitute for ‘pain’, one can 
use ‘painfulness’. ‘Painfulness’ is a perfect substitute for ‘pain’ in that it 
provides everything required for constructing a new Russellian illuminati 
argument: almost everybody knows a priori what ‘painfulness’ means. 
Moreover, with inscrutable terms and truths, it can yield various semantically 
neutral truths, whose primary possibilities entail secondary possibilities. 
Therefore, if ‘pain’ is semantically non-neutral, one can use ‘painfulness’ 
instead. If ‘phenomenal redness’ is semantically non-neutral, one can use 
‘phenomenal redness-likeness’ as an ersatz phenomenal term. Formalizing a 
new Russellian illuminati argument is simple. All we need to do is slightly 
revising the terminology of the original version: replace q with ei, which is 
an intensional essence term for an arbitrary phenomenal property.     
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To sum up, regardless of whether phenomenal terms are semantically 
neutral or not, the Russellian illuminati argument holds. If the primary and 
secondary intensions of phenomenal terms coincide, one can have the 
original Russellian illuminati argument. Even if they do not coincide, then 
one can construct a variant of the original argument, replacing phenomenal 
terms with intensional essence terms. The situation also can be put in terms 
of consciousness: if there is no appearance-reality gap in consciousness, 
there would be both Russellian illuminati worlds and Russellian zombie 
worlds, and one can raise a reductio argument against CP+. Even if 
consciousness allows the appearance-reality gap, then there would be a 
world where the appearance of consciousness is broadly physical and its 
broadly physical duplicate without the appearance of consciousness, so that 
CP+ faces a reductio again. In one way or another, there can be a version 
of the Russellian illuminati arguments against CP+. 
3.2.3 Objections and Replies
Possible objections to my argument are expected. As other premises of the 
Russellian illuminati argument seem acceptable, objections can be raised 
against the two central premises, (R1) and (R6). I anticipate most of 
objections will be concentrated on the conceivability of Russellian illuminati 
and Russellian zombies. In this section, I will consider a number of possible 
objections and reply in turn. 
Objection 1: you claim that we can positively conceive both Russellian 
illuminati and Russellian zombies. The problem is, however, that we do not 
know much about the central notions involved in these statements yet. 
Type-B Russellian physicalism’s minimal and rough description falls short of 
providing positive conceptions about what inscrutables are. Further, while 
inscrutables are assumed to be broadly physical in type-B Russellian 
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physicalism, we do not have any idea about what these broadly physical 
inscrutables would be like. Our understanding about the nature of the 
physical has been governed by the standard fundamental physics. The 
physics, however, does not, and cannot, tell us anything about being broadly 
physical. If the descriptions of type-B Russellian physicalism are not positive 
and specific enough, it is not clear at all that we can positively conceive 
Rusellian illuminati or Russellian zombies.
Reply: though we do not know everything about inscrutables, we know 
enough. We know what properties should be counted as inscrutables. 
Properties that ground microphysical dispositions and structures and 
constitutively contribute to phenomenal properties are inscrutables. This is all 
we need to know when we are positively conceiving Russellian illuminati 
and Russellian zombies. The rest is a matter of arbitrary details. Even under 
rough and schematic descriptions, one can still have an intuition of a 
situation, if she can fill in all the details without contradiction. For instance, 
even when only approximate and abstract descriptions about a flying pig is 
given, it is still possible to have an intuition of such imaginary creature. 
Thus, while type-B Russellian physicalism’s descriptions about inscrutables 
are not specific, it cannot be a reason to doubt the positive conceivability 
of a statement about inscrutables. Even though we do not know any specific 
description about being broadly physical, we do know what should be 
considered as broadly physical. If something is an inscrutable but neither 
phenomenal nor neutral, it can be counted as broadly physical and one can 
name it ‘broadly physical’. The lack of specific and positive ideas about 
broadly physical inscrutables does not matter. What such 
neither-phenomenal-nor-neutral inscrutables would be like is, again, a matter 
of details. Anything can be counted as broadly physical, insofar as it does 
not contradict with the descriptions provided by type-B Russellian 
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physicalism. Indeed, nothing prevents one from positively conceiving a 
statement involving broadly physical inscrutables.
  It seems that the objection conflates inconceivability with infinite 
conceivability. From the fact that central notions involved in a statement are 
not specific, the objection argues that such statement cannot be positively 
conceivable. The exact opposite seems true, however. It is not that there is 
no way to positively conceive a statement involving rough notions. Rather, 
there are infinite ways to positively conceive the statement. There is no 
limit in filling in arbitrary details of a verifying situation. This explains why 
some find Russellian illuminati or Russellian zombies positively 
inconceivable. Non-specific, negative descriptions about broadly physical 
inscrutables allow too much: there are too many ways of detailing, so that 
coherently modally imagining Russellian illuminati or Russellian zombies 
tends to go beyond the limit of ordinary psychological and rational abilities. 
For this overwhelming cognitive overload, we are compelled to think that 
the statements are positively inconceivable.31) 
Objection 2: PiQTI&(pi=q) may be negatively conceivable, but not positively. 
Some may object that the identity claim pi=q is positively inconceivable, 
since we cannot form a positive conception of a situation that verifies the 
claim. There can be several reasons for this objection. First, some may 
point out that the identity between pi and q is unexplainable in principle 
and one cannot have a positive conception of something unexplainable. 
31) In this respect, positively conceiving such statements is similar to imagining 
what would happen inside a black hole. Many would say that we ‘cannot’ imagine 
what would happen inside of a black hole, since everything is possible in there. 
Yet, if everything is really possible, it implies that we can imagine as much as 
possible. There would be almost infinite ways to provide a consistent and detailed 
story about the heart of the black hole. This infinity is so dazzling that one might 
feel that she ‘cannot’ think up anything about it. Likewise, one might conflate 
positively inconceivable statements with infinitely positively conceivable ones, when 
verifying situations can be detailed in almost unlimited ways.  
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Second, in the Russellian illuminati world, there are no properties, relations, 
laws, or principles that can explain the identity. This implies that in order 
to form a positive conception of the Russellian illuminati world, one should 
have an intuition of the absence and reflect upon it. This intuition of or 
reflection upon the absence seems psychologically and rationally problematic. 
At best, it would provide a certain negative conception.
Reply: first, there are many situations that are unexplainable but positively 
conceivable. In fact, Chalmers provides one example. Arguing that 
interactionist dualism is compatible with the conceivability of zombies, he 
says “physically identical beings without consciousness will presumably have 
large causal gaps in their functioning (or else will have some new element 
to fill those gaps), but there is nothing obviously inconceivable about such 
causal gaps.” (Chalmers, 2010, p. 156) One can form a positive conception 
of zombies’ unexplainable functioning. The fact about zombies’ functioning 
cannot be explained by any fact about realizers of functioning, because there 
are no such facts. Likewise, the fact about the identity between pi and q 
cannot be explained by certain grounding facts, since there no such 
grounding facts. Thus, if one can have a positive conception of such brutal 
functioning, I think she can also have a positive conception of the brutal 
identity in the Russellian illuminati world. 
Second, there seems to be no problem in having an intuition of or 
reflecting upon a situation in which there is no ectoplasm or psychophysical 
law. Philosophers always engage in such thought experiments. The objection 
appears to assume that intuition of or reflection upon absences is cognitively 
impossible. Or, it might be thought that intuition of or reflection upon 
absences enforces us to think about something rather than nothing. Further, 
one might even think that we can have an intuition of or reflect upon an 
absence of something only when we already know well about it. The 
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examples mentioned above clearly show that all these claims are plainly 
false. We can form a positive conception of an absence of something that 
we do not know exactly what it is.
Last, the history of debates concerning the zombie argument suggest that 
if there are debates about a positive conceivability, the burden of proof 
must be on the side of those who are against the conceivability. I think 
this dialectic should be applied to the debates concerning the Russellian 
illuminati argument. Once there is a claim of the positive conceivability of 
PiQTI&(pi=q), opponents must provide a certain counterargument or 
counterevidence. I think the opponent cannot shoulder this burden, however. 
In order to deny the positive conceivability of Russellian illuminati, 
opponents must argue against the coherent modal imagination of the 
Russellian illuminati world. There are only two ways: denying that one can 
have a detailed intuition of the Russellian illuminati world or denying that 
the imagined Russellian illuminati is coherent. Both seems unlikely. Intuition 
is not something that can be simply denied. As I have argued in Section 
1.3.4, one cannot have an intuition from the scratch. Intuition is largely 
relative to subjects’ psychological, philosophical or ideological bias. Even if 
a situation does not seem intuitive to dualists or orthodox physicalists, it 
may appear intuitive to type-B Russellian physicalists. It is not obviously at 
all that how this disagreement in intuitions can be resolved. One cannot 
merely pit one intuition against another. Further, there seems to be no 
apparent contradiction or inconsistency in the imagined Russellian illuminati 
world. Unless it turns out to be incoherent, the imagined Russellian 
illuminati world should be taken as coherent. So it seems hard to argue 
against the conceivability of Russellian illuminati.
Objection 3: type-B Russellian physicalism seems to involve a very 
problematic sort of identity. The identity between phenomenal qualities and 
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complex physical inscrutables is assumed to be epistemically primitive. This 
identity is so different from paradigmatic cases that one may claim that 
there cannot be such identity. Indeed, Chalmers and Jackson claim 
“Identities are ontologically primitive, but they are not epistemically 
primitive.” (Chalmers and Jackson, 2001, p. 354) Almost in all cases, 
identities are entailed by underlying truths that are irrelevant to identities. 
Water=H2O, for instance, is implied by the underlying truths in chemical or 
microphysical truths. When one exhaustively knows all the truths about H2O, 
she will be able to deduce a priori water=H2O. To epistemically primitive 
identity, however, there cannot be any a priori deduction: even if all the 
truths about C is known, a subject will not be in a position to deduce a 
priori C=migraine, since there are no underlying truths that entail 
C=migraine. Such identity is too exceptional to be considered as identity. 
There seems to be no reason to believe that there is such epistemically 
primitive sort of identities.      
Reply: the absence of epistemically primitive identities cannot be the reason 
to think that they are inconceivable. The Russellian illuminati argument is 
grounded by the ideal positive primary conceivability of epistemically 
primitive identities. It does not require the actual truth or even the 
possibility of such identities. Pointing out that identities are generally 
implied by underlying truths that do not involve any identity is thus 
irrelevant to my claim that PiQTI&(pi=q) and C=migraine are conceivable. 
There seems to be no better reasoning to defeat the belief about 
epistemically primitive identities. And there seems to no reason not to form 
a positive conception of epistemically primitive identities. We can argue that 
the Russellian illuminati world is conceivable in every relevant sense.32)
32) Chalmers and Jackson says “A type-B materialist might bite the bullet on these 
things and hold that psychophysical identities are sui generis. In response, one can 
argue that identities between natural phenomena cannot be epistemically primitive. 
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Interestingly, it is Chalmers and Jackson’s discussion that strongly 
suggests epistemically primitive identities are conceivable. Although Chalmers 
and Jackson(2001) do not believe that there are epistemically primitive 
identities, they spend a considerable amount of time discussing what such 
identities would be like. “We think that this sort of case cannot occur, but 
we will set that worry aside for the moment, and will pretend that it can 
occur.” (Chalmers and Jackson, 2001, p. 353, italics added) What does this 
‘pretending’ mean? It simply means that the situation where epistemically 
primitive identities hold is intuitive enough to be discussed and analyzed. If 
The point where one finds objective (nonindexical) epistemically primitive 
regularities among natural phenomena is precisely the point at which one finds 
fundamental natural laws. And one can argue that what it is to be a fundamental 
law of nature is precisely to be an objective, epistemically primitive 
counterfactual-supporting regularity. If this is right, then if there are epistemically 
primitive psychophysical regularities, they must be regarded as fundamental natural 
laws.” (Chalmers and Jackson, 2001, p. 357) They seem to think that epistemically 
primitive regularities between natural phenomena entail fundamental natural laws. If 
there are such fundamental laws, identities would be explained by those laws and 
cannot be epistemically primitive. However, this response begs the question of 
conceivability of epistemically primitive identities. If it is conceivable that 
epistemically primitive regularities are sui generis, it will be also conceivable that 
such regularities are supported by epistemically primitive identities. Moreover, even 
if to be a fundamental law is nothing but to be an epistemically primitive 
regularity, it would be still conceivable that epistemically primitive regularities are 
grounded by epistemically primitive identities. There is not reason not to conceive 
these cases.
Chalmers also claims “Indeed, it is often held that this sort of primitiveness—the 
inability to be deduced from more basic principles—is the mark of a fundamental 
law of nature. In effect, the type-B materialist recognizes a principle that has the 
epistemic status of a fundamental law but gives it the ontological status of an 
identity. An opponent will hold that this move is more akin to theft than to honest 
toil. Elsewhere, identifications are grounded in explanations, and primitive principles 
are acknowledged as fundamental laws.” (Chalmers, 2010, p. 116) Again, the issue 
is not whether assuming epistemically primitive identity is “theft” or not. What 
identifications in elsewhere are like does not matter. The issue is that such “theft” 
is ideally positively and primarily conceivable. No matter how it is akin to theft, if 
an epistemically primitive identity is conceivable, the Russellian illuminati argument 
works.
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the situation were not intuitive, Chalmers and Jackson would not even 
attempt to pretend that such situation can occur. However, under the 
pretense that epistemically primitive identities hold, they describe what such 
identities would be like and what kind of explanatory work they can do. 
Their analysis clearly shows that one can have an intuition of and reason 
about epistemically primitive identities. Chalmers and Jackson’s discussion 
does not provide any reason to doubt that statements about epistemically 
primitive identity are positively conceivable. Rather, it lends a strong support 
for their positive conceivability.
Objection 4: replacing □(p=q) with pi=q in (R1), you claim that the 
Russellian illuminati argument is safe from the objection that CP+ should be 
applied only to non-modal claims. This is a mistake, however. Even though 
there is no explicit modal operator, pi=q is an identity statement anyway. 
An identity statement already smuggles in necessity. There would be no 
difference between conceiving an identity statement and conceiving necessary 
statement. Either way, we are to conceive a necessary identity statement. If 
so, conceiving pi=q would be equivalent to conceiving □(pi=q). Then, the 
apparent difference between the original illuminati argument and the 
Russellian illuminati argument disappears, and the Russellian illuminati 
argument will suffer from the same objection as the illuminati argument.
Reply: at least for the positive conceivability, there is a significant 
difference between conceiving non-modal claims and conceiving modal 
claims. The crucial point is that when we are positively conceiving a 
non-modal claim, it is enough to have an intuition of and reflect upon a 
non-modal situation. In order to positively conceiving a modal claim, 
however, one must have an intuition of and reflect upon a modal situation. 
For instance, when one positively conceives water=H2O, it is enough for her 
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to coherently modally imagine a situation where H2O has all the non-modal 
properties that water has and vice versa. In this case, we imagine a 
situation where H2O is watery and water is H2O-like. No modal properties 
are involved. Water and H2O share all their non-modal properties and that 
is all. On the other hand, in positively conceiving □(water=H2O), one must 
coherently modally imagine a situation where H2O is necessarily identical to 
water and water is necessarily identical to H2O. At least two modal 
properties, being necessarily identical to water and being necessarily identical 
to H2O, must be involved in the imagined situation. If there are no such 
modal properties, it is clear that after the reflection upon the imagined 
situation, one would find that the imagined situation does not verify □
(water=H2O). That is, positively conceiving non-modal and modal claims 
involve different imagined situations. 
If this is the case, the same goes with pi=q and □(p=q). Positively 
conceiving pi=q and positively conceiving □(pi=q) are not equivalent, since 
imagined situations that verify them are different. The imagined situation 
that verifies pi=q involves only non-modal properties, while the imagined 
situation that verifies □(p=q) must be partially constituted by necessary 
properties. To verify □(pi=q), the situation must contain at least two modal 
properties: being necessarily identical to q and being necessarily identical to 
pi. Thus, one can distinguish the claim that pi=q is positively conceivable 
from the claim that □(pi=q) is so. The Russellian illuminati argument applies 
CP+ only to the former, not the latter. Then, the Russellian illuminati 
argument would not suffer the same weakness as the illuminati argument 
does.
 
Objection 5: Even if PiQTI&(pi=q) is ideally positively primarily 
conceivable, it is still harder to conceive than PTI&~Q or PiTI&~Q. 
Russellian illuminati are more difficult to conceive than zombies or 
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Russellian zombies. Chalmers says “Many people have noted that it is very 
hard to imagine that consciousness is a physical process. I do not think this 
unimaginability is so obvious that it should be used as a premise in an 
argument against materialism, but likewise, the imaginability claim cannot be 
used as a premise either.” (Chalmers, 2010, p. 180) This also can be said 
to Russellian illuminati. Though Russellian illuminati are conceivable in 
some relevant sense, such conceivability is not strong enough to be used as 
a premise of the Russellian illuminati argument against CP+.
Reply: conceivability is not a matter of degree. As I explained in Section 
1.3.4, conceivability is digital. If a statement is conceivable, it is 
conceivable. Saying a certain statement is harder to conceive than others is 
misleading. I have argued in Section 1.3.4 that such view conflates 
probability of actual conceiving with conceivability per se. There is no 
threshold of degrees of conceivability to be used as a premise of an 
argument. Frankish(2007) provides helpful comments on this issue.
It is true that there is some imaginative resistance to the idea that 
consciousness might be physical. ‘How could this’, people sometimes ask, 
mentally indicating some experience, ‘be just a neurological state?’. 
Difficulty is irrelevant here, however. Conceivability is all or nothing, and 
one state of affairs may be harder to imagine than another without being 
less conceivable. (It is, for example, much harder to imagine Ronald Reagan 
and Freddie Mercury being the same person than to imagine their being 
distinct, but the two scenarios are on a par with respect to primary 
conceivability.) (ibid., p. 660)
Objection 6: the conceivability of Russellian zombies is questionable. As 
mentioned in objection 1, we have no idea what PiTI would be like. If 
there is an a priori entailment from PiTI to Q, PiTI&~Q would not be 
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conceivable in any relevant sense. At the current stage of discussion, there 
is no guarantee that there is no such a priori entailment. In this respect, 
PiTI is essentially different from PTI. There is a principled reason to deny 
that PTI entails a priori any phenomenal truth. No matter what the 
complete physics turns out to be, it would only deliver structures and 
dynamics of the world. It seems that structures and dynamics, whatever they 
are, can be instantiated without experience. This is the crucial point that 
Chalmer(2010; 2015) repeatedly emphasizes.33) Nonetheless, we cannot find 
any such principled reason in the relationship between PiTI and Q. The only 
thing we know about PiTI is that it is a conjunction of all broadly physical 
truths plus indexical truths. No one knows at this point that what the 
broadly physical truths plus indexical truths would entail a priori. If one 
cannot rule out the possibility that PiTI⊃Q holds, it is possible to reject 
(R6), and the Russellian illuminati argument fails.
Reply: first thing to notice is that this objection is dialectically weak. To 
argue against a conceivability claim, one must explicitly point out a hidden 
contradiction in the claim. Likewise, in arguing against the claim that 
PiTI&~Q is conceivable, merely pointing out that PiTI is poorly understood 
or PiTI⊃Q might hold does not work. Those who argue against the 
33) Chalmers says “I have occasionally heard it said that panprotopsychism can be 
dismissed out of hand for the same reason as materialism. According to this 
objection, the epistemic arguments against materialism all turn on there being a 
fundamental epistemic (and therefore ontological) gap between the nonphenomenal 
and the phenomenal: There is no a priori entailment from nonphenomenal truths to 
phenomenal truths. If this were right, the gap would also refute panprotopsychism. I 
do not think that this is right, however. The epistemic arguments all turn on a more 
specific gap between the physical and the phenomenal, ultimately arising from a gap 
between the structural (or the structural/dynamical) and the phenomenal. We have 
principled reasons to think that phenomenal truths cannot be wholly grounded in 
structural truths. But we have no correspondingly good reason to think that 
phenomenal truths cannot be wholly grounded in nonphenomenal (and nonstructural) 
truths, as panprotopsychism suggests.” (Chalmers, 2015, p. 81) 
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conceivability of PiTI&~Q must point out PiTI&~Q is inconsistent or prove 
that PiTI⊃Q holds. As I mentioned in reply to Objection 2, this feature 
reflects general dialectics of debates concerning conceivability arguments: 
once there is a debate about a certain conceivability claim, the burden of 
proof is always on the side of those who argue against the claim. If there 
is any moral from the two decades of ‘the zombie war’, it would be that it 
is always physicalists who must show why zombies are inconceivable. If 
someone rejects the conceivability of zombies by pointing out that we do 
not have PTI yet or PTI⊃Q might hold, we would dismiss such reaction as 
dialectically inappropriate. This dialectic of the zombie argument should be 
applied to the debate concerning the Russellian illuminati argument. The 
burden of showing that PiTI&~Q is inconceivable is on the side of those 
who argue against it. In order to reject the conceivability of PiTI&~Q, what 
is needed is an actual refutation, not a mere skepticism. 
Further, I think there is no essential difference between PTI and PiTI 
regarding a priori entailment. There is a principled reason to deny that PiTI
⊃Q holds. Whatever it is, Pi should consist of truths about physical 
inscrutables. Nonetheless, both truths about physical inscrutables can be 
accessed neither by perception nor by science. We cannot even introspect 
what they are. If there is any truth about physical inscrutables, it must be 
acquired through theoretical and even speculative considerations. Indeed, 
many Russellian monists claim that they pursue the best explanation for 
most of data. All things considered, it is clear that Pi must be public truth: 
truth that can be shared with others and communicable through public 
language. If Russellian monists find some our inscrutable truths, we would 
be very glad to hear what they are and (hopefully) be able to understand 
them. Q, on the other hand, cannot be public truth. Qualia are usually 
characterized as ineffable, and such ineffability leads to qualia’s another 
essential property, privacy. Even though we can indirectly infer or describe 
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phenomenal truths, there cannot be any public language to capture 
phenomenal truths. In this sense, Q must be private truth. There is a sort 
of epistemic gap between these public and private truths. Chalmers often 
says “the structure and dynamics of physical processes yield only more 
structure and dynamics” (Chalmers, 2010, p. 15). It seems plausible that the 
public and objective truths yield only more public and objective truths. How 
can something ineffable in nature come from something essentially effable? 
More precisely, how can publicly communicable broadly physical truths (plus 
indexical truths) entail publicly incommunicable phenomenal truths? This gap 
between the public and the private provides a good reason to doubt that 
there can be a priori entailment from PiTI to Q. Thus, there is a principled 
reason to believe that phenomenal truths cannot be a priori entailed by 
inscrutable truths. 
In this chapter, I have argued that there is a counterargument against CP+. 
According to the Russellian illuminati argument, insofar as both Russellian 
illuminati and Russellian zombies are equally ideally positively primarily 
conceivable, CP+ yields a contradiction. If the argument is sound, the 
second central premise of the zombie argument is false. That is, the ideal 
positive primary conceivability of zombies does not entail the metaphysical 
possibility of zombies. 
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Chapter 4
 Phenomenal Concept Strategy and the Master 
Argument
4.1 Chapter Introduction 
There are many ways for type-B materialists to argue against the zombie 
argument. Some type-B materialists take the Phenomenal Concept 
Strategy(PCS). PCS appeals to the special nature of phenomenal concepts to 
explain why there is the explanatory gap or why zombies are conceivable. 
While PCS has been thought of as denying the second premise of the 
zombie argument, close examinations reveal that PCS is irrelevant to the 
second premise. Rather, even when the first and the second premises of the 
zombie argument are well defended, PCS enables physicalists to argue 
against the zombie argument. Chalmers, however, provides the master 
argument against all possible forms of PCS. In Section 4.2, I will show 
how PCS can be ‘the third way’ for physicalists and why the master 
argument fails. Moreover, I shall present a dilemma against the master 
argument in Section 4.3. This will complete my fourfold argument against 
the zombie argument. 
4.2 Epistemic Equilibrium and the Anti-Master Argument
Type-B materialists claim that although there is the epistemic gap between 
physical processes and experience, there is no ontological gap. If so, even if 
the zombies are conceivable, they are not possible. One of the ways to 
argue for this claim is so-called the Phenomenal Concept Strategy(PCS). 
Proponents of PCS often argue that why there is the epistemic gap can be 
explained by the special feature of phenomenal concepts. Several versions of 
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PCS already have been suggested and developed by type-B materialists. 
Chalmers, however, argues that PCS is inherently doomed to fail. According 
to his master argument, PCS faces a dilemma: no matter how the strategy 
is developed, either phenomenal concepts cannot be physically explained or 
our epistemic situation cannot be explained by phenomenal concepts. Either 
way PCS cannot succeed. Although the master argument seems plausible at 
first sight, I shall argue that it is not PCS that is stuck in a dilemma. 
Rather, it is the master argument that faces its dilemma. When the notion 
of epistemic situation is rightly understood, all the Chalmers argues turn out 
to be misleading because they ignore the special constraint Chalmers himself 
puts on the epistemic situation. First, in Section 4.2.1, I will briefly 
introduce PCS and how exactly it can reply to the zombie argument. 
Chalmers’ analysis of PCS and the master argument is summarized in 
Section 4.2.2. In Section 4.2.3, it will be argued that, contrary to what 
Chalmers claims, our and our zombie twins’ epistemic situation are 
epistemically equal. Then, PCS can hold one of the two horns of the master 
argument. 
4.2.1 Phenomenal Concept Strategy and the Zombie Argument 
Some physicalists admit that zombies are conceivable in some sense. They 
accept that there is a certain epistemic or conceptual gap between 
microphysical truths and phenomenal truths. What they deny is that there is 
a metaphysical or ontological gap between physical properties and 
phenomenal properties. According to these physicalists, although zombies are 
conceivable in some sense, this conceivability tells us nothing about the 
metaphysical possibility of zombies. These physicalists are called type-B 
materialists.
How can type-B materialists accept the epistemic gap but deny the 
ontological gap? Some of type-B materialists claim that while phenomenal 
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properties are identical to physical properties, phenomenal concepts are 
distinct from physical concepts. That is, even though there is only physical 
kind of properties, there are two sorts of concepts, phenomenal and physical 
concepts. According to type-B materialists, phenomenal concepts have some 
conceptually, cognitively, or psychologically special features. These special 
features enable us to explain why zombies are conceivable and why there is 
the epistemic gap between the phenomenal and the physical, without 
appealing any non-physical, phenomenal properties. Also, type-B materialists 
hold that the special features themselves can be explained in physical terms. 
If this is the case, while there cannot be a physical explanation for 
consciousness, why there cannot be a physical explanation for consciousness 
can be physically explained. In this way, conceptual dualism and ontological 
monism can be reconciled. Further, physicalism can be compatible with the 
conceivability of zombies and epistemic gap. Stoljar(2005) named this 
interesting and attractive move the phenomenal concept strategy (PCS). 
One can distinguish at least four versions of PCS. First, some 
philosophers claim that phenomenal concepts are nonstandard recognitional 
concepts that pick out their referents via essential modes of presentation. 
(Loar, 1990/1997; Carruthers, 2004; Tye, 2003a; Levin, 2007) According to 
these philosophers, some physical properties essentially have special modes 
of presentation, which can explain the explanatory gap. Others argue that 
phenomenal concepts and physical concepts play very different conceptual 
roles. (Hill, 1997; Hill and McLaughlin, 1999) They claim that special 
cognitive roles played by phenomenal concepts can explain the explanatory 
gap. A number of philosophers think that phenomenal concepts are indexical 
concepts. (Ismael, 1999; O’Dea, 2002; Perry, 2001) They suggest that the 
explanatory gap can be considered as a gap between indexical concepts and 
physical concepts. Finally, other philosophers suggest that phenomenal 
concepts are quotational concepts, which ‘quote’ physical properties in such 
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a way that some expressions quote other expressions. (Papineau, 2002; 2007; 
Block, 2007) Despite their differences, all four versions show the general 
structure of PCS: first, PCS endows certain special features to phenomenal 
concepts. Then, it explains our epistemic situation with the special features 
of phenomenal concepts.       
It is crucial to understand what type-B materialists must do with PCS. 
Dialectically, type-B materialists are not obligated to justify their 
physicalism. What they must do is showing how our epistemic situation 
with regard to consciousness can be explained by some special features of 
phenomenal concepts, if physicalism is right. In PCS, physicalism is 
presupposed or assumed, not argued. Once PCS succeeds in explaining why 
there is the explanatory gap or why zombies are conceivable, it completes 
its mission. In other words, what PCS should do is to reconcile ontological 
monism (physicalism) and conceptual dualism. It is not PCS’s duty to 
justify ontological monism itself.
Further, it is worth noting that PCS has a semantically significant 
implication. According to PCS, physical properties can be picked out by two 
concepts. In Fregean term, a physical property can have two modes of 
presentation: a phenomenal mode and a physical mode. Fregean senses of 
phenomenal concepts can be phenomenal modes of presentation, but referents 
of phenomenal concepts must be physical properties. In the two-dimensional 
framework, this Fregean distinction between sense and referent in 
phenomenal concepts can be interpreted as a distinction between the primary 
and secondary intensions. That is, primary and secondary intensions of 
phenomenal concepts do not coincide: whereas primary intensions of 
phenomenal concepts refer to phenomenal properties, secondary intensions 
pick out physical properties. On the other hand, primary and secondary 
intensions of physical concepts refer to the same physical properties. For 
example, both primary and secondary intensions of the physical concept 
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<H2O> pick out H2O. Simply put, PCS entails that while phenomenal 
concepts are semantically non-neutral, physical concepts are semantically 
neutral. 
Confronted with the zombie argument, many type-B materialists have 
adopted PCS to strike back. However, exactly how PCS can be used to 
argue against the zombie argument is not clear. PCS enables type-B 
materialists to accept the conceivability of zombies but denies the 
metaphysical possibility of zombies. To the ‘old’ zombie argument, this can 
be a proper reply: the second premise of the old zombie argument states 
that if PTI&~Q is conceivable, PTI&~Q is metaphysically possible. The 
problem is that the zombie argument physicalists must deal with is not the 
old zombie argument. Criticizing the old zombie argument is toothless, since 
there is a more developed and articulated, official version of the zombie 
argument.34) Only this official version deserves to be called the zombie 
argument against physicalism. The zombie argument does not merely 
suppose that conceivability entails metaphysical possibility. As we have seen 
in the previous chapter, the zombie argument’s second premise is an 
application of CP+, which connects ideal positive primary conceivability to 
primary possibility. Primary possibility is not metaphysical possibility. Thus, 
even if type-B materialists argue that zombies are conceivable but not 
metaphysically possible, it does not have any bearing on the zombie 
argument. Then, it is not obvious that PCS can be an effective strategy for 
type-B materialists.    
I think there is a good reason for type-B materialists to take PCS: it can 
deny the third premise of the zombie argument. The third premise states 
that if PTI&~Q is primarily possible, then PTI&~Q is secondarily possible 
or Russellian monism is true. How can PCS reject the third premise? 
Remind that PCS entails the semantic non-neutrality of phenomenal concepts. 
34) This was the main point of Section 1.2.
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Since phenomenal concepts’ primary and secondary intensions differ, Q’s 
primary and secondary intensions must differ. If so, even if PTI&~Q is 
primary possible, it may not be secondarily possible. Further, PCS entails 
the semantic neutrality of physical concepts. As physical concepts’ primary 
and secondary intensions coincide, P’s primary and secondary intensions 
should coincide. Then, Russellian monism cannot be true, because Russellian 
monism supposes that primary and secondary intensions of microphysical 
concepts do not coincide. In short, if PCS is successful, one can accept the 
primary possibility of zombies, while denying both the secondary possibility 
of zombies and Russellian monism.  
The analysis so far suggests that PCS can be ‘the third way’ for 
physicalists. If PCS works, even if zombies are conceivable and 
conceivability entails primary possibility, the secondary (metaphysical) 
possibility of zombies does not follow. The key to refute physicalism is the 
metaphysical possibility of zombies, and PCS can effectively reject the 
metaphysical possibility of zombies. Indeed, PCS is in itself extremely 
interesting and also can be an attractive strategy for defending physicalism.
4.2.2. The Master Argument
Chalmers knows well about PCS. He presents the general structure of PCS. 
(Chalmers, 2010) According to Chalmers, proponents of PCS hold a thesis 
C that attributes special psychological features of phenomenal concepts. 
These special psychological features can be called “the key features”. (ibid., 
p. 310) As explained in the previous section, PCS must show two things: 
first, it must show that how C explains our special epistemic situations with 
regard to consciousness, such as the conceivability of zombies or the 
epistemic gap. Second, PCS must show how C can be explained in physical 
terms. If PCS can do both, as Chalmers says, we may have “the next best 
thing”. (ibid., p. 311) While PCS would not provide a direct physical 
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explanation of consciousness itself, it would provide a physical explanation 
of our epistemic situations. For instance, PCS never answers to the Hard 
problem of consciousness. Rather, it will explain away why we cannot 
answer the Hard problem. This is undoubtedly considerable progress.   
Chalmers concedes that PCS is a powerful strategy for physicalists. 
However, he nonetheless thinks that PCS is doomed to fail. Chalmers 
argues, “[W]e can see that no account of phenomenal concepts is both 
powerful enough to explain our epistemic situation with regard to 
consciousness and tame enough to be explained in physical terms.” (ibid., p. 
306) According to Chalmers, PCS cannot claim C explains our epistemic 
situation and can be physically explained at the same time. In other words, 
either C cannot explain our epistemic situation or C cannot be physically 
explicable. For any kinds of C, Chalmers provides the following argument:
(M1) If P&~C is conceivable, then C is not physically explicable.
(M2) If P&~C is not conceivable, then zombies satisfy C.
(M3) Zombies do not share our epistemic situation.
(M4) If zombies satisfy C but do not share our epistemic situation, then C 
cannot explain our epistemic situation.
(M5) If P&~C is not conceivable, then C cannot explain our epistemic 
situation.
__________________________________________________
(M6) Either C is not physically explicable, or C cannot explain our 
epistemic situation. (ibid., p. 313-315)
Chalmers calls this argument the master argument. (Chalmers, 2010, p. 
312-320) The master argument is valid. It takes the form of dilemma. The 
first horn is Premise (M1). The inference from Premise (M2) to (M4) yields 
(M5), which is the second horn of the dilemma. I will clarify Premise (M1) 
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and the inference in turn.
Premise (M1) can be justified as follows: if P&~C is conceivable, then P 
cannot entail C a priori. If P cannot entail C a priori, P cannot explain C. 
In other words, even if one knows everything about microphysics of our 
world, she would not be in a position to deduce C. This means that there 
is no transparent physical explanation of why C holds. Therefore, between P 
and C, there will be an explanatory gap. For example, if our physical 
duplicates that lack a key feature attributed by C are conceivable, then we 
would wonder why we have the key feature. As our physical duplicates 
share everything physical with us, actual physics will not answer the 
question. As the conceivability of P&~Q is enough to make the explanatory 
gap between P and Q, the conceivability of P&~C is enough to do the 
same thing. If so, we can say that if P&~C is conceivable, C is not 
physically explicable.
Here, it must be noted that C must be cast in topic neutral terms. 
(Chalmers, 2010, p. 314) C must not require the existence of non-physical 
phenomenal properties or concepts that refer to them. I will call this 
requirement the constraint of topic-neutrality. The constraint of 
topic-neutrality is justified by the following consideration: suppose that C 
explicitly requires non-physical phenomenal properties or concepts refer to 
such properties. Then, zombies would fail to satisfy C or acquire 
phenomenal concepts. Conceiving P&~Q would be tantamount to conceiving 
P&~C. As type-B materialists admit P&~Q is conceivable, they must admit 
that P&~C is conceivable. Once the conceivability of P&~C is accepted, as 
the conceivability of P&~Q makes the explanatory gap between P and Q, it 
makes the explanatory gap between P and C. A transparent physical 
explanation of the truth of C would be automatically ruled out. If C is not 
constrained to be topic-neutral, type-B materialists must take the first horn 
of the master argument. This is not fair to type-B materialists and PCS, 
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however. In PCS, the thesis C is supposed to be physically explained. 
Casting C as a thesis explicitly about non-physical phenomenal properties or 
concepts that refer to them begs the question of why it should be. Type-B 
materialist can legitimately reject such formulation of C. Therefore, C must 
be cast in topic-neutral terms.  
How should C be formulated? According to Chalmers, although C can 
include psychological or epistemological vocabulary, phenomenal vocabulary 
must be barred. Once C is cast in this way, strictly speaking, it cannot be 
a thesis about phenomenal concepts. Rather, C is a thesis about 
quasi-phenomenal concepts. (Chalmers, 2010, p. 314) Chalmers claims that 
quasi phenomenal concepts “can be understood as concepts deployed in 
certain circumstances that are associated with certain sorts of perceptual and 
introspective processes and so on.” (ibid., p. 314) Under the constraint of 
topic-neutrality, phenomenal concepts become quasi-phenomenal concepts. 
And it is clear that zombies can have such quasi-phenomenal concepts.   
The argument for Premise (M2) is straightforward. Premise (M2) states 
that if P&~C is not conceivable, then zombies satisfy C. If P&~C is not 
conceivable, there can be only one reason for such inconceivability. It is 
because P entails C a priori. And once P entails C a priori, zombies 
necessarily satisfy C. Hence, the inconceivability of P&~C entails that 
zombies must have key features as we do. 
In Premise (M3), Chalmers introduces the notion of epistemic situation. 
About epistemic situation, he says  
I will take it that the epistemic situation of an individual includes the truth 
values of their beliefs and the epistemic status of their beliefs (as justified 
or unjustified and as cognitively significant or insignificant). As before, an 
epistemic situation (and a sentence E characterizing it) should be understood 
in topic-neutral terms, so that it does not build in claims about the presence 
of phenomenal states or phenomenal concepts. We can say that two 
118
individuals share their epistemic situation when they have corresponding 
beliefs, all of which have corresponding truth values and epistemic status. 
(Chalmers, 2010, p. 314, emphasis original)
We and our zombie twins can be said to share their epistemic situation if 
we and our zombie twins have corresponding beliefs, all of which have 
corresponding truth values and epistemic status. Here, Chalmers assumes that 
if two utterances correspond to each other, they express corresponding 
beliefs. 
It is crucial to note that as C is under the constraint of topic-neutrality, 
epistemic situations are under the same constraint. Again, construing 
epistemic situation in phenomenal terms would beg the question against 
PCS. If our epistemic situation is, at least partially, portrayed in 
non-physical phenomenal properties or phenomenal concepts referring to 
them, then there cannot be any way for type-B materialists to explain our 
epistemic situation in principle. Type-B materialists cannot accept such 
non-physical phenomenal properties and phenomenal concepts because of 
their metaphysics. And PCS is tailor-made for type-B materialists to explain 
our epistemic situations without resorting to anything existing outside the 
domains of the functional, physical, or psychological. However, once our 
epistemic situation is understood in anything phenomenal, the whole project 
of PCS cannot get off the ground. So, epistemic situations must not require 
any non-physical phenomenal properties or concepts that refer to them. In 
other words, beliefs in an epistemic situation must not refer to non-physical 
phenomenal properties or be consist of phenomenal concepts. Let us call 
such beliefs quasi-phenomenal beliefs. Under the constraint of 
topic-neutrality, epistemic situations must include only quasi-phenomenal 
beliefs and preclude all phenomenal beliefs. These epistemic situations under 
the constraint of topic-neutrality deserve to be called phenomenally neutral 
situations.35)  
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Chalmers presents two reasons for Premise (M3). The first reason is that 
zombies are seemingly less accurate in their self-conception than we are. I 
have many beliefs about my conscious experience, such as <I am 
conscious> or <I have this such-and-such experience that insistently resists 
any functional or physical explanation>. While my zombie twin has certain 
corresponding beliefs, it is intuitively appealing that its beliefs are different 
from my beliefs in their truth value and/or epistemic status. It seems likely 
that my zombie twin’s beliefs are false or at least that less justified than 
my beliefs. The second reason is that our zombie twins’ knowledge seems 
essentially different from our knowledge. For instance, when Mary sees red 
for the first time, the knowledge she gains is cognitively significant. It 
teaches what it is like to see red and cannot be inferred from complete 
physical knowledge. On the other hand, when Mary’s zombie twin, Zombie 
Mary, is released from the black-and-white room and encounters the ripe 
tomato, it is plausible that she does not learn anything cognitively 
significant. While Zombie Mary may gain certain abilities to classify, 
imagine, and recognize red things or certain indexical knowledge such as <I 
am having this experience now>, these are by no means analogous to the 
cognitively significant knowledge that Mary gains. In this sense, Zombie 
Mary does not share Mary’s epistemic situation. If so, zombies fail to share 
our epistemic situation.  
Premise (M4) is obvious. If zombies satisfy C but do not share our 
35) Chalmers does not require corresponding beliefs have the same content. He 
says, “It is plausible that a nonconscious being such as a zombie cannot have 
beliefs with exactly the same content as our beliefs about consciousness.” (Chalmers, 
2010, p. 316) It seems that while we have phenomenal beliefs that refer to 
non-physical phenomenal properties, our zombie twins cannot. Then, if sharing 
epistemic situations requires sharing contents of beliefs, it is impossible for us and 
our zombie twins to share their epistemic situations in principle. Again, this begs 
the question. Why should sharing epistemic situations require sharing contents of 
beliefs in the first place? Type-B materialists would deny this assumption. Thus, 
corresponding beliefs do not have to have the same contents.
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epistemic situation, it means that there is no a priori entailment from C to 
E, which is the full characterization of our epistemic situation. And if E is 
not entailed by C a priori, even if one knows everything about C, she 
would not be in a position to know why E holds. Therefore, C cannot 
transparently explain our epistemic situation. From (M2), (M3), and (M4), 
(M5) follows. Premise (M1) and (M5) completes the dilemma. Then, we 
have (M6): either C is not physically explicable, or C cannot explain our 
epistemic situation.   
4.2.3 Epistemic Equilibrium between Us and Zombies
The master argument is compelling. It is designed to refute all possible 
forms of PCS. If the argument succeeds, no PCS can succeed. In this 
section, I shall argue that the central premise of the master argument, (M3), 
is false. I think both two reasons for (M3) provided by Chalmers cannot 
support (M3) because of the constraint of topic-neutrality. If so, our zombie 
twins share our epistemic situation, and the master argument fails.
First, once our epistemic situation is cast in topic-neutral terms, there 
cannot be any discrepancy of beliefs between zombies and us. Under the 
constraint of topic-neutrality, our epistemic situation must contain 
quasi-phenomenal concepts and beliefs only. For the same reason, under the 
constraint of topic-neutrality, whatever their corresponding beliefs are, 
zombies’ epistemic situation must be phenomenally neutral too. As a result, 
in the phenomenally neutral situation, we and our zombie twins only have 
quasi-phenomenal, topic-neutrally explicable beliefs. The crucial point is that, 
except non-physical phenomenal properties and phenomenal concepts, we and 
our zombie twins share everything. We and our zombie twins are internally 
as well as externally identical: physical and functional properties, 
environments, histories, contexts, pieces of evidence, cognitive and inferential 
abilities, and so on. If so, we and zombies would share every 
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quasi-phenomenal belief, including perceptual, introspective, indexical, 
abstract, and high-order beliefs. For instance, if I have a belief <I am 
conscious> or <I am having this experience now>, this belief must be 
construed in topic-neutral language. That is, it must be a quasi-phenomenal 
belief. Since my zombie twin shares every topic-neutral, non-phenomenal 
aspect with me, it must have the same quasi-phenomenal belief. If we have 
a certain belief, so do zombies, and vice versa. By contraposition, if 
zombies do not have a certain belief, neither do we, and the reverse holds. 
It short, under the constraint of topic-neutrality, we and our zombie twins 
are doxastically symmetric. 
As we and zombies share everything in phenomenally neutral situations, 
all quasi-phenomenal beliefs shared by us and our zombie twins would 
share their truth values. Suppose that Mary has a true perceptual belief 
<The sky is blue>. Her zombie twin, Zombie Mary, would share that belief, 
for she shares all brain processes and cognitive abilities with Mary. 
Moreover, Zombie Mary’s belief would be true too, since Mary and Zombie 
Mary shares their environments. If Mary has a wrong belief, for the same 
reason, Zombie Mary will share the same wrong belief. Likewise, all other 
sorts of shared beliefs would share their truth values. If I have a true 
indexical belief <I am here>, so does my zombie twin. If I falsely believe 
that 4 is an odd number, my zombie twin will share that false belief. The 
reverse also holds. In this sense, we and our zombie twins are veridically 
symmetric.
Further, all the quasi-phenomenal beliefs shared by us and our zombie 
twins should share their justifications. Roughly, there are two main sources 
of justification: causation and inference. Again, the point is that we and our 
zombie twins share all causal and inferential relations and pieces of 
evidence. I and my zombie twin share every background condition, 
environment, and causal law. Thus, if a certain causal process justifies my 
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perceptual belief <The sky is blue>, the same causal process would justify 
the same perceptual belief of my zombie twin. If my belief is not causally 
justified, my zombie twin would also fail to causally justify the same belief, 
and vice versa. On the other hand, if Mary infers her belief <I am in my 
room> from her indexical beliefs <I am here> and <Here is my room>, 
such inference justifies her belief. Due to the doxastic symmetry between 
Mary and Zombie Mary, Zombie Mary has the same indexical beliefs and 
inferential capacities. She would justify the same belief with the same 
inference. If Mary fails to infer that belief, so does Zombie Mary. Simply 
put, causally or inferentially, if we rationally hold some quasi-phenomenal 
beliefs, zombies would rationally hold the same beliefs. The reverse is also 
true. Therefore, we and zombies are rationally symmetric.     
There cannot be any discrepancy of cognitive significance in 
quasi-phenomenal beliefs shared by us and our zombie twins. A belief is 
cognitively significant when it contains new information. Information is 
formed, transmitted, stored, and retrieved by cognitive systems. And we and 
our zombie twins share every information processing. When we have a 
certain belief with new information, our zombie twins would have the same 
belief with the same new information. Conversely, if our zombie twins have 
cognitively significant beliefs, such as <Hesperus=Phosphorus>, we would 
have those beliefs too. As far as we and our zombie twins have the same 
brains, the same cognitive processes, and the same environments and 
histories, when we have cognitively significant beliefs, zombies have the 
same cognitively significant beliefs, and vice versa. Further, zombies do not 
have a certain cognitively significant beliefs, neither do we, and the reverse 
is also true. We and our zombie twins are cognitively symmetric. 
When two or more epistemic subjects are rationally as well as cognitively 
symmetric, they deserve to be called epistemically symmetric. Moreover, if 
multiple epistemic subjects are doxastically, veridically, and epistemically 
123
symmetric, we can say that they reach an epistemic equilibrium. Once two 
or more epistemic subjects are in an epistemic equilibrium, they must share 
the same beliefs with the same truth values and epistemic statuses. It is 
easy to see that when multiple epistemic subjects are in their epistemic 
equilibrium, by definition, they must share their epistemic situation. I have 
shown thus far that once their epistemic situation is constrained to be 
topic-neutral, we and our zombie twins achieve an epistemic equilibrium. 
Then, we and our zombie twins must share their epistemic situation. In 
other words, when our epistemic situation is supposed to be phenomenally 
neutral, zombies must share our epistemic situation. This results from the 
constraint of topic-neutrality and the definition of zombies. If so, Premise 
(M3) is false, so that the master argument fails. 
The whole point of my argument boils down to thins: we and our 
zombie twins share every topic-neutral aspect by definition. Of course, there 
can be topic-neutrally construable properties other than those mentioned so 
far. Whatever such properties are, unless they are phenomenal, our zombie 
twins must share them with us. If so, once our epistemic situation is 
understood in topic-neutral terms, there cannot be difference between us and 
our zombie twins: once beliefs, truth making, and epistemic statuses are 
construed in topic-neutral language, everything of our epistemic situation is 
explicable by our topic-neutral aspects. And our zombie twins share all 
topic-neutral aspects with us. Therefore, epistemically, they must have what 
we have, and we must have what they have. They cannot have what we do 
not have, and we cannot have what they do not have. The epistemic 
equilibrium between us and our zombie twins goes both ways.
Under the constraint of topic-neutrality, our epistemic situation is 
phenomenally ‘neutralized’. Once our epistemic situation is phenomenally 
neutralized, one would not be able to find any difference between the 
epistemic situation of us and that of our zombie twins. Indeed, the only 
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thing that makes epistemic differences between us and zombies is 
phenomenal consciousness and phenomenal beliefs. When they are 
neutralized by the constraint of topic-neutrality, both our epistemic situation 
and our zombie twins’ epistemic situation will only contain 
quasi-phenomenal beliefs. Then, there will be no reason for zombies not to 
share our epistemic situation. Rather, our zombie twins must share our 
epistemic situation by their definition. Under the constraint of 
topic-neutrality, we and our zombie twins become not only physically but 
also epistemically doppelgangers. All our quasi-phenomenal beliefs and 
zombies’ quasi-phenomenal beliefs should perfectly mirror each other. In 
phenomenally neutral situations, we epistemically become zombies and 
zombies epistemically become us. This is the whole point of epistemic 
equilibrium.      
What about the two reasons for (M3)? As Chalmers points out, it is 
strongly intuitive that zombies have wrong or at least less justified beliefs 
about themselves than our beliefs. Also, unlike Mary, Zombie Mary appears 
not to gain any knowledge even when she gets out of the room. Though 
she might gain a certain new belief, there is a strong intuition that such 
belief is different from Mary’s knowledge both in justification and cognitive 
significance. Given the intuition, it seems that we and our zombie twins 
cannot reach any epistemic equilibrium. 
Although these intuitions seem strong at first glance, if one reminds that 
epistemic situation must be characterized in topic-neutral terms, I think the 
intuitions in question will disappear or at least lose its force. The intuition 
results from ignoring the phenomenally neutral nature of epistemic situation. 
Why do we easily think that zombies do not have true beliefs that we have 
or Zombie Mary does not gain knowledge that Mary gains? What is the 
source of such strong intuition? The only reason I can think of is that we 
implicitly suppose that Mary’s epistemic situation is not phenomenally 
125
neutral. In other words, we unwittingly ignore the fact that our epistemic 
situation must be cast in topic-neutral terms. If our epistemic situation is not 
restricted to quasi-phenomenal concepts and beliefs, implicitly or explicitly, 
phenomenal concepts and beliefs which require the presence of non-physical 
phenomenal properties will be presupposed. This is tantamount to presuppose 
non-physical phenomenal properties. Then, one cannot help but think that we 
and our zombie twins or Mary and Zombie Mary are epistemically unequal. 
It is quite natural to believe that zombies falsely believe that they are 
conscious while we rightly believe that we are conscious. It is even 
inevitable that Mary gains a certain justified and cognitively significant 
knowledge but Zombie Mary does not. Once the constraint of 
topic-neutrality is restored, however, the initially strong intuition seems to 
stop being appealing and even disappear. We cannot have true phenomenal 
beliefs that correspond to our zombie twins’ false beliefs. Mary cannot 
acquire a new, justified, and cognitively significant knowledge that Zombie 
Mary do not have.
It is worth noting that under the constraint of topic-neutrality, the newly 
acquired knowledge of Mary cannot be the one that is usually thought of. 
When we imagine what Mary would know when she gets out of the 
achromatic room, we naturally think that Mary gains a piece of new 
knowledge about a phenomenal redness of the ripe tomato. Further, some 
might think that such knowledge is justified by seeing the phenomenal 
redness. The constraint of topic-neutrality, however, undercuts these thought 
processes. Whatever it is, everything Mary can acquire when she is released 
must be quasi-phenomenal knowledge. And there is no reason for Zombie 
Mary not to share Mary’s quasi-phenomenal knowledge.
The observation thus far reveals that Chalmers commits the fallacy of 
equivocation. From the start, Chalmers explicitly emphasizes that our 
epistemic situation must be conceptualized in topic-neutral terms and not to 
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build in non-physical properties or phenomenal concepts. But when he is 
wanting to force us to think that our zombie twins do not share our 
epistemic situation, he implicitly assumes that our epistemic situation must 
be understood under phenomenal characterization. That is, Chalmers is 
illicitly violating the rule of topic-neutrality. He is unwittingly changing a 
topic-neutral understanding of our epistemic situation with a phenomenal 
understanding in an attempt to argue that our zombie twins do not share 
our epistemic situation. Due to the constraint of topic-neutrality, our 
epistemic situation must not involve anything phenomenal. However, we can 
understand why our zombie twins do not share our epistemic situation only 
if we already assume that our epistemic situation must involve something 
phenomenal. Without equivocation, Chalmers cannot make these two claims 
at the same time. A topic-neutral understanding applies to both of us and 
our zombie twins. Saying that our zombie twins do not obtain cognitively 
significant knowledge because they lack phenomenal consciousness is to 
forget the fact that such cognitive significant knowledge is supposed to be 
construe without invoking phenomenal consciousness. Ergo, as far as our 
epistemic situation and our zombie twins’ epistemic situation are understood 
fully or exhaustively in topic-neutral terms, there cannot be any difference 
between us and our zombie twins. In other word, they reach a perfect 
epistemic equilibrium.
This diagnosis helps us to deal with Chalmers’ response to the claim that 
our zombie twins share our epistemic situation. Responding possible and 
actual reactions to the master argument, Chalmers writes 
This proposal might be developed in two different ways: either by deflating 
the phenomenal knowledge of conscious beings or by inflating the 
corresponding knowledge of zombies. That is, a proponent may argue either 
that Mary gains less new knowledge than I suggested earlier or that Zombie 
Mary gains more new knowledge than I suggested earlier. Earlier, I argued 
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that Mary gains new cognitively significant non-indexical knowledge, 
whereas Zombie Mary does not. The deflationary strategy proposes that 
Mary gains no such knowledge; the inflationary strategy proposes that 
Zombie Mary gains such knowledge, too. (Chalmers, 2010, p. 327)
Chalmers rejects both ways in that neither the deflationary nor the 
inflationary strategy can succeed. To the deflationary strategy, he argues that 
if we deflate Mary’s epistemic progress, then we are committed to holding 
that what Mary learns when she sees red for the first time is just an 
indexical knowledge. (Chalmers, 2010, p. 327-329) But this is implausible. It 
is widely held that there is more than the mere indexical knowledge in 
Mary’s epistemic progress. On the other hand, if one inflates Zombie 
Mary’s epistemic progress, then one is committed to holding that as Mary 
acquires cognitively significant phenomenal knowledge, Zombie Mary acquire 
analogous cognitively significant knowledge. Chalmers rightly points out that 
this is not what happens when we conceive zombies. When we imaginarily 
subtract phenomenal consciousness from ourselves, we do not put something 
instead to where our phenomenal consciousness has been. We just take our 
phenomenal consciousness away, so that our zombie twins’ inner life should 
be poorer than ours. Even if it is conceivable that our zombie twins have 
something analogous to our phenomenal consciousness, it is still conceivable 
that they do not. Then, PCS still in trouble, since even if our zombie twins 
have C, it cannot reductively explain their analogous cognitively significant 
knowledge. There arises another epistemic gap between our zombie twins’ C 
and their analogous cognitive significant knowledge. 
  I will not delve into details of Chalmers’ responses because they are 
irrelevant to my argument. The problem of his objection is that it relies on 
the same intuition I have already dissolved: there is or can be a difference 
between our epistemic situation and our zombie twins’ epistemic situation. 
In dealing with the case of Mary and Zombie Mary, I noticed that while 
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the intuition seems strong at first glance, its force would be weakened or 
even neutralized when one bears in mind the constraint of topic-neutrality. 
Due to the constraint, both Mary and Zombie Mary cannot keep their 
epistemic situation topic-neutral without sharing it with her counterparts. 
They must reach epistemic equilibrium. Arguing for their epistemic 
equilibrium, I make no claims about the amount of knowledge that Mary 
and Zombie Mary gains when they exit the black-and-white room. My 
argument only involves the language characterizing their epistemic situations. 
It is also worth noting that my argument does not preclude that Mary 
acquires cognitively significant non-indexical knowledge when she exits her 
room. Mary acquires such knowledge. In this sense, my argument is not 
deflationary. Instead, all that I argue is conditional: when epistemic 
situations are characterized in topic-neutral terms, if Mary gains such 
cognitively significant knowledge, it must be shared by Zombie Mary. 
Further, I am not arguing that Zombie Mary acquires a certain cognitively 
significant non-indexical knowledge after seeing red. Thus, I am not 
committed to the inflationary strategy either. What I have to argue is that 
under the topic-neutral understanding of epistemic situations, if Zombie Mary 
does not acquire some cognitive significant non-indexical knowledge, Mary 
would not acquire such knowledge too. Therefore, my argument for 
epistemic equilibrium is neither inflationary nor deflationary. If epistemic 
situations assumed to be given an appropriate characterization in topic-neutral 
terms, then there is really no need to deflate Mary’s knowledge or inflate 
Zombie Mary’s knowledge. Thus my argument is not susceptible to 
Chalmers’ criticisms against the deflationary and inflationary strategy. I see 
no need to deflate what Mary would know, or inflate what Zombie Mary 
would know. I simply claim that under the topic-neutral understanding of 
their epistemic situations, there cannot be any gap to be bridged by 
deflation or inflation of knowledge. I think this is a virtue of my argument. 
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Last, one might ask whether Chalmers can argue that our zombie twins 
do not share our epistemic situation and hold that our epistemic situation 
can be fully or exhaustively understood in topic-neutral terms. I do not see 
how this is even possible. Ex hypothesi, the only difference between us and 
our zombie twins is the fact that we do have phenomenal consciousness 
while our zombie twins do not. This means that their epistemic situations 
can differ is only if a full characterization of epistemic situations involves 
phenomenal consciousness. By assumption, however, this is simply 
impossible as far as the constraint of topic-neutrality holds. Under the 
topic-neutral characterization of epistemic situations, one cannot argue that 
our epistemic situations differ from our zombie twins, and vice versa. As a 
result, there can be no difference between our epistemic situation and that 
of our zombie twins. Unless Chalmers gives up the constraint of 
topic-neutrality, he cannot insist that zombies do not share our epistemic 
situation.
To conclude, PCS does not lose its explanatory potential. If we and our 
zombie twins share their full epistemic situation, by the epistemic 
equilibrium, PCS can physically account for our epistemic situation. 
Therefore, type-B materialists can hold the second horn of the master 
argument. 
4.3 The Anti-Master Argument 
Given the arguments so far, now I provide an argument against the master 
argument. The argument can be formalized as follows:
(A1) If our epistemic situation is not cast in topic-neutral terms, the master 
argument begs the question of whether PCS can explain our epistemic 
situation.    
(A2) If our epistemic situation is cast in topic-neutral terms, the master 
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argument fails to show that PCS cannot explain our epistemic situation. 
__________________________________________________________________
(A3) Therefore, either the master argument begs the question of whether 
PCS can explain our epistemic situation, or it fails to show that PCS is 
doomed to fail.  
The argument has the form of a dilemma and seems valid. Each premise 
constitutes one of its horns. If both premises are successfully defended, the 
anti-master argument will undermine the master argument. Accordingly, PCS 
would be safe from the master argument and still be worth to pursue. 
Premise (A1) is the first horn of the dilemma. It says that if our 
epistemic situation is not constrained to be topic-neutral, the master 
argument begs the question of whether PCS can explain our epistemic 
situation. If our epistemic situation allows phenomenal beliefs that 
referentially, causally, or inferentially require non-physical phenomenal 
properties, our epistemic situation itself builds in claims of the presence of 
non-physical phenomenal properties. If so, there is no way for PCS to 
explain our epistemic situation. PCS is originally designed for type-B 
materialism to explain our epistemic situation without appealing to any 
non-physical phenomenal properties. Insofar as PCS denies phenomenal 
properties as such, it cannot explain our epistemic situation including 
phenomenal beliefs. In this sense, once our epistemic situation is not cast in 
topic-neutral terms, the master argument begs the question against PCS: it 
must presuppose the failure of PCS in explaining our epistemic situation.
Premise (A2) is the second horn. Under the topic-neutrality, the master 
argument cannot go through. I have argued in the previous section that 
there is no epistemic difference between us and our zombie twins. There are 
doxastic, veridical, and epistemic symmetries between us and zombies. By 
this threefold symmetry, we and zombies reach an epistemic equilibrium. 
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This equilibrium implies that we and zombies perfectly share every 
component of their epistemic situations. Zombies’ sharing of our epistemic 
situation directly falsifies the central premise of the master argument, namely 
(M3). Therefore, if our epistemic situation is constrained to be phenomenally 
neutral, the master argument fails to show PCS can explain our epistemic 
situation, as one of its premises turns out to be wrong. 
Overall, Chalmers’ master argument fails. The master argument is a 
dilemma for all possible forms of PCS. Nonetheless, if my argument in this 
section is on the right track, the table would be turned. It is the master 
argument that faces a dilemma from the constraint of topic-neutrality on our 
epistemic situation. On the one hand, if our epistemic situation is not 
characterized topic-neutrally, Chalmers must presuppose the phenomenal 
concepts or beliefs that necessarily refer to non-physical phenomenal 
properties. Since PCS only admits physical properties and denies 
non-physical properties, this begs the question against PCS. On the other 
hand, if our epistemic situation is characterized topic-neutrality, PCS can 
explain our epistemic situation and type-B materialists can hold the second 
horn of the dilemma. In one way or another, the master argument against 
PCS cannot succeed. Therefore, type-B materialists still can have the third 
way to reply to the zombie argument.  
4.4 Conclusion
From Chapter 1 to 4, I have examined the central notions and premises of 
the argument. If they are successful, all the works in those chapters will 
lead to a fourfold argument against the zombie argument: 1) the zombie 
argument is based on the problematic notion of conceivability. 2) Even if 
the notion of conceivability is accepted, the first premise of the zombie 
argument, the conceivability of zombies, is wrong. 3) Even if the first 
premise of the zombie argument is right, the second premise, namely CP+, 
132
is wrong. 4) Even if the second premise is right, it does not guarantee that 
zombies are metaphysically possible. Therefore, the zombie argument fails. 
First, the notion of conceivability supposed by the zombie argument is 
problematic. The zombie argument supposes that zombies are ideally, 
positively, and primarily conceivable. In Chapter 1, I have shown that ideal 
conceivability is problematic in that its two possible formulations face their 
own problems. Positive conceivability is questionable in that it is too 
intuition-sensitive. Knowing whether zombies are positively conceivable 
requires a complete theory of qualia, which is not given yet. As the notion 
of conceivability plays essential roles in the zombie argument, these 
problems shake the argument to its ground. The zombie argument may not 
be able to get off the ground. 
Second, even if the notion of conceivability is clarified and well 
defended, the first premise of the zombie argument is false. Zombies are not 
ideally positively primarily conceivable. All the sections in Chapter 2 cover 
my long and hard reductio against the conceivability of zombies. The real 
consequence of the conceivability of zombies is the disjunction of Qualia 
epiphenomenalism, Russellian monism, and interactionist dualism. I have 
argued that all of the disjuncts are wrong, as they necessarily commit to the 
negative conceivability of negatively inconceivable scenarios. So qualia 
epiphenomenalism, Russellian monism, and interactionist dualism are wrong. 
Therefore, the conceivability of zombies is wrong.
Third, even if the first premise of the zombie argument is true, the 
second premise is false. That is, even if zombies are conceivable, they are 
not primarily possible. The second premise is justified by CP+. In Section 
3.2.2, I have provided the Russellian illuminati argument against CP+. The 
Russellian illuminati argument is a reductio against CP+. It draws a 
contradictory conclusion that Russellian zombies are secondarily 
(metaphysically) possible and impossible. This yields a paradoxical result 
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that if CP+ is right, it is wrong. If my Russellian version of anti-zombie 
argument is sound, CP+ would be self-defeating. In other words, ideal 
positive primary conceivability cannot be a guide to primary possibility. If 
so, even if zombies are ideally positively primarily conceivable, there is no 
guarantee that they are primarily possible.      
Finally, even if the second premise of the zombie argument is right, 
zombies can be metaphysically impossible. In Section 4.2.1, I have argued 
that PCS can be the third way for physicalists to argue against the zombie 
argument. According to Chalmers’ master argument, however, as far as 
phenomenal concepts are physically explainable, they cannot explain our 
epistemic situation. I have argued that the constraint of topic-neutrality, both 
we and our zombie twins share their epistemic situation. Since PCS can 
explain our zombie twins’ epistemic situation, it can explain our epistemic 
situation either. Thus, the master argument fails.
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국문초록
  본 논문의 목적은 철학자 데이비드 차머스에 의해 개발된 좀비
논변을 재검토하는 것이다. 좀비 논변은 물리주의에 반대하는 상
상가능성 논증으로 알려져 있다. 논변은 우리와 물리적으론 동일
하지만 우리 경험의 현상적 느낌, 또는 감각질을 결여한 존재의
상상가능성을 주장하면서 시작한다. 차머스는 좀비의 상상가능성
으로부터 그것의 가능성을 끌어낸다. 좀비가 가능하다면 감각질은
물리적 사실들에 수반하지 않는다. 물리주의가 심신 수반을 함축
한다는 것은 널리 수용되고 있기에, 좀비의 가능성은 모든 가능한
형태의 물리주의를 논박하게 된다. 그 크나큰 함축으로 인해, 좀비
논변은 의식의 본성과 물리주의에 대한 격렬한 논쟁을 불러일으켰
다. 실로 그것이 처음 제시된 이후로 좀비 논변은 논쟁적이기를
그친 적이 없다. 좀비 논변에는 의미론, 형이상학, 인식론과 관련
된 까다로운 문제들이 뒤얽혀있다. 본 논문에서, 나는 좀비 논변의
핵심 개념들과 전제들을 비판적으로 검토하고 관련된 문제들을 탐
색해 볼 것이다.
  본고는 4장으로 구성된다. 1장은 좀비 논변에서 사용되는 상상
가능성 개념을 다룬다. 좀비 논변에서 상정된 상상가능성 개념은
문제적이다. 좀비의 상상가능성과 관련하여 차머스는 몇 가지 구
분을 제시한다: 일견적/이상적, 적극적/소극적, 일차적/이차적 상상
가능성이 그것이다. 이상적 상상가능성의 개념이 문제적인 것으로
밝혀진다. 그것이 잘 작동할지 의심스럽기 때문이다. 좀비의 적극
적 상상가능성 또한 의심스럽다. 그것은 지나치게 직관에 민감하
고 또한 감각질에 대한 완전한 이론을 요구하는데, 그런 이론은
아직 주어지지 않았다. 만약 상상가능성의 개념이 문제적이라면
좀비 논변은 시작조차 할 수 없게 된다.
147
  2장은 좀비 논변의 첫 번째 전제, 즉 좀비의 이상적 적극적 일
차적 상상가능성에 대한 나의 귀류 논변을 다룬다. 좀비의 상상가
능성은 감각질 부수현상론, 러셀일원론, 그리고 상호작용론적 이원
론의 선언을 함축한다. 이 모든 선언지들이 틀렸음을 보이기 위해, 
나는 감각질의 인지적 친밀성을 논증했다: 의식적 경험의 현상적
질은 훼손되지 않은 배경조건 하에서, 경험의 주체에 의해 반드시
잠재적으로 주의를 받거나 알아차려질 수 있어야만 한다. 인지적
친밀성은 선험적으로 참이며, 따라서 인지적으로 친밀하지 않은, 
소외된 감각질이란 소극적으로조차 상상불가능하다. 그러나 모든
선언지들은 인지적으로 소외된 감각질의 소극적 상상가능성에 개
입한다. 귀류에 의해, 좀비는 이상적 적극적 일차적으로 상상불가
능해진다. 만약 이러한 귀류논변이 통한다면, 설사 이상적 적극적
일차적 상상가능성 개념이 옹호될 수 있더라도, 좀비 논변의 첫째
전제는 거짓이 된다.
  3장에서는 좀비 논변의 두 번째 전제가 검토된다. 두 번째 전제
는 이상적 적극적 일차적 상상가능성은 일차적 상상가능성을 함축
한다는 원리(CP+)의 한 적용이다. CP+에 맞서, 몇몇 철학자들은
좀비 논변을 패러디하려 했다. 그러나 이러한 반-좀비 논변들은 그
들 나름의 문제가 있다. 러셀 일루미나티 논변은 내 버전의 반-좀
비 논변으로 그러한 문제들을 피할 수 있다. 러셀 일루미나티 논
변은 CP+를 전제하고 그로부터 모순을 끌어낸다. 만약 이 논변이
건전하다면, 이상적 적극적 일차적 상상가능성은 일차적 가능성에
대한 가이드가 될 수 없을 것이다. 따라서, 설사 좀비가 이상적 일
차적 적극적으로 상상가능하더라도, 그것이 일차적으로 가능하리
라는 보장은 없다. 좀비 논변의 첫째 전제가 참이라도, 두 번째 전
제는 거짓인 것이다.
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  4장은 좀비 논변에 대한 물리주의자들이 또다른 대응, 현상적
개념 전략(PCS)을 다룬다. 어떤 철학자들은 현상적 개념의 특수한
본성에 호소하면서 설명적 간극이나 좀비의 상상가능성 등을 포함
한, 의식과 관련된 우리의 문제적인 인식적 상황들을 설명해치워
버리려 시도한 바 있다. PCS에 의존하여, 물리주의자들은 좀비 논
변의 핵심 전제들을 받아들이면서도 그 결론은 부정할 수 있다. 
그러나 차머스의 만능 논변에 따르면, 현상적 개념이 물리적으로
해명가능한 한 그것은 우리의 인식적 상황을 설명할 수 없다. 만
능 논변에 맞서, 나는 인식적 상황이 주제-중립적 용어에 의해 특
성화되어야 하는 한 PCS는 그 설명적 잠재력을 유지할 수 있음을
논증했다. 그러므로 만능 논변은 실패하며 오히려 그 나름의 딜레
마에 봉착하게 된다. PCS는 여전히 물리주의자들에게 살아있는 선
택지인 것이다. 즉 설사 좀비 논변의 첫째 전제와 둘째 전제가 옳
다고 하더라도, 물리주의자들에게는 좀비 논변을 거부할 수 있는
‘제3의 길’이 있는 셈이다. 
  만약 본고에서 제시된 논변들이 성공적이라면, 그 모든 작업들
은 좀비 논변에 대한 4중의 비판으로 귀결될 것이다: 1) 좀비 논변
은 상상가능성에 대한 문제적인 개념에 기반을 두고 있다. 2) 설사
상상가능성의 개념이 수용되더라도, 좀비 논변의 첫째 전제, 즉 좀
비의 상상가능성은 틀렸다. 3) 설사 좀비 논변의 첫째 전제가 옳다
고 하더라도, 둘째 전제가 틀렸다. 4) 설사 첫째와 둘째 전제가 모
두 옳다고 해도, 이것이 좀비가 형이상학적으로 가능하다는 것을
보장해주진 않는다. 따라서, 좀비 논변은 실패한다.
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